


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
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To Lieut-General J. T. Dickman,
whose most-loyal and dis-
tinguished services as Division
and Corps commander during the
active operations of the American
Expeditionary Forces in the World War,
and later as Commander of the Ameri-
can Forces on the Rhine, added luster
to American arms deserving of the
highest praise, from his comrade
and lifelong friend.

Sept 12 }
1924 }

John J. Pershing

REPORT OF THE
FIRST ARMY
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

ORGANIZATION
AND
OPERATIONS

GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING
August 10, 1918, to October 15, 1918

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HUNTER LIGGETT
October 16, 1918, to April 20, 1919

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
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
Report of General John J. Pershing, August 10 to October 15, 1918.

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First Section

REPORT OF
GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING
U. S. ARMY

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

August 10, 1918, to October 15, 1918

Introduction

Resume of Operations

1. The organization and operations of the First Army, A.E.F., covered the period from August 10, 1918 (date of initial organization) to April 20, 1919. The army was under my personal command from August 10 to October 15, 1918, and under the command of Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett from October 16, 1918, to April 20, 1919. In order to furnish a complete account, my report and that of General Liggett have been combined in one document presenting a continuous narrative.

2. The history of the First Army, taken from the records on file at First Army Headquarters, may be epitomized as follows:

(a) Army Headquarters was organized by August 10, 1918, at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. Command of the American divisions on the Vesle (August 10, 1918) was taken over from the Sixth French Army, but it was immediately returned to that army.

(b) Between August 10th and 16th, preparatory to the St. Mihiel operation, army headquarters was moved to Neufchateau, where the organization of army headquarters was rounded out, the army was gathered into higher commands, and plans for the St. Mihiel operation were completed.

(c) On August 28th, army headquarters (1st echelon) moved to Ligny-en-Barrois, from which place the St. Mihiel operation was directed.

(d) On August 30th, the First Army took over from the Second and Eighth French Armies the command of that part of the front extending from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle River, to Watronville, north of Les Eparges.

(e) On September 3d, information was received that the First Army was to undertake the Meuse-Argonne offensive. Plans for St. Mihiel were modified and those for the Meuse-Argonne battle were prepared.

INTRODUCTION

(f) On September 12th, the St. Mihiel attack started. On September 13th, all objectives were reached and by September 15th the operation was completed.

(g) On September 16th, the concentration of the large forces for the Meuse-Argonne offensive was well under way, including the movements from the St. Mihiel front.

(h) On September 21st army headquarters moved to Souilly, from which place the Meuse-Argonne offensive was directed.

(i) On September 22d, the First Army took over the command from the Second French Army of the front from Watronville to the Argonne inclusive. This arrangement placed the front from Port-sur-Seille to the Argonne inclusive, under the commander of the First Army.

(j) On September 24th, the concentration for the Meuse-Argonne offensive was completed. The attack was started on September 26th.

(k) From September 26th, the First Army attacked continuously except for a few rest and resupply days, until the signing of the Armistice, November 11, 1918. On October 12th, Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett was assigned as Commander of the First Army. He assumed command on October 16th.

3. The St. Mihiel operation was carried out expeditiously and exactly as planned, the enemy losing heavily in men and guns. All objectives were carried within forty-eight hours, and our losses were less than our captures. Aside from the defeat and losses inflicted on the enemy the St. Mihiel attack accomplished the following:

(a) Opened the Paris-Nancy and Verdun railroad.

(b) Deprived the enemy of the excellent observation points on the Cotes de Meuse.

(c) Lessened the chances of a hostile counter attack against our flank during the Meuse-Argonne.

(d) So threatened Metz and the Briey Basin that the enemy was misled as to our future intentions.

The foregoing achievements were essential to, or at least greatly enhanced, our chances of success in the Meuse-Argonne offensive. In addition to the tactical advantages stated above, the success of the St. Mihiel operation had

INTRODUCTION

a marked psychological effect upon the enemy and the Allies.

4. The continuous attacks delivered by the First Army from September 26th to October 31st; the advances on November 1st, 2nd and 3rd; the crossing of the Meuse, south of Dun-sur-Meuse, on November 5th; and the advance to the east immediately thereafter, placed the First Army in an excellent position for future operations, which were rendered unnecessary by the signing of the Armistice.

5. In the short period of three months (August 10 to November 11, 1918) the First Army was organized and carried through to successful completion two difficult major operations.

6. The report of the army's organization and operations is arranged under the following sub-divisions:

FIRST SECTION:

Report of General John J. Pershing, August 10, to October 15, 1918.

- | | |
|--------------|---|
| PART I. | —ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRST ARMY. |
| PART II. | —EVENTS PRELIMINARY TO OPERATIONS. |
| PART III. | —ST. MIHIEL OPERATION. |
| PART IV. (a) | —MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE—September 26, to October 15, 1918. |

SECOND SECTION:

Report of Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett—October 16, 1918, to April 20, 1919.

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| PART IV. (b) | —MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE—October 16, 1918, to the Armistice. |
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| PART VI. | —SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. |
| PART VII.* | —SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS. |
| PART VIII.* | —DAILY SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE. |
| PART IX.* | —FILE OF FIRST ARMY FIELD ORDERS. |

7. The detailed reports of the staff sections, services and departments, the reports of corps and division commanders, and all correspondence and original documents are filed with the records of G-3, Headquarters, First Army.

*Not printed.

PART I

Organization of the First Army

1. From the time of our arrival in France, it had been planned to expedite the training of our combat units, and to develop rapidly our corps and other staffs with a view to the organization of an American army under American command at the earliest possible moment. In the spring of 1918, the extreme emergency in which the Allies found themselves made immediate aid necessary, and it became evident that the organization of our army would be delayed. The situation had become so critical that it was necessary to give special preference to the shipment of infantry and machine gun units, which would leave us short of corps and army troops, such as artillery, engineers, pioneers, and supply trains, which were required to complete corps and army organizations. As our units became available, they were sent to different parts of the western front, for immediate service with the French or British armies.

By August 1, 1918, sixteen (16) American divisions and several non-divisional organizations had already been engaged with the enemy. Our I Army Corps (Major General Hunter Liggett) had entered the battle and exercised command over three of our divisions successively and over one French division. Four other corps headquarters and an army artillery headquarters had partially completed their organization, but had not operated in combat. A supply section with the I Army Corps on the Vesle was the only part of an army staff actually in operation at this time.

The concentration of our combat troops, scattered from the North Sea to the Swiss border, the rapid preparation of newly-arrived organizations for active participation in battle, the assembly of auxiliary and supply units, and, especially, the organization of corps and army staffs, all during the progress of operations, constituted a tremendous task.

Between August 1st and September 30th, approximately one million men in scattered units were concentrated, organized for combat under our own command and launched in two successful major operations. Within this limited period, especially in preparation for the St. Mihiel offensive of September 12th, the First Army grew by leaps and bounds through the constant accession not only of our own new units and replacements, but of French combatant and special troops as well.

2. As Chief of Staff, First Army, Brigadier General Hugh A. Drum, G. S., was selected on July 4, 1918, and given instructions to begin the organization of the headquarters staff. With the existing supply section and the partially formed army artillery headquarters as a nucleus, the necessary staff officers, clerks, orderlies, etc., were at once detailed and the headquarters built up and organized with a minimum of delay.

Army Headquarters was first to be located at Coulommiers in the Chateau-Thierry region, but the rapid advance of the Allied armies north of the Marne in July and during the first week of August necessitated its establishment at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre.

3. The initial organization of Army Headquarters was announced in General Orders No. 120, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, 1918, as follows:

G.H.Q.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

GENERAL ORDERS }
No. 120. }

FRANCE, *July 24, 1918.*

I. In accordance with authority contained in War Department Cablegram (No. 743), the First Army, A.E.F., is organized as indicated hereinafter, to take effect August 10, 1918.

II. The First Army, A.E.F., will consist of the following organizations:

A.—HEADQUARTERS.

Station—La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Department of Seine-et-Marne, France.

Commander—Gen. John J. Pershing, U.S. Army.

General Staff

Chief of Staff—Lieutenant Colonel Hugh A. Drum, G.S.
 Asst. Chief of Staff, G-1—Lieutenant Colonel Jens Bugge, G.S.
 Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2—Lieutenant Colonel Willey Howell, G.S.
 Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3—Colonel Robert McCleave, G.S.
 Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4—Lieutenant Colonel John L. DeWitt, G.S.
 Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5—Lieutenant Colonel Lewis H. Watkins, G.S.

Chief of Artillery—Major General Edward F. McGlachlin, N.A.

Administrative and Technical Services.

Adjutant General—Col. Joseph F. Barnes, A.G.D.
 Inspector General—Col. Jacob C. Johnson, I.G.D.
 Judge Advocate—Lieutenant Colonel Blanton Winship, J.A.
 Chief Quartermaster—Major George Luberoff, Q. M.R.C.
 Chief Surgeon—Colonel Alexander N. Stark, M.C.
 Chief Engineer—Brigadier General Jay J. Morrow, N.A.
 Chief Signal Officer—Lieutenant Colonel Parker Hitt, S.C.
 Chief Ordnance Officer—Colonel Edward P. O'Hern, Ordnance Dept., N.A.
 Chief of Air Service—Colonel William Mitchell, S.C.
 Chief of Motor Transport Corps—Colonel William H. Winters, Q.M.C.
 Chief of Chemical Warfare Service—(To be designated later).
 Chief of Tank Corps—(To be designated later).
 Provost Marshal—(To be designated later).

Headquarters Troop—Major Edward C. McGuire, 3d Cavalry.

Such assistants as may be necessary will be designated in orders of the First Army.

B.—TROOPS AND SERVICES

Such troops and services as may be designated by confidential instructions of these headquarters.

III. The staff officers mentioned in Sec. II above and such assistants as may be authorized by the Army Commander will proceed to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre for station in time to take over their duties on the date indicated above. The travel directed is necessary in the military service.

IV. The provisions of Sec. III, G.O. No. 65, current series, these headquarters, are so amended as to designate the Fourth Section (G-4), General Staff, referred to therein, as G-4, Second Army.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL PERSHING:

JAMES W. McANDREW,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Adjutant General.

On July 31st, in General Orders No. 1, command of the First Army was assumed by me, and the staff was announced.

A staff based on an army of about 200,000 men was primarily provided, but as the army grew, the strength of the staff naturally became greater than that provided in our original tables, totalling during the Meuse-Argonne offensive about 600 officers and 1500 field clerks and specially detailed soldiers. The initial organization and assignments remained unchanged throughout the operations. General Orders, First Army, issued early in August, set forth in considerable detail the assignment of staff duties, and materially aided the early creation of an efficient staff team that insured effective coordination between the different services. The problems of such a staff are too complicated to be directed and coordinated in all details by either the army commander or his chief of staff, but centralization in control and decentralization and coordination in execution were accomplished by grouping the staff services and departments under assistant chiefs of staff, who were given the authority and held to the responsibility of working out details and issuing necessary directions.

4. The general plan of army staff organization under the chief of staff, was as follows:

(a) To assist the chief of staff in his manifold duties and afford him opportunity to study tactical questions, a deputy chief of staff was appointed who was at first concerned with administration only, but who later had centralized under him problems of supply.

(b) Daily meetings of the heads of staff groups and the chief of staff were held during which the military situation was presented, instructions from the Army Commander regarding operations and administration and supply were announced, and coordination was outlined. These meetings eliminated correspondence, encouraged teamwork, and built up staff esprit de corps.

(c) By direct conference between the officers concerned and by circulating memoranda, the head of each staff section, service and department kept all other heads informed of the progress of his special task.

(d) A policy of direct communication and frequent personal association between the head of each general staff section of the army and the corresponding chief of section in lower units created an intimate understanding between the various echelons.

(e) The deputy chief of staff and assistant chiefs of staff were authorized to issue orders, in accordance with an announced policy or plan, in the name of the army commander, regarding all matters within the scope of their respective sections.

(f) In order to give mobility to the army headquarters, the staff was divided into two echelons, the first of which, being concerned directly with combat, was to accompany the headquarters, while the second, consisting of non-combatant services and departments, was located permanently in the rear to insure continuity in their work with consequent greater efficiency.

(g) Conferences on various subjects between the army commander and his corps commanders and their chiefs of staff were frequently held. Before each operation, the details of corps missions were carefully explained and discussed in conference.

5. Troops known as army troops comprise the following: Artillery, consisting of heavy, tractor-drawn and railroad types; anti-aircraft guns of various types; tanks; chemical warfare troops; aeronautical units consisting of combat, reconnaissance and bombing planes; hospitalization and hospitals, evacuation trains, and other hospital units; graves registration units; military police troops and prisoner of war escort units; replacement depot organizations; salvage units; signal corps troops comprising telegraph, telephone, radio and pigeon units; engineer troops consisting of standard gauge and light railroad, road, construction, water supply, electrical and mechanical, bridge, pioneer and searchlight; sound and flash ranging and camouflage troops; truck and wagon trains; depot and dump personnel for all departments; and other special units.

Succinctly, except artillery, air service, tank troops, and chemical warfare troops, army troops, with their allied technical services, may be classed as the skilled serv-

ices and laborers who insured the supply of food and ammunition, clothing, etc., and the communications and hospitalization of the fighting forces. They included a wide variety of trades known in civil life and were essential to the successful operations of the combat forces.

6. During the period between the organization of the First Army and the arrival at the front of large numbers of our special troops, which occurred after the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne battle, our shortage in army troops consisting of the larger part of the army artillery, the greater part of the air service, and a lesser proportion of the services of supply troops, was made up, as far as practicable, by French units placed at the disposal of the First Army. The French themselves lacked labor troops and were unable to meet our full requirements in this respect. As the campaign progressed, additional American units arrived and corresponding French units were released.

7. The control and efficient employment of this large force of mixed and constantly changing army troops presented many difficulties. The rapid development of the battle, after the entry of the American Army, afforded little time for deliberate preparations, and necessitated the employment of every means at hand without waiting to complete our organization. The successful handling of this provisional force of army special troops engaged in service behind the lines, comprises in itself a remarkable achievement.

8. An army corps headquarters with its corps troops is recognized and employed as a separate unit, divisions being temporarily assigned to meet the requirements of the varying phases of operations. The organization of army corps headquarters and army corps troops was regulated by General Headquarters, as far as possible in accordance with the tables of organization, but with the exception of the I Army Corps, none had received a full quota of special troops before the Armistice.

Two, and at one time three, French army corps were attached to and formed a part of the First Army command. In the Meuse-Argonne battle the offensive was driven at such high pressure that it was not possible to relieve any

American corps headquarters or corps troops for rest and refitting, the I Army Corps being employed almost continuously in line from July 4 to November 9, 1918.

9. The organization prescribed by the divisional tables of the American Expeditionary Forces was followed so far as the available personnel, equipment and material permitted, but there were many shortages in important elements. In the spring of 1918 the demand for American infantry and machine gunners required to meet the critical situation on the western front left several American divisions without their artillery, so that when these divisions entered the battle as a part of our army, many artillery brigades were still undergoing the final course in field firing. The assignment of French artillery to certain divisions and of American artillery brigades to divisions other than their own made it difficult to secure perfect teamwork between the infantry and the artillery.

During the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the frequent relief of divisions, coupled with the shortage of artillery and of animals, made it necessary practically to pool the divisional artillery, which often remained in action during the fighting tours of two successive divisions, while in some instances artillery brigades remained in the line continuously after once being engaged.

10. The experience of the First Army with replacements during the period of the Meuse-Argonne is instructive.

The basic A.E.F. plans contemplated a constant flow of replacements from America to arrive in France in sufficient time to undergo a short course of training before being employed at the front. Owing to the non-arrival of replacements in sufficient numbers, this policy had to be modified. In order to maintain our experienced divisions at efficient fighting strength it became necessary to break up newly arrived combat divisions, and compelled the employment in battle of many partially trained men. Even this drastic expedient did not suffice, and the situation grew so serious that the strength of infantry companies had to be reduced from 250 to 175 men.

11. The wide front held by our army, the scarcity and character of the roads, and the constantly changing progress

of the battle, created unusual demands on field transportation. We had only 28% of the authorized allowance of motor transportation (French aid raised this to 52%); and animals, at all times hard to obtain, were quickly used up in service. With each successful penetration of the enemy's lines, the increased length of haul and the resulting casualties caused a further shortage of animals. Due to lack of transportation, the 81st, 88th, and 7th Divisions could not be used in the advanced portion of the battle front.

12. Starting with 2% of requirements, our air units continued to arrive during the operations, rapidly improved, and with experience established teamwork between liaison planes and the other arms. Troops at the front usually expected greater local protection from the air service than its tactical employment and capabilities would permit.

13. A large number of tanks employed by the First Army were manned by French personnel, but the intimate liaison which must exist between the tanks and the infantry in battle was rendered difficult by the difference in language. No large tanks were ever available for employment on the First Army front.

14. For rosters of commanders, staff and organizations serving with the First Army, see appendices A, B, and D, herewith.

PART II

Events Preliminary to Operations

1. The violence of the German offensive in the spring of 1918, strained the Allies to the limit of their reserves, but fortunately American troops commenced to arrive in large and constantly increasing numbers. The vital need of fresh combat troops on every portion of the front threatened by German attacks necessitated the employment of our divisions here and there, often before they had completed their training, and frequently without their organic artillery. In the early part of July, 1918, our divisions were being employed in support of the British Army, in Allied strategic reserve near Beauvais, and also with the French, on the Chateau-Thierry front, on the Champagne front, in the Toul sector, in the sector east of Luneville, and in the Vosges. Newly arrived divisions were undergoing intensive training in the region around Chaumont. This wide dispersion, coupled with the lack of corps and army troops, materially delayed the early organization of an American combat army.

2. The basic plan of the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces had contemplated the organization of the first American army on the St. Mihiel front north of Toul. However, the situation created by the final German offensive on July 15th, 16th, and 17th, east and west of Rheims, and the successful counter offensive of July 18th, south of Soissons, brought together near Chateau-Thierry the I American Army Corps and several American divisions under the Sixth French Army and presented an immediate opportunity for the creation of American higher commands on that front.

The high morale and strong offensive spirit of the American divisions prompted their employment on the most active portion of the line. This, coupled with the concentration of American troops about Chateau-Thierry, deter-

mined the Commander-in-Chief on July 24th to organize the First American Army on that front without further delay. With army headquarters at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, arrangements were completed to relieve the Sixth French Army north of Chateau-Thierry on August 10th. At this time that army had command of the I and III American Army Corps with the 3d, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32d, 42d, and 77th American Divisions and four French divisions.

3. The transfer of command from the French to the American Army was complicated by the continuous battle then in progress and by the lack of a full complement of American corps and army troops. In addition, many difficult questions had to be decided such as territorial control, repair of railroads and bridges, exploitation of local resources, and provisioning of the population of the devastated regions. These questions were satisfactorily settled and the transfer completed by the morning of August 10th, except for the last formality of taking over actual command. But by this time, the Allied advance had halted on the Vesle River and it was decided to stabilize this front for the time being. Meanwhile came the decision for an operation to reduce the St. Mihiel salient. This caused a complete change of plan for the immediate employment of the First American Army, and definitely terminated the arrangements to take over the command of the Sixth French Army lines north of Chateau-Thierry.

4. The detailed study made at General Headquarters in September, 1917, as to the employment of our forces led to the final conclusion that our effort should be directed against the German railroad system north and east of the Meuse River and the ore deposits in the vicinity of Longwy and Metz, with the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient as a necessary preliminary operation. A glance at the map of this region will indicate the two main factors which prompted the above decision, viz:

(a) Development of the Meuse-Argonne operation on a large scale would be impracticable so long as the enemy controlled the Commercy-Nancy and St. Mihiel-Verdun railroads and retained his observation posts along the heights of the Meuse.

(b) The presence of the enemy within the St. Mihiel salient during an offensive directly west of the Meuse, or to the southeast of Metz would constitute a serious threat against the rear of our attacking army, as strong hostile counter attacks were always to be expected, and the proximity and importance of Metz made such reaction probable.

5. The strategic offensive plan of the Allies as agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief in conference with Marshal Foch on July 24th, involved the reduction of the various salients which interfered with the main railroad communications paralleling the front. The Chateau-Thierry salient had been reduced, and attacks on the Amiens salient were then in progress. Operations against the Ypres-Lys salient were to commence on August 19th, with the St. Mihiel salient as the last to be eliminated.

The final decision that the First Army would undertake the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient as its first operation was transmitted to Army Headquarters on August 10th, and the army staff immediately began the development of plans for the concentration of the necessary troops for its execution.

The St. Mihiel operation would be the first demonstration of the efficiency of the American Army in this war. The psychological effect on the enemy of our success as well as on our Allies, our own troops, and our people at home would be of great importance. The attack must not only succeed, but must develop exactly as planned and a serious hostile reaction must be made impossible.

6. The headquarters of the First Army were removed to Neufchateau between August 11th and 16th, and plans for the coming battle were prepared and completed. Neufchateau had been the center of American activity for many months and was a central point for operations on any portion of the front from St. Mihiel to the Swiss frontier. Its selection would keep the enemy in ignorance as to the exact sector we were to occupy. The special army troops assembled north of Chateau-Thierry were moved eastward during the same period.

7. The following corps and divisions were placed at the disposal of the First Army for the St. Mihiel operation:

I, IV and V Army Corps.

1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 26th, 33d, 35th, 42d, 78th, 80th, 82d, 89th, 90th and 91st Divisions—a total of three (3) corps headquarters and troops, and fifteen (15) combat divisions.

In addition, the II French Colonial Corps, comprising the 2d Dis-mounted Cavalry, and the 26th and the 39th Infantry Divisions, already in sector at the tip of the salient, was assigned to the First Army, as was later the 15th French Colonial Division.

Plate II shows the location of the army corps and divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces about the middle of August, at the time they were turned over to the control of the First Army.

The training of the divisions for the coming operation was directed by the Training Section of General Headquarters. The equipment of these units, their supply, and the handling of required replacements, were first undertaken by General Headquarters, but later devolved upon the First Army, as did the reception, equipment, and supply of thousands of corps and army troops arriving from the Services of Supply or directly from transports. This immense task of preparation and concentration was accomplished in less than four weeks.

8. The condition of the army corps and divisions at the time they were turned over to the First Army may be summarized as follows:

1st and 2d Divisions:

Excellent as to training, equipment, and morale. Had attacked July 18th in the Soissons drive and lost heavily. Sent to quiet sectors in the vicinity of the Moselle River to relieve fresh French divisions. Withdrawn two weeks before the St. Mihiel offensive to re-equip, train, and receive replacements.

3d, 4th, 26th, and 42d Divisions:

Fought in the defense about Chateau-Thierry and in the advance on the Ourcq and the Vesle Rivers, sustaining fairly heavy losses. Sent to training areas from two to three weeks before St. Mihiel to re-equip, train, and receive replacements.

89th and 90th Divisions:

Holding for first time front line sectors. Going through their sector training on the front between Toul and the Moselle River.

5th and 35th Divisions:

Same as 89th and 90th Divisions, except training sectors were in the Vosges. Difficult to withdraw them in time for the attack.

33d, 78th, 80th, and 82d Divisions:

Had been training in rear of the British front, one brigade of the 33d having had front line service with the British. The 82d Division had been in line north of Toul for sector training, and was now astride the Moselle River, having relieved the 2d Division.

91st Division:

Never in the front line; had less than four weeks' training and was short of transportation.

I, IV and V Corps Headquarters:

I Corps well organized and had operated for over one month in the Aisne-Marne defensive and offensive. IV and V Corps Headquarters only partially organized and had very few corps troops.

Except for one brigade of corps artillery and three or four air service squadrons, all of the American corps and army troops to be employed were at this time in their preliminary training period in France.

9. The front which included the southern face of the St. Mihiel salient was under General de Castelnau, commanding the Group of Armies of the East, with the Eighth French Army holding the southern face while the Second French Army, of the Group of Armies of the Center, General Hirschauer, commanding, held the western face. It was arranged to have the French Group of Armies of the East retain control of all matters relating to the population, rear services, and civil government. Many French services for supplying troops, such as laborers, road and railway troops, depot troops, etc., were to continue in the performance of their duties in this region, for the time being, as we did not have available the corresponding American units with which to replace them. It was also arranged that these special troops should function under the control of the First American Army until such time as they could be replaced by American troops, and that the French should continue to supply their own troops.

While the First American Army was given a distinct and independent mission, it was suggested by the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, as expedient that it should function under the nominal direction of General Petain, the French Commander-in-Chief, in order to assure coordination on the part of the French armies adjacent to the First Army and provide the French units needed at the outset for our rear services. To all intents and purposes the First Army was entirely independ-

ent of the French Command, all movements and operations being ordered by the commander of the First Army, as agreed upon.

10. On August 28th the first echelon of army headquarters moved to Ligny-en-Barrois, its command post for the battle.

At 4 P.M. August 30, 1918, the command of the front from Port-sur-Seille (east of the Moselle River) to Watronville (north of Les Eparges) passed from the Eighth and Second French Armies to the First American Army. At this time the front was held as follows:

- I U.S. Corps Hq. at Saizerais.
(82d and 90th Divisions.)
- IV U.S. Corps Hq. at Toul.
(89th Division.)
- II C.A.C. (French Colonial Corps) Hq. at Ernecourt.
(26th and 39th French Divisions.)
- V U.S. Corps Hq. at Benoite Vaux.
(2d French Cavalry Division.)

In addition to the defensive lines along the front, the army took over command of the permanent frontier fortresses around Toul.

11. The heavy movement of American divisions towards Lorraine aroused speculation among the inhabitants as to the prospects for an American offensive in that region. While such an attack was logical and to be expected, it is probable also that the enemy gained some information regarding our concentration, which may have led him to think we were planning an attack on the St. Mihiel front. To counteract this probability the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, took advantage of the presence of several American divisions in the Vosges to deceive the enemy as to our intentions. An army corps commander with his staff was ordered to Belfort with instructions to establish an Army Headquarters at that place and to draft the plans and carry out the reconnaissances preparatory to an offensive operation towards Mulhouse. Offices were opened, staff reconnoitering parties were sent out and groups from American divisions were ordered to that front. Finally, a carbon copy of the orders directing these preliminary steps, was intentionally left in a hotel at Belfort

by a staff officer from General Headquarters, and it quickly disappeared. The success of this ruse was apparent as the Germans concentrated several divisions in reserve in that vicinity.

PART III

St. Mihiel Operation

1. The mission assigned the First Army in the initial instructions for the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient remained unchanged, but the more detailed instructions for the operation, the depth to which the attack was to be carried, and the troops and means to be employed, were modified from time to time. The original plan contemplated the full exploitation of the success, but the final decision reached by Marshal Foch, General Petain, and myself, in conference on September 2d, provided for clearing the salient only so far as necessary for the safety of a larger operation to be carried out immediately thereafter on the Meuse-Argonne front. The ultimate purpose of this second operation was to destroy the German army on that front and to cut the main line of communications south of the Ardennes.

2. In view of the importance of an early initiation of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the time in which to complete the St. Mihiel operation was very short, especially as many of the troops required for the latter must necessarily participate in the former. Indeed it was a question whether or not it would be practicable to undertake the St. Mihiel operation at this time. But the rail and road systems from St. Mihiel to Verdun were so essential to the supply of a large army operating immediately west of Verdun, and the salient would present such a constant threat to these communications, that the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces considered the elimination of the salient as a very necessary preliminary. It was therefore decided that the attack should be limited to a rapid, powerful blow against the St. Mihiel salient, without exploiting the successes gained. The orders already issued and the movements in the concentration of the divisions were modified accordingly, although there was not time to alter materially the order of battle already determined upon.

3. The theater of operations against the St. Mihiel salient covered the region between the Meuse and the Moselle Rivers. These watercourses, with their dominating heights and the Etang (pond) de Lachaussee, represented the framework of the terrain. The wooded heights of the Cotes de Meuse, extending north and south along the east bank of the Meuse, overlook the river valley. These heights are pierced by the valley of the Creue, running west from Vigneulles to Spada. East of the heights of the Meuse lies the broad plain of the Woivre, with its large forests and numerous small lakes and swampy areas. High wooded bluffs follow both banks of the Moselle River, and the deep ravines and heavy forest on the west bank offered particularly difficult terrain for offensive operations. Half-way between the Moselle river and the tip of the St. Mihiel salient, the battlefield was crossed by the Rupt de Mad, a stream of variable behavior, flowing in a northeastern direction through Thiaucourt and emptying into the Moselle river.

The principal forests in the plain of the Woivre are the Bois le Pretre, the Bois Mort Mare and the Bois de Vigneulles. The detached heights of Loupmont and Montsec and the steep eastern bluff of the Cotes de Meuse, served as excellent hostile observatories, from which practically every portion of the plain could be seen.

The railroad and road situation correspond to the characteristics of the terrain, that is, main rail lines and roads run along the river valleys, with subsidiaries passing through the heart of the salient, along the eastern slope of the Cotes de Meuse and through Thiaucourt.

The Woivre is seriously affected by wet and dry seasons, the former beginning about the middle of September. In the dry season, water supply is difficult, while during the rainy period, the country becomes flooded, rendering many of the roads impassable. It was therefore desirable that our advance should either be carried beyond the lowlands of the plain to the higher ground near Spincourt—Conflans—Chambley, or stopped west of the plain, along the Cotes de Meuse and the heights of the Rupt de Mad.

The bluffs along both banks of the Moselle River afford each other mutual support, and if it were desired to carry either side by an operation from the south, a simultaneous attack on the other would be necessary.

4. Plate III is a reprint of a map captured from the enemy shortly before the St. Mihiel attack, which furnished information of material importance in supplementing the data already available of the enemy's defensive plans.

At the time of the operation the enemy had occupied the salient for about four years, and during this period had strengthened its natural defensive features by elaborate field fortifications. Earlier in the war, heavy French attacks had been repulsed, especially in the region of Les Eparges, Apremont, and the Bois le Pretre.

The salient formed a bastion projecting from the main hostile defensive position (Hindenburg Line) with the positions and defensive zones indicated on the map referred to. The following defensive positions existed:

(a) A first position (Wilhelm Sector) which included the outpost system, except north of Les Eparges where it was withdrawn some distance into the plain, as the Allies held the dominating heights of the Cotes de Meuse in this region.

(b) An intermediate position to cover the forward artillery zone, about 2 kilometers in rear of the first position.

(c) A second position (Schroerer Sector) 4 to 8 kilometers in rear of the first position.

(d) A withdrawal position, or the "Hindenburg Line," extending across the base of the salient, just north of the Etang de Lachaussee.

(e) In addition, there were detached works from 4 to 6 kilometers in rear of the Hindenburg Line, which formed a second position for that line.

(f) Finally, in rear of the foregoing positions, were the permanent fortifications surrounding Metz and Thionville.

The first and intermediate positions were well organized, with a dense network of wire and numerous concrete dugouts and machine gun emplacements. The second position was also well protected with wire but had few trenches. The Hindenburg Line had not been entirely completed, but

contained a good system of wire entanglements and numerous concrete strongpoints. There were several switch lines connecting the various positions.

The possession by the Allies of the eastern edge of the Cotes de Meuse in the vicinity of Les Eparges and Watronville gave them an advantage in this region against which the enemy had endeavored to guard himself by the construction of switch trenches in the plain below. Farther south, along these same heights, the enemy possessed not only important observation stations, but also means for concealing large masses of artillery that could cover either the Woevre plain or the valley of the Meuse. This last condition made it especially advisable for us to attack the west face of the salient in conjunction with any attack against the south face.

5. The salient had been recognized for some time as a quiet sector. That portion of the front between Bezonvaux (east of Verdun) and the Moselle River, was usually held by the enemy with 9 divisions in line and 2 in reserve, 7 of the front line divisions lying between Les Eparges and the Moselle. A study indicated the enemy's ability to bring up 2 additional divisions within 2 days, 2 more divisions in 3 days, and a large number in 4 days, depending upon the reserves available on other portions of the western front. It was thus evident that a strong hostile counter attack could be launched by the third day following the initiation of our attack.

From the location of the enemy reserves with reference to the railroad net about Sedan and Metz, it appeared that any hostile counter attacks would probably be launched from the direction of Metz, Etain, or Conflans; or from all of these points at the same time. The Etang de Lachaussee made improbable any hostile counter thrust in its vicinity until after our attack had passed to the north and east of that obstacle.

6. On September 11th, the day before the St. Mihiel attack was launched, the enemy's order of battle was:

ARMY DETACHMENT "C"

East of the Moselle—84th and 31st Landwehr Bri-	} Metz
gades	
Just west of the Moselle—255th Division	} Group

Between Fey-en-Haye and Montsec	} 77th and 10th Divs.—I Bavarian Corps
Around the salient from Montsec to Lamorville	} 5th Landwehr and 31st Divs.—I Bavarian Corps

[NOTE.—192d Div was relieving the 31st Div at time of the attack.]

From Lamorville to north of Watron- ville	} 35th Austro-Hungarian, 13th Landwehr and 8th Landwehr Divs.	} Combres Group V Corps
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Reserves known—195th Div. in Metz.
Commander—General von Fuchs.

From captured documents it appeared that the enemy had prepared a general plan for evacuating the salient and holding the Hindenburg Line, based on a methodical withdrawal covering a period of about 30 days. Prisoners captured early in September gave conflicting statements as to the enemy's plans. Considering the situation as it appeared at the time, the following conclusions seemed reasonable:

(a) The German High Command, while aware of a probable American attack against the salient, did not suspect the strength or imminence thereof.

(b) A decision had been made to withdraw to the Hindenburg Line in case of heavy Allied pressure, and preliminary arrangements for the retirement had been started.

(c) Only the higher German commanders had been informed of the decision to withdraw in case of a heavy Allied attack.

Information at hand on the evening of September 11th, was insufficient to justify any definite conclusions as to the enemy's intentions, but it was known that the normal garrison still held the salient.

7. Plate V shows the location before concentration, of the American and French divisions that participated in the attack. The Americans were familiar with that portion of the front from the Moselle River to Apremont and the portion east of Sommedieue. The remainder of the front was not well known to us. Our divisions had held the sector north of Toul since January. We had installed advance supply depots and light railways; air depots, parks, and aerodromes had been located in the vicinity of Colombey-

les-Belles and Gondrecourt. Our supplies for this front were being forwarded through the regulating station at Is-sur-Tille.

8. The following plan for the operation, prepared at Army Headquarters and submitted on August 15th to General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, contemplated in detail:

(a) A main attack from the south on the front Fey-en-Haye—Richecourt, to penetrate the Hindenburg Line near Rembercourt, carrying the line forward to the east bank of the Etang de Lachaussee (7 divisions in line and 2 in reserve).

(b) A secondary attack from the west on the front Les Eparges—Watronville, to penetrate the Hindenburg Line near Parfondrupt, and to close the salient by forming a junction on the Etang de Lachaussee with the southern attack (3 divisions in line and 1 in reserve).

(c) An extension of the secondary attack to the north by troops of the Second French Army, on the front Watronville—Bezonvaux (5 or 6 French divisions).

(d) Holding attacks along the remainder of the salient (3 French divisions in line, 1 American division in reserve).

(e) Three American divisions to be held in army reserve.

(f) An advance beyond the Hindenburg Line to be developed in accordance with the extent of the initial success obtained and the character of the hostile opposition encountered, with the object of carrying the heights east of the Etang de Lachaussee.

9. On August 16th, our General Headquarters ordered the First Army to prepare to attack prior to September 11th, the freeing of the Paris—Nancy railroad being the minimum result to be attained. The main attack was to be delivered on the front Fey-en-Haye—Richecourt, and the secondary attack from north of Les Eparges. The line Vandieres—heights north of Thiaucourt—Vigneulles was designated the minimum objective, with Marieulles—Mars-la-Tour—Etain as the ultimate objective.

On August 17th, more detailed instructions, in accordance with an agreement reached by Marshal Foch and my-

self, made it the mission of the First Army to free the Paris—Avricourt railroad, with the line Buxieres-sous-Froidmont—Ruisseau de Gorze—Mars-la-Tour—Parfondrupt—Bezonvaux as the objective. This was to be accomplished by making a main attack on the front Les Mesnils—Seicheprey, against the south face of the salient, while simultaneously another would be directed against the west face on the front Tranchee de Calonne—Haudiomont, and the third from the west between Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes and Bezonvaux. The holding attacks were to be executed by a French force against the tip of the salient. This plan was in confirmation and general approval of the proposal previously submitted by the First Army.

10. In accordance with the foregoing instructions, the original First Army plan, known as the August plan, was perfected and promulgated. Two French army corps of 3 divisions each were to execute the attack north of Watronville, and their mission was so intimately a part of that of the First Army that General Petain placed all the French troops involved in the operation under the control of the American Army. The whole attack contemplated the employment of 25 French and American divisions, and if successful would: (1) eliminate the salient; (2) pierce the Hindenburg Line; and (3) threaten the defenses of Metz and the Briey iron region. This was the basis of the operation as carried out.

11. FINAL INSTRUCTIONS.—As previously mentioned, the original plans of the First Army for the St. Mihiel attack were altered in view of the decision that it was to be preliminary to the large operation to be undertaken on the Meuse-Argonne front about 10 days later. While the former operation was to be preparatory to the Meuse-Argonne, its importance was not materially diminished.

The ultimate objective was therefore limited to the line Les Eparges—Vigneulles—Thiaucourt—Moselle River. The First Army's original plan was consequently modified to a main attack, by seven American divisions, from the Seicheprey—Limey plateau, with the line Vigneulles—Thiaucourt for a general objective; a secondary attack, by one American and one French division, southeast from the

vicinity of Les Eparges—Mouilly to form a junction with the main attack in the heart of the salient; while three French divisions on a broad front were to press against the tip of the salient. The captured position was to be organized immediately for defense.

12. Field Orders No. 9, First Army, dated September 7th, promulgated the final plans for the battle. The principal modifications were that the number of divisions to be used was reduced and the objectives were more limited, requiring a slight change in the direction of the attack both from the south and west. Surplus divisions were assigned to army reserve. The details of the operation were (see Plate IV):

(a) The main attack to be against the south face, through and on both flanks of the wooded areas south of Thiaucourt.

(b) A secondary drive against the west face between Les Eparges and Mouilly, directed towards Hannonville-sous-les-Cotes and Hattonville.

(c) A supporting advance on the left of the principal drive on the southern face.

(d) A similar advance on the right of the western attack.

(e) Troops at the apex to hold the enemy in their front.

(f) Eventual exploitation.

The main attack was to be made by the I and IV Army Corps, the secondary by the V Army Corps, while the II French Colonial Corps was to support and hold as outlined.

The order of battle from east to west was:

<i>Line Divisions</i>	<i>Army Corps</i>	<i>Corps Reserve Divisions</i>	<i>Army Reserve Divisions</i>
82d American (Burnham)	I Corps (Liggett)	78th American (McRae)	35th American (Traub)
90th American (Allen)			
5th American (McMahon)			
2d American (Lejeune)			

89th American (Wright)	IV Corps (Dickman)	3d American (Buck)	91st American (Johnston)
42d American (Menoher)			
1st American (Summerall)			
39th French	II Colonial (French)		80th American (Cronkhite)
26th French			
2d French (Dismounted Cavalry)			
26th American (Edwards)	V Corps (Cameron)	4th American (part only) (Hines)	
15th French (Colonial)			
4th American (part only) (Hines)			

CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING TROOPS AND THEIR ASSIGNMENT

13. It should be remembered that the army was newly organized—many troops met here their associates and leaders for the first time. To some extent, it was a mixed command, owing to the large amount of French artillery, air service, and other specialists. Of the 3 American army corps headquarters and 9 American divisions in the first line, 2 corps headquarters and 4 divisions had never before engaged in offensive combat.

Disregarding the strength of the fortifications and of the natural features of the terrain, the attack was otherwise difficult of execution. It required for the main attack a change of direction of sixty degrees during the advance. Furthermore it was necessary to issue orders before launching the attack for the early withdrawal and movement to other theaters of operation of 2 army corps, 4 first line divisions, practically all the army artillery, and the corps and army reserves.

The long range guns of the permanent fortifications of Metz covered the valley of the Moselle River as far as Pagny-sur-Moselle where the Hindenburg Line crossed the river, and the enemy's position on the heights east and west of

the Moselle gave each other mutual support. These two factors, coupled with our lack of available divisions to extend the operation to the east bank of the Moselle, necessitated a refusal of the right flank of the southern attack.

A large number of heavy and light tanks had been promised for the attack, but a few days before the operation the number of tanks to be turned over to the First Army was unavoidably reduced and no heavy tanks were available. The light Renault tanks provided could not be used for cutting gaps in the wire. An artillery bombardment of less than 12 hours' duration could have little effect on the dense network of wire known to exist, and the essential surprise element in the plan prohibited a long artillery preparation. It therefore became the task of the infantry, assisted by engineer detachments, to penetrate the wire defenses.

The duration of the artillery preparation (4 hours) was fixed, primarily, from the standpoint of expected moral effect upon the enemy as well as upon our own troops. In four hours the enemy could not materially offset the surprise of the attack.

14. In order to permit the delivery of a rapid and deep, powerful blow, the veteran 1st, 2d and 42d Divisions were given positions in the main attack opposite the most open terrain. Once the general line Xammes—Nonsard should be carried the reduction of the salient would be assured. A hostile counter attack, directed either from the salient proper against the left, or from Chambley against the center of the southern attack, would encounter tired troops. As the gap between the southern and western attacks closed on the Etang de Lachaussee, the 1st and 42d Divisions could be withdrawn and would be available as reserves, first, to meet any hostile reaction, and, second, for early employment in the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

The location of the army reserve divisions (35th, 91st, and 80th), while making them available to meet unforeseen eventualities, also made possible their rapid transfer to the Meuse-Argonne front.

15. Plate V shows the concentration of the corps and divisions in preparation for the battle. In addition, many thousands of corps and army troops and many heavy

guns were moved into position during the 10 days previous to September 12th. Most of these troops, especially French artillery units, arrived from the west, via Bar-le-Duc; thus complicating our routings, as their line of march crossed that of columns going northward.

Accurate or positive information as to available rail or bus transportation was not at hand until September 2d, much of it being in use farther west. All transportation for the movement of troops was furnished through the French High Command. Announced schedules therefore had to be frequently changed and details of concentration materially modified. Plans were drawn for movement by rail as well as by bus and by marching, but in the end the three methods were used.

Between September 1st and 11th, 600,000 men were brought into their combat positions on the southern and western flanks of the salient, the first movement starting August 28th and the last ending on September 11th. All movements, except by rail, were carried out under the cover of darkness, the troops being concealed in billets or woods during daylight hours.

The scarcity of roads, and the unavoidable crossing of columns, necessitated the formulation by army headquarters of complete march tables for all units. These tables indicated the routes, the halts, the locations of the heads and tails of columns and the headquarters and railheads at designated hours. With these tables in the hands of corps and division commanders, the units were moved under army orders until they reached corps areas where their march was continued under corps orders to their final positions. Daily marches were 15 kilometers for foot troops and $22\frac{1}{2}$ for mounted troops, guns and vehicles.

Final deployment along the front line of departure was delayed generally until the night of September 11th-12th, to avoid the possibility of the enemy gaining new identifications of divisions by capture of prisoners. The outposts of divisions already in the line continued to hold the front until the last moment, the attacking divisions taking over support and reserve positions on September 9th and 10th. To afford time for emplacing guns and bringing up am-

munition to battery emplacements, the artillery went into position from 2 to 3 nights before the attack.

16. The battle was initiated on the morning of September 12th by artillery preparation, which began at 1:00 A.M.; the main (southern) attack being launched at 5:00 A.M., and the secondary (western) at 8:00 A.M. The follow-up attacks by the French commenced one hour later in each case, that is, at 6:00 and at 9:00 A.M., and the French raids against the tip of the salient started at 6:00 A.M.

The secondary attack was delayed in order to give three hours of daylight for artillery preparation on that portion of the front and to disconcert the enemy. The follow-up attacks and raids were delayed one hour in each case in view of the direction of the attack and the reduced strength of the French units. A heavy rain-fall during the night of the 11th-12th made the weather conditions most unfavorable, but the entire operation was carried through with precision and without untoward event. The divisions of General Dickman's Corps (IV) and those on the left of General Liggett's Corps (I) overwhelmed the hostile garrisons and quickly overran their positions carrying the fighting out into the open. The German resistance on this portion of the front, due to the rapidity of our advance, was disorganized and soon overcome. On the west face of the salient the advance of General Cameron's Corps (V) was not so rapid. However, the momentum of the southern attack made it possible on the first day to reach the first objectives assigned for the second day along most of the army front.

17. By evening General Liggett's Corps (I) had captured Xammes and Jaulny; General Dickman's Corps (IV) was approaching Beney and held the northwest portion of the Bois de Vigneulles; the French Colonial Corps had occupied Apremont, St. Mihiel, and Spada; and General Cameron's Corps (V) on the left had reached the heights west of Hannonville-sous-les-Cotes. Plate VI shows the line at midnight on each day.

18. During the night of September 12th the situation within the salient was not clear at Army Headquarters. Reports from aviators and ground troops indicated the

enemy's withdrawal from the salient and the arrival of hostile reinforcements on the front of General Liggett's Corps (I). Thousands of prisoners had been captured, but little information was secured from them. The French follow-up attacks had succeeded in accompanying the flanks of the main and secondary attacks, but their raids around the tip of the salient had made little advance, due to the strong opposition encountered. Upon the request of the commander of the II French Colonial Corps, a regiment of General Cronkhite's Division (80th) was placed at his disposal on the left of the corps during the night of September 12th-13th. General Dickman's Corps (IV) had one squadron of American cavalry which, entering the salient on the left flank of General Summerall's Division (1st) during the afternoon of September 12th, reached the Heudicourt—Vigneulles road, where it was stopped late in the afternoon.

Despite the uncertainty of the situation within the salient, the Army Commander, in person, directed Generals Dickman (IV Corps) and Cameron (V Corps) to push their advance to Vigneulles during the night of September 12th-13th; as a result of which, detachments from Generals Summerall's (1st) and Edward's (26th) Divisions made a junction in the vicinity of Vigneulles early on the morning of September 13th, thus completely closing the gap. The enemy within the salient had evidently begun to withdraw as soon as our attack developed, the rear guards apparently holding up the advance of the II French Colonial Corps.

19. The advance was continued and the attack terminated on the 13th when the army objective was occupied along the entire front and strong reconnaissances were pushed forward to the exploitation line. During the night of the 13th, the troops were engaged in organizing their new positions for defense, preparatory to withdrawing divisions and corps troops for participation in the Meuse-Argonne battle. In view of the favorable situation just west of the Moselle River, the attack on this front of General Liggett's Corps (I) was pushed forward to the line Jaulny—Pagny-sur-Moselle. The enemy reacted with counter attacks on the left front of General Liggett's Corps (I)

only. On September 14th, 15th, and 16th, local operations continued, consisting in strong reconnaissances, the occupation of better ground for defensive purposes, and repulsing local counter attacks.

Reports received during the 13th and 14th indicated that the enemy was retreating in considerable disorder. Our patrols advanced to Dampvitoux, the eastern edge of Etang de Lachaussee, Jonville, St. Hilaire and Fresnes-en-Woevre. Without doubt, an immediate continuation of the advance would have carried us well beyond the Hindenburg Line and possibly into Metz, but our success could not have been thus exploited without delaying the Meuse-Argonne operation already planned.

20. The daily order of battle for the First Army during this period was as follows:

	<i>V Corps</i>	<i>II French Colonial Corps</i>	<i>IV Corps</i>	<i>I Corps</i>
	DIVISIONS			
<i>Sept. 12th</i>				
Line -----	4($\frac{1}{2}$)-15 ^f -26	2 ^f -26 ^f -39 ^f	1-42-89	2-5-90-82
Corps Res. -----	4($\frac{1}{2}$)		3	78
Army Res. -----		80	91	35
<i>Sept. 13th</i>				
Line -----	4($\frac{1}{2}$)-15 ^f -26	2 ^f -26 ^f -39 ^f	1-42-89	2-5-90-82
Corps Res. -----	4($\frac{1}{2}$)	1 Regt. 80	3	78
Army Res. -----		80 (less 1 Regt)	91	35
<i>Sept. 14th</i>				
Line -----	4($\frac{1}{2}$)-15 ^f -26	2 ^f -39 ^f	42-89	2-5-90-82
Corps Res. -----	4($\frac{1}{2}$)	26 ^f	1-3 ^(a)	78
Army Res. -----		80	91	35
<i>Sept. 15th</i>				
Line -----	15 ^f -26	2 ^f -39 ^f	42-89	2-5-90-82
Corps Res. -----	4 ^(a)	26 ^f	1	78
Army Res. -----		80 ^(a)	91 ^(a)	35 ^(a)
<i>Sept. 16 (c)</i>				
Line -----	15 ^f -26	2 ^f -39 ^f	42-89	78-5-90-82
Corps Res. -----		26 ^f	1 ^(a)	2 ^(b)

^(a)En route to Meuse-Argonne.

^(b)Assembling to go to Meuse-Argonne.

^(c)The relief of the I and V Corps was completed on this date and they were moved to the Meuse-Argonne front.

^f French divisions.

During the fighting from September 12th to 16th, the 125th, 8th Landwehr, 88th, and 28th German Divisions were brought to reinforce the enemy's line and, in addition, several other divisions arrived in reserve positions.

The German order of battle, west to east, of September 16th was as follows:

<i>In Line</i>	<i>In Reserve</i>
32d Division	28th Reserve Division
8th Landwehr Division	77th Reserve Division
88th Division	195th Division
35th Austro-Hungarian Division	3d Austro-Hungarian Division
192d Division	37th Austro-Hungarian Division
5th Landwehr Division	38th Austro-Hungarian Division
10th Division	1st Landwehr Division
31st Division	
123d Division	
255th Division	
31st Landwehr Brigade	
84th Landwehr Brigade	

Total 10 divisions and 2 brigades. Total 7 divisions.

21. American troops engaged numbered approximately 555,000. The strength of the French units operating under the First Army in this battle is not accurately known, but a close estimate places their total at 110,000 (including 4 divisions), making a grand total of 665,000 men. The concentration of air forces under American command for this battle was one of the largest ever made and included the French Air Division and the British Independent Bombing Squadrons.

22. The French Group of Armies of the East materially assisted in the work of supply and hospitalization, turning over many existing installations, but the actual control and direction of these services were carried out by the First Army Staff.

The nature of the St. Mihiel operation and the positions of the American corps for attack—the I and IV Corps being separated from the V Corps by the II French Colonial Corps (for the supply of which the American Army was not responsible)—made dual arrangements necessary in handling supply and hospitalization, each to function independently during the operation.

The American regulating officer at Saint Dizier, who was authorized to make direct call on the American regu-

lating station at Is-sur-Tille for shipments in bulk, was designated to supply the First Army and to continue at the same time to supply our troops temporarily under control of the Second French Army. Subsistence, miscellaneous material, and replacements for the regions east of St. Mihiel were forwarded from Is-sur-Tille directly to railheads, and for the region west of St. Mihiel by way of St. Dizier. The ammunition supply was sent forward in trainload lots from depots at Brienne, Vaivre, and Villers-le-Sec, directly to the proper stations.

To provide for the liaison between the American and French units, and to handle the supply of artillery ammunition, for which we were almost entirely dependent upon the French, a group of French officers was attached to the Fourth Section of the General Staff of the First American Army.

The Chief Surgeon of the First Army, through a representative in charge of the group of hospitals and sanitary units on the south face of the salient, and through another on the west, coordinated their work from Army Headquarters, where he had the advantage of the American trunk telephone lines to both fronts and to the rear.

By September 11th all arrangements had been completed for ample hospitals, hospital trains, and sanitary units, the First Army taking over some of the existing French hospitals on the Toul and Verdun fronts, and establishing others, but using American personnel in all. As the actual number of casualties was far below the estimated number, this problem presented no difficulties, and ample food and medical attendance were never lacking. Explicit instructions for careful sorting of wounded at division stations, obviated the necessity for a secondary evacuation to hospitals of severely or slightly wounded. As the advance was limited, changes in the location of the various hospitals and sanitary units were unnecessary.

French engineer depots were taken over by American units and much work was done in connection with road construction and water supply prior to and immediately after the operation. The principal task of the Engineer Corps was the construction and reconstruction of railroads

to connect up the old German network with existing lines in order to facilitate the supply for the troops occupying the newly organized front.

Circulation, traffic, and prisoners of war were handled by the military police under direction of the provost marshal. Since the military police establishment was a new departure in the American Army, the personnel lacked experience and special instruction, but succeeded in carrying out exacting duties in a commendable manner. Mixed posts of American and French military police were placed at points where the First Army joined with the French units.

The reports of G-1, G-4, and of the Chief Surgeon of the First Army, cover the above matters in a comprehensive manner.

23. As a result of this operation, the Paris-Nancy railroad was freed, the salient reduced, 600 square kilometers of French soil were reclaimed, and the mission assigned the army was exceeded. Nearly 16,000 prisoners and 443 cannon were captured, while our total casualties from all causes, including sickness and light gas cases, were about 13,700, approximately half of which were sustained after the objective had been reached. Of the number of prisoners mentioned above, over 4,000 were captured in the salient proper.

More important still was the moral effect on the enemy and on our Allies. An American Army had suddenly appeared on the front and crushed the enemy in one of his strongest positions. Hitherto, the enemy had encountered Americans under French or British leadership, and no doubt expected this condition to continue. His sudden defeat by an American Army must have brought keen realization of the situation that confronted him.

In the concentration preceding the battle and in the conduct thereof, General Liggett (I Corps) and General Dickman (IV Corps) executed a complicated and delicate task and carried the advance forward with dash and spirit. Generals Summerall (1st Division), Menoher (42d Division), Wright (89th Division), and Lejeune (2d Division), quickly conquered the enemy's positions and without delay

seized the commanding works along the Rupt de Mad, displaying the quick decision and tactical initiative so essential in combat leaders.

The organization and initial operation of the First Army fully justified our belief in the natural initiative, resourcefulness, and adaptability of the American. The experience, confidence, and consequent increase in morale, gained by our officers and men at St. Mihiel made it possible for us to end the war by driving to a successful conclusion within the succeeding two months the desperate battle of the Meuse-Argonne.

PART IV (a)

Meuse-Argonne Offensive

September 26 to October 15, 1918

1. The Allied and American operations on the western front during the summer prior to September 26, 1918, resulted in the reduction of the Amiens, Chateau-Thierry, and St. Mihiel salients. Immediately west of the Meuse River the battle line had remained practically unchanged since 1917. It was on this front that the American blow of the great converging offensive was to be delivered. In accordance with the general plan determined in the conference of Commanders-in-Chief already referred to in Part III of this report, offensives were to be launched by the Allies as follows:

(a) A British-French attack on the general line St. Quentin—Cambrai, advancing between the Oise and the Scarpe Rivers.

(b) A French-American attack on the general line Rheims—Verdun, advancing between the Suippe and the Meuse Rivers.

(c) A combined Allied attack east of Ypres.

(d) Between the attacks mentioned above, liaison was to be maintained by intervening armies.

2. Plate XIV showing developments, clearly indicates the conception of the Allied offensive, which was to consist of simultaneous attacks along the greater part of the western front, forcing the enemy to disperse his reserves and weaken his defense generally, or to concentrate his reserve power at what appeared to be the vital points, thus jeopardizing the remainder of his line.

Successful advances in the three indicated directions would form salients in the enemy's line which would threaten his forces exposed on the flanks and compel their withdrawal to new lines, upon which the operation would then be repeated.

3. The associated operations of the Fourth French Army, attacking between the Suippe River and the Argonne Forest, and of the First American Army, on the front from the Argonne Forest to the Meuse River, were based upon the same strategical principle as that of the general Allied offensive. The task of attacking this important section of the line had thus fallen to the First American Army, supported on its left by the Fourth French Army. Our thrust east of the forest by threatening the left flank of the enemy's position in front of the Fourth French Army, on the Aisne River, would force a withdrawal of hostile resistance, and the combined or successive advance of both armies would throw the enemy back on the line Stenay—Le Chesne—Attigny, and eventually on Mezieres. The successive steps of the operation were marked by the lines: (1) Dun—Grandpre—Challerange—Somme-Py. (2) Stenay—Le Chesne—Attigny.

This danger confronting the enemy made it imperative that he should hold on in front of the American Army to the limit of his resources. From the German point of view the vital portion of the front was undoubtedly that just west of the Meuse River, because there the enemy's main artery of supply (Carignan—Sedan—Mezieres) was closer to the battle line than at any other point. If we should sever this artery, before the enemy could retire from northwestern France and western Belgium, it would probably compel him to surrender a large portion of his armies in these regions, because of his inability to supply them through the Ardennes, or to evacuate them by his narrow line of communications that lay to the north between the Ardennes and the Holland frontier. He could afford to withdraw his armies from all fronts except the Meuse-Argonne, where his line must be held until the last.

4. In preparation for our offensive the First American Army took over the entire front from the Moselle River to the Argonne Forest, inclusive, a distance of 150 kilometers. While the fighting of the First Army in the Meuse-Argonne offensive was practically continuous, it may, for the sake of clearness, be epitomized as follows:

(a) September 26th to October 31st, which included the initial concentration and the attack that cleared the Argonne Forest. The enemy was forced to retire to the Aisne River and was driven from the major portion of the Hindenburg Line (Kriemhilde-Stellung).

Nov. 7
(b) November 1st to 7th, during which the enemy's position on the Aisne River was flanked, his vital artery of communication on the western front was cut, and he was driven across the Meuse River.

(c) October 8th to November 11th, during which the enemy was driven from the heights of the Meuse east of that river and preparations were made by us for an advance towards Montmedy.

The experience of our troops at St. Mihiel developed certain defects which showed that more attention should be given to battle training. Unfortunately, lack of time did not permit the divisions available for the opening of the Meuse-Argonne battle to rehearse this phase of their training. We were only able to point out the difficulties.

Liaison between infantry and artillery, infantry and tanks, and air service and ground troops was not what it should have been. The short training period, the unforeseen separation of artillery brigades from their divisions for the period of their field firing, and the delay in the organization of our tank and air forces, had prevented sufficient preliminary practice.

The rate of advance of the artillery barrage at St. Mihiel was uniform along each corps front, with the result that it was too fast in some localities and too slow in others. It was found advisable to allow more latitude to each division in determining the rate of advance for the barrage on its front.

"Infantry batteries" and "accompanying guns" were not always employed in suitable situations. Artillerymen opposed these detachments as decreasing their power of concentrations. Infantrymen maneuvered the "accompanying gun" in too exposed positions and attempted to employ "infantry batteries" as in the role of divisional artillery.

The distribution of ammunition at St. Mihiel was based on the existing French plan, adopted for trench warfare,

of 3 days of fire at battery emplacements, 1 day at corps dumps, and 1 day at army dumps. As only an average of one and a half days of fire was used by the light guns before they advanced, the ratio of 2, 2, and 1 was established for the Meuse-Argonne.

Our military police system in the higher units, corps and army, had been hurriedly improvised for the St. Mihiel operation and had difficulty in regulating traffic on the main arteries not controlled by the divisional military police. Some congestion occurred in the hastily improvised passages over the devastated zone of no-man's-land.

5. The principal mission assigned the First American Army, as previously stated in general terms, remained the same throughout this great offensive, being changed by subsequent orders only in minor particulars.

In detail, an attack was to be launched west of the Meuse River between September 20th and 25th, the right of our army to be covered by the Meuse River and the left to be supported by a simultaneous attack by the Fourth French Army.

The front of the attack was to extend from the Meuse River westward, to include the Argonne Forest, and was to be driven, with all possible strength, in the general direction of Mezieres.

All available American forces were to be employed in this operation, including certain divisions on the St. Mihiel front which were to be moved to the Meuse-Argonne front as rapidly as the situation would permit of their withdrawal.

The operations of the First American Army and the Fourth French Army were to be coordinated under agreement between General Petain, commanding all French armies on the western front, and myself.

The first operation of our army was to have for its objective the Hindenburg position on the front Brioules-sur-Meuse—Romagne-sous-Montfaucon—Grandpre, with a following development in the direction of Buzancy—Mezieres in order to outflank by the east the enemy's positions on the Vouziers—Rethel line.

In conjunction with our advance, which would outflank the enemy's position south of the Aisne, the Fourth French

Army by attacking successively the positions between the Aisne and the Suippe Rivers would be able to occupy the line Vouziers—Rethel; after which it could operate in the direction of the plateau east of the Rethel—Signy-l'Abbaye Road.

A liaison detachment was designated to operate along the western edge of the Argonne Forest as a connecting link between the French and American Armies.

6. The region involved in the Meuse-Argonne operation was ideal for defensive fighting, as it presented unusual difficulties from the viewpoint of the assailant. On the east, the Cotes de Meuse commanded that river valley, and on the west the rugged, high hills of the Argonne Forest dominated the valley of the Aire River. In the center, the watershed between the Aire and the Meuse Rivers commanded both valleys, with the heights of Montfaucon, Cunel, Romagne and of the Bois de Barricourt, as natural strong points and observation stations for the enemy. (See Plate VII.)

The terrain over which the attack was to be made formed a defile blocked by three successive barriers, the heights of Montfaucon, those of Cunel and Romagne, and the ridges of the Bois de Barricourt and of the Bois de Bourgogne. The Meuse River was unfordable, the Aire River fordable only in places. In addition to the heavy Forest of the Argonne, the woods of Cheppy, Montfaucon, Romagne, Cunel, Bourgogne, Foret, Loges, Ogons, and Barricourt, presented serious obstacles to an advance.

7. While naturally strong, the enemy's position had been strengthened during a period of four years by every known artifice in field fortifications, and was covered by a dense network of wire entanglements, with many concrete machine gun emplacements and dugouts, the natural advantages being utilized in every possible manner to secure cross and enfilading fire.

8. The following were the main lines of defense, all strong and all thoroughly organized, except the fourth, which possessed great natural strength but was organized for defense in only a few places:

(a) *First Position.*—On the general line Ruisseau de Forges—Malancourt—Avocourt—Vauquois—Boureuilles—

north of La Harazee; with an intermediate position through Cuisy and Cheppy.

(b) *Second Position*.—Through Montfaucon—Epinonville west to the Argonne Forest, where the entire eastern edge of the Argonne bluffs had been fortified.

(c) *Third Position*.—Known as the Kriemhilde-Stellung or Hindenburg Line, extending through Haraumont (east of the Meuse River)—Cunel Heights—heights of the Bois de Loges—Grandpre. A switch line from the Bois de Romagne to Fleville joined with the Argonne defenses about Cornay.

(d) *Fourth Position*.—Known as the Freya Stellung, extending along the ridge of the Bois de Barricourt, through Bayonville—Sivry-les-Buzancy to Thenorgues.

(e) The intermediate strong points were very numerous; nearly every patch of woods and all knolls between the recognized positions had been fortified.

The narrow front of this natural defile, with its excellent observation stations, and the depth of the hostile organization, averaging 22 kilometers, from the first line to the fourth position, prepared throughout as a defensive zone, made the task of an assailant extremely hard. To drive salients into this defensive zone by frontal attacks and follow by attacks against the flanks thus created was the only feasible method of assault.

9. The enemy's order of battle as far as known to us on September 25th was, from west to east, as follows:

<i>In Line</i>		<i>In Reserve</i>
9th Landwehr Division	Between the Ar- gonne Forest and the Meuse River.	228th Division
2d Landwehr Division		53d Reserve Division
1st Guard Division		37th Division
117th Division		44th Reserve Division
115th Division		77th Division
Total 5 divisions.		8th Landwehr Division
		10th Division

1st Austro-Hungarian Division	Between the Meuse and the Moselle Rivers.	37th Austro-Hungarian Division
33d Division		38th Austro-Hungarian Division
32d Division		1st Landwehr Division
28th Reserve Division		25th Division
13th Landwehr Division		15th Division
107th Division		
35th Austro-Hungarian Division		
195th Division		
5th Landwehr Division		
88th Division		
31st Division		
123d Division		
255th Division		
31st Landwehr Brigade		
84th Landwehr Brigade		
Total 13 divisions plus 2 brigades.		Total 12 divisions (identified). 2 Unidentified divisions also in Lorraine.

The enemy's forces between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest were distributed in depth, with the apparent intention of holding the first position as an outpost zone and the second position as a main line of resistance.

10. Information secured through prisoners, observation of circulation in the rear areas, and a study of the hostile artillery fire and air activities, presented contradictions which made it difficult to judge accurately either the enemy's intentions or his knowledge of our preparations for attack. It was definitely known that the enemy had increased the strength of his ground and air troops east of Verdun and around Metz and that he was concerned for the safety of the latter.

The sum total of our information on September 25th showed an uncertainty on the part of the enemy as to the location and day for our attack. He undoubtedly expected a continuation of the St. Mihiel operation, with an extension to the east of the Moselle River or on the front east of Verdun, rather than a new operation to the west of the Meuse River.

11. On the day prior to the attack, it was estimated that the available hostile reserves would permit the enemy to reinforce the Meuse-Argonne front as follows:

1st day of attack by 4 divisions,
2d day of attack by 2 divisions,
3d day of attack by 9 divisions,
4th day and later, 10 divisions from the west and 7 from
the east, depending upon Allied operations elsewhere.

12. When the plans for the Meuse-Argonne operation were agreed to on September 2d, the army staff was concentrating on preparations for the St. Mihiel operation, for which all available men and material were needed. The result of this attack could not be foreseen with certainty, but it was estimated that the danger of serious hostile counter attacks would exist for at least four days after the commencement of that battle, and the withdrawal of troops in large numbers could not be undertaken until this probability had passed.

These conditions arbitrarily limited the selection of divisions for the Meuse-Argonne attack to those which would be immediately available. Lack of sufficient artillery, air service, and transportation, for two simultaneous major offensives necessitated the employment in the Meuse-Argonne of practically all the troops and services used in the St. Mihiel attack, and vastly increased the difficulties of the problem which confronted the Army Commander and his staff.

13. The front from Watronville, southeast of Verdun, to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, 88 kilometers, had been under the control of the Second French Army for some time. At this moment 6 French and Italian divisions held the line, 4 of these being to the west of the Meuse. Included in this front were the permanent fortresses surrounding Verdun. The existing facilities for supply and hospitalization were practically sufficient, except for certain modifications to adapt them to American use. Railroads and roads, however, would not be adequate until those passing through St. Mihiel could be opened to traffic.

It was deemed inadvisable for the First Army to take over active control of the Meuse-Argonne front while conducting the St. Mihiel operation. Therefore, the Second

French Army arranged to carry out the withdrawal of the French and Italian divisions and to receive and locate our troops arriving prior to September 22d, the date on which control of this front would pass to the American Army, in accordance with the plans of the First Army. This greatly facilitated the work of the army staff.

14. Presenting in further detail our mission, it was actually planned by the First Army to make:

(a) An advance of 16 kilometers and a penetration of the hostile third position to force the enemy to evacuate the Argonne Forest and insure our junction with the Fourth French Army at Grandpre.

(b) Then, a further advance of about 16 kilometers to the line Stenay—Le Chesne to outflank the enemy's position along the Aisne River in front of the Fourth French Army, and clear the way for our advance on Mezieres or Sedan.

(c) An operation to clear the heights east of the Meuse River, either by an attack in an easterly direction, following the penetration of the Kriemhilde-Stellung position near Cunel, or by an attack northwards along the east bank of the Meuse River between Beaumont and Sivry-sur-Meuse, to clear the crest south of Bois de la Grande Montagne, or by a combination of these two attacks. Both of these operations were eventually carried out.

In the main, these plans were not changed, only minor modifications being made because of the non-availability of troops and transportation. Plans (a) and (b) were published in the form of battle instructions to corps commanders on September 16th and 17th and issued in formal field orders on September 20th, (See Plate VIII) while plan (c) was considered and tentatively approved on September 25th.

15. Thus it will be seen that in the initial advance two salients were to be driven into the German defenses, one between the Bois de Forges and the Bois de Montfaucon, and the other between the Bois de Montfaucon and the Argonne Forest. These two advances would carry the hos-

tile second position and outflank Montfaucon. The troops driving in the two salients just mentioned, having been joined by the troops attacking in the interval between the salients, would advance until a penetration of the third hostile position about Romagne and Cunel had been effected. Succinctly, the plan contemplated a double penetration of the right and left centers, and, after passing Montfaucon, a single penetration of the right center. The plan provided full advantage for advance over open ground against positions strongly organized in depth, and from which later on to flank the more difficult wooded terrain.

For the initial attack on September 26th, the following combat units only were available:

(a) Available before the St. Mihiel attack and not associated with that attack:

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Condition</i>
III Corps Hdqrs	In action on the Vesle River.	In action about one month.
32d Div.	Near Soissons.	In action for one month. Needed rest and replacements.
28th Div.	In action on the Vesle River.	Needed rest and replacements.
77th Div	In action on the Vesle River.	Needed rest and replacements.
29th Div.	Training sector, Belfort.	Fresh.
92d Div.	Training sector, St. Die.	Fresh.
37th Div.	Training sector, Baccarat.	Fresh.
36th Div.	Training area.	In France 3 weeks. Short transportation.
79th Div.	Training area.	In France about 7 weeks.
33d Div.	En route from British front.	Fresh.

(b) Available five days after St. Mihiel attack started:

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Condition</i>
I Corps Hdqrs.	Comdg. right corps St. Mihiel.	Engaged since July 4th.

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Condition</i>
80th Div.	Army Reserve Tronville.	Fresh—completed training with British.
35th Div.	Army Reserve Liverdun.	Fresh—completed training.
91st Div.	Army Reserve Pagny-sur-Meuse.	Fresh—completed area training.

(c) Available after St. Mihiel attack stabilized:

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Condition</i>
V Corps Hdqs.	Comdg. left corps St. Mihiel.	First Operation, St. Mihiel.
4th Div.	In line and reserve V Corps St. Mihiel.	Fought in the Aisne—Marne offensive.
82d Div.	Right Div. I Corps St. Mihiel.	First engaged at St. Mihiel.
3d Div.	Reserve IV Corps St. Mihiel.	Fought on Marne River and in Aisne—Marne offensive.
1st Div.	Line IV Corps St. Mihiel.	Fought at Soissons and St. Mihiel.

(d) The difficulties of concentration and other reasons, as shown above, such as having been recently in action, prevented the early employment of some of these divisions, and limited selection for the initial attack to the following corps and divisions, given in order from right to left:

First Line:

General Bullard's (III Corps), General Cameron's (V Corps), and General Liggett's (I Corps), 33d, 80th, 4th, 79th, 37th, 91st, 35th, 28th, and 77th Divisions.

Reserves:

29th, 92d, 82d, 3d, and 1st Divisions, none of which could arrive in time to be employed in the first line, and the 32d which needed rest and replacements.

16. Thus we were limited to the selection of nine divisions, of which only the 33d, 4th, 28th, and 77th had been previously engaged. The absence of certain artillery brigades in the training camps necessitated assignment to four divisions (33d, 37th, 79th, and 91st) of artillery brigades belonging to other divisions, several of which had never before been engaged.

With the purpose of driving the two attacks, already described, through the hostile first and second positions on the flanks of the Bois de Montfaucon, the line had to be sufficiently strong to carry through the third hostile position, which required depth of reserves to provide continuous pressure and passage of lines. Generals Hines' (4th) and Kuhn's (79th) and Generals Johnston's (91st) and Traub's (35th) Divisions were to drive, and General Farnsworth's (37th) Division was to maintain liaison between the two attacks and to clean up the woods in its front. Generals Bell's (33rd) and Cronkhite's (80th) Divisions were required on the eastern flank to defend the constantly increasing river line following the advance in the center, and at a later date to join in the operation east of the Meuse River.

To General Muir's (28th) Division, on a narrow front, was assigned the attack against the eastern flank of the Argonne Forest, which was considered to be a difficult operation, especially if the hostile third position were not penetrated early. As a heavy attack was not contemplated within the forest itself, a relatively small force, considering the frontage, was thought sufficient for this purpose, and General Alexander's Division (77th) was given this assignment.

When the preliminary plans for the Meuse-Argonne were under consideration, the First Army advocated a local offensive on the western flank of the Argonne Forest. It was believed by the First Army that, unless this flank of the Argonne was included in the operation, the enemy would have free access to the forest and would thereby be able to maintain his forces on the east side of the Argonne in greater strength.

Yielding to the French view, tactical connection between the Fourth French Army and the First Army was to be maintained by liaison detachments. Between September 26th and October 5th, a combined French-American force carried out this task. The detachment comprised one French infantry regiment with some French artillery and one regiment of the 92d Division, all under the command of the XXXVIII French Corps operating on the right of the Fourth French Army. In view of the inability of the

above detachment to advance, the 92d Division was turned over on September 29th to the Fourth French Army for employment in the area between the two armies. However, no additional unit of the division was employed in the front line. After October 5th the connection was maintained by flank detachments furnished by the divisions on the adjoining flanks of the two armies.

17. The allotment of three divisions as corps reserve and of three divisions as army reserve was made to insure the immediate replacement of worn-out first-line divisions; to provide troops for a possible extension of front, especially along the Meuse River; to meet a possible hostile counter offensive against us east of Verdun; and later to follow up by an operation east of that river; and furthermore, in the event that the hostile third position should not be carried as planned, it would be necessary to have strong reserves available to meet the enemy's reinforcements and insure the maintenance of a continuous attack over a long period of time.

18. The network of roads south of no-man's-land converged near the front, only three routes being available for heavy vehicles across no-man's-land, one through Esnes, another through Avocourt, and a third through Varennes; one for each army corps. A fourth road through Le Four de Paris joined the third road in Varennes but it was not suitable for vehicular traffic. After having been repaired, these roads barely sufficed for the supply of divisions in the attack. Any additional divisions would have taxed the roads beyond their capacity.

19. On September 3d, the Second French Army held the front from Watronville (southeast of Verdun) to the Argonne Forest, with three army corps:

XI Corps on the right, P.C. at Souilly.

XVII Corps in the center, P.C. at Regret.

II Italian Corps on the left, P.C. at Triaucourt.

Divisions from east to west:

10th French Colonial.

18th French.

120th French, astride the Meuse.

157th French.

73d French.

3d Italian.

In the rear areas were seven other divisions.

20. The rear zone of the Second French Army was restricted due to the curve in the line from Verdun south to St. Mihiel. It included the territory approximately bounded by the following lines:

North and east, the front line of resistance;
On the west, Ste. Meneshould—Revigny;
On the south, Revigny—Bar-le-Duc—St. Mihiel.

In this deep but narrow zone only the following railroads and main roads were available:

Railroads:

Ste. Meneshould—Verdun.
Bar-le-Duc—Clermont-en-Argonne.
Bar-le-Duc—Souilly—Verdun, and later, Commercy—St. Mihiel—Verdun.

Main roads:

Bar-le-Duc—Souilly—Verdun.
Bar-le-Duc—Clermont-en-Argonne.
Ste. Meneshould—Verdun, and later, Commercy—St. Mihiel—Verdun.

To enter this zone from the St. Mihiel front, the following railroads and roads were available:

Railroads:

Toul—Commercy—Bar-le-Duc and later, Toul—Commercy—Verdun.

Main roads:

Commercy—Bar-le-Duc and later, Commercy—St. Mihiel.

21. The concentration involved moving from the area the French and Italian troops; two corps headquarters with corps troops, eleven divisions, and several army units; and the movement into the area of the American troops, consisting of three corps headquarters with corps troops, fifteen divisions, and several thousand army troops. All movements were made under cover of darkness by rail, autobus, and marching. During the period mentioned approximately 220,000 men were moved out of the area, and 600,000 men into it, making a grand total of 820,000 men handled, in addition to large quantities of supplies, ammunition, and hospital equipment. See Plate IX.

Under the conditions existing, this concentration was a gigantic yet delicate task for both the staff and the troops. It was executed with smoothness and precision, and with-

out the knowledge of the enemy. The weather was cold and inclement, but the troops maintained their schedule and slept without fires.

To deceive the enemy, a thin line of French detachments continued to hold the front line trenches until the night of September 25th-26th.

THE FIRST OPERATION—SEPTEMBER 26TH TO OCTOBER 31ST

22. The first operation consisted in flanking the enemy from his position on the southern part of the Aisne River, by driving him from his third line (Kriemhilde-Stellung), in clearing the Argonne Forest, and in local attacks east of the Meuse River.

For convenience in description it is subdivided, tactically, into the following phases:

First phase.—September 26th to September 30th, the initial attack.

Second phase.—October 1st to October 6th, a general attack to carry the hostile third position and to prepare for a flanking movement against the Argonne Forest.

Third phase.—October 7th to October 11th, clearing the Argonne Forest and operations east of the Meuse River.

Fourth phase.—October 12th to October 16th, a general attack to outflank the Bois de Romagne and the Bois de Bantheville.

Fifth phase.—October 17th to October 31st, local operations and preparations for the general attack on November 1st.

23. The order of battle of the First Army for September 26th was as follows:

ARGONNE FOREST TO MEUSE RIVER

	<i>I Corps</i>	<i>V Corps</i>	<i>III Corps</i>
Front Line -----	77-28-35	91-37-79	4-80-33
Corps Res. -----	92 (less 1 Regt) ^a	32	3
	5 Cav. Div. ^f		
Army Res. -----	82	29	1

MEUSE RIVER TO MOSELLE RIVER

	<i>XVII Fr. Corps</i>	<i>II Fr. Col. Corps</i>	<i>IV U.S. Corps</i>
Line -----	18f-10f-15f	26-2f-39f	42-89-78-90-69f
Corps Res. -----	26f		5

The army order prescribed the following missions for the three army corps on the front of attack:

^a1 Regt 92d Div with Fourth French Army.

^fFrench divisions.

III CORPS (Right)

Mission

- (a) By promptly penetrating the hostile second position it will turn MONTFAUCON and the section of the hostile second position within the zone of action of the V Corps, thereby assisting the capture of the hostile second position west of MONTFAUCON.
- (b) With its corps and division artillery it will assist in neutralizing hostile observation and hostile fire from the heights east of the MEUSE.
- (c) Upon arrival of the III Corps at the Corps Objective (dashed brown line)* it will advance in conjunction with the V Corps to the American Army Objective (full brown line).†
- (d) It will protect the right flank of the advance and organize the line of the MEUSE for defense.
- (e) When ordered by the Army Commander it will continue the advance from the Combined Army First Objective (full brown line)‡ to the north, in the zone between the MEUSE exclusive, and the line 1 kilometer west of AINCREVILLE—VILLERS-DEVANT-DUN inclusive—1 kilometer west of MONTIGNY-DEVANT-SASSEY.

V CORPS (Center)

Mission

- (a) With its corps and divisional artillery it will assist in the neutralization of hostile observation from MONTFAUCON.
- (b) It will reduce the BOIS DE MONTFAUCON and the BOIS DE CHEPPY by outflanking them from the east and the west thereby cutting off hostile fire and hostile observation from these woods against the III and I Corps.
- (c) Upon arrival of the III and I Corps at the Corps Objective (dashed brown line)* it will continue the advance to the American Army Objective (full brown line)† and penetrate the hostile third position without waiting for the advance of the III and I Corps.
- (d) With its tanks it will, if necessary, assist the III Corps in the capture of the hostile intermediate position, hostile second position, and hostile third position.
- (e) Upon orders of the Army Commander it will continue the advance to the Combined Army First Phase Line (dashed red line)|| capturing the heights of the BOIS DE ROMAGNE and the BOIS DE GESNES.
- (f) When ordered by the Army Commander it will continue the advance to the north between the eastern line 1 kilometer west of AINCREVILLE—VILLERS-DEVANT-DUN, exclusive, 1 kilometer west of MONTIGNY-DEVANT-SASSEY, and the western line IMECOURT exclusive—SIVRY-LES-BUZANCY—1 kilometer west of SOMMAUTHE.

I CORPS (Left)

Mission

- (a) It will reduce the FORET D'ARGONNE by flanking it from the east.

*Open red dot line on Plate X.

†Closed red dot line on Plate X.

‡Full blue line on Plate VIII.

||Closed blue dot line on Plate X.

- (b) It will assist in cutting off hostile artillery fire and observation from the eastern edge of the FORET D'ARGONNE.
- (c) Upon arrival at the Corps Objective (dashed brown line)* it will advance to the American Army Objective (full brown line)† in conjunction with the V Corps.
- (d) Upon orders from the Army Commander it will advance to the combined Army First Phase Line (dashed red line)|| and assist the V Corps in the capture of the BOIS DE MONCY and LE PETIT BOIS.
- (e) It will clean up the FORET D'ARGONNE.
- (f) When ordered by the Army Commander it will continue the advance to the north in the zone IMECOURT inclusive—SIVRY-LES-BUZANCY inclusive—1 kilometer east of BUZANCY—1 kilometer west of SOMMAUTHE, and the western line GRANDPRE inclusive—BOULT-AUX-BOIS inclusive—CHATILLON-SUR-BAR inclusive—LES PETITES ARMOISES inclusive.
- (g) It will maintain contact with the XXXVIII French Corps on its left.
- (h) Special measures will be taken to insure contact between the 35th Division and the 28th Division on the line of the AIRE RIVER.

24. At 5:30 A.M. on September 26th the First Army launched its attack on the front west of the Meuse River and at the same time carried out local raids and demonstrations from the Meuse to the Moselle Rivers. Harassing and interdiction fire had commenced at 11:30 P.M., September 25th, in conjunction with the artillery preparation of the Fourth French Army. Our artillery preparation started at 2:30 A.M., September 26th, with approximately 2,700 guns in action. The Fourth French Army commenced its attack at 6:00 A.M. on the same date. See Plate X.

25. The strength of the attack came as a complete surprise to the enemy and his forward positions were quickly overrun by our troops. The vast network of uncut barbed wire, the deep ravines, dense woods, myriads of shell craters, and a heavy fog made it extremely difficult to coordinate the movements of the advancing infantry, especially in the less experienced divisions.

26. Before dark General Bullard's (III) Corps had carried the enemy's second position. General Bell's (33d) Division had taken its objectives and wheeled to the right along the bluffs of the Meuse. General Cronkhite's (80th) Division had advanced beyond Dannevoux and on its left

*Open red dot line on Plate X.

†Closed red dot line on Plate X.

||Closed blue dot line on Plate X.

General Hines' (4th) Division had arrived abreast of Nantillois, three kilometers beyond Montfaucon. The marked success gained early by General Hines, placed his western flank nearly five kilometers in advance of the nearest friendly troops in that direction, as the center corps of the army was checked south of Montfaucon and did not succeed in carrying that position until the following day.

General Johnston's (91st) Division on the left of General Cameron's (V) Corps made good progress during this day, reaching the ridge southwest of Ivoiry. On the left of the army the troops of General Liggett's (I) Corps made excellent progress; General Traub's (35th) Division, advancing east of the Aire River, carried the formidable positions on the height of Vauquois and the hills north of Very. General Muir's (28th) Division, attacking west of the Aire and along the eastern bluffs of the Argonne Forest, reached the outskirts of Montblainville, while General Alexander's (77th) Division penetrated three to four kilometers into the Argonne Forest. The enemy utilized his temporary stand on Montfaucon to bring up reinforcements and made every use of the favorable terrain for cross and enfilading fire, especially from the bluffs along the eastern edge of the Argonne Forest and from the heights east of the Meuse River. His employment of single light guns and his prodigal use of machine guns presented serious obstacles to our advancing troops.

27. The terrain just beyond no-man's-land was ill adapted to the employment of the limited number of tanks (189) at our disposal, particularly the small type we were compelled to use, and most of our infantry was without experience in cooperating with them. Nevertheless, the tanks rendered effective assistance during the early period of the battle, particularly on the 26th and 27th, but casualties, mechanical troubles, and the relief of French units reduced their number to eighteen (18) by the end of the first ten days. An adequate supply of tanks, such as were being used by the French and British at this time, would have materially quickened our advance and reduced the number of casualties suffered by our infantry in penetrating the thickets of machine gun nests.

At the opening of the battle our concentration of 821 aeroplanes controlled the air and rendered valuable service. Later on as our advance carried us away from established aviation fields into country too rugged for the location of temporary aerodromes, while at the same time, the enemy was falling back on large, well equipped fields, our aviation found it increasingly difficult to dominate the enemy's air activities.

28. From the 27th to the 30th, continuous fighting carried the army forward to the general line Meuse River—Bois de la Cote Lemont—Bois de Briulles—Nantillois—Apremont—Pont a l'Aune—Mn de l'Homme mort. Montfaucon was carried on the morning of the 27th by General Kuhn's (79th) Division which, by the 28th, had passed through Nantillois, while General Farnsworth's (37th) Division on its left had reached the southern outskirts of Cierges. The center of the army was now abreast of the flanks, but the delay in its advance had permitted the enemy to employ his local reserves to man the strong positions south of Cunel and Romagne. General Bullard's (III Corps) made an important advance on the 27th despite strongly organized resistance, passing through the large forest area on its front and reaching the heights of the Meuse overlooking Vilosnes-sur-Meuse. The battle of General Liggett's (I Corps) greatly increased in severity on the 27th, three new German divisions, including the 5th Guard Division, having appeared in the line on this portion of the front. General Traub's (35th) Division reached Exermont on the 29th, but the violence of the enemy's fire delivered by the newly arrived 52d German Division forced the former to retire to the south of Bois de Montrebeau. The same day General Muir's (28th) Division captured Apremont and established its left in the edge of the Argonne Forest. By the 30th General Alexander's (77th) Division had cleared the Argonne to a depth of seven kilometers.

29. During the first four days of the battle we had achieved a maximum advance of about twelve kilometers through the strongest position on the western front. The enemy was struck such an unexpected and powerful blow through this phase of the attack that his situation was

critical. The loss of his third position on our front would not only threaten the retreat of his troops confronting the Fourth French Army but would expose his vital artery of communication from Carignan through Sedan to Mezieres. At the cost of weakening himself at other points he was forced to strengthen greatly and immediately his armies in the Meuse-Argonne. He had lost approximately 9,000 prisoners and a large amount of materiel, including 100 guns. The entire western front felt the effect of our advance.

The problems presented to our inexperienced divisions during this phase of the fighting were peculiarly perplexing. Liaison between the various echelons was unusually hard to maintain owing to the broken nature of the terrain and the numerous wooded areas. Supported in most instances by artillery units with which they had never before maneuvered, efficient teamwork between the artillery and the infantry was not easily attained.

The supply problems during the Meuse-Argonne operation, especially in the beginning, presented many difficulties. The only roads (3) crossing no-man's-land had been practically obliterated by the fighting of the previous four years and artificial obstacles, such as mine craters and contact mines, had been freely employed by the enemy. Notwithstanding the limited time available, the scarcity of service troops, transferred from the St. Mihiel front as rapidly as they could be spared, and the heavy rainfall which interfered with the moving of heavy artillery, the task of transporting troops, supplies, and ammunition was accomplished in a very commendable and successful manner due mainly to the work of pioneer, road, railroad, and truck train troops.

During this period and throughout the battle, the Army Commander, assisted by his immediate personal staff and other officers especially equipped for this duty, frequently visited corps and divisions to give personal encouragement to commanders and staffs, to adjust difficulties, and to indicate the most advantageous methods of handling the troops in future attacks.

30. The severity of the fighting from September 26th to the 30th, and the intermingling of some units, necessi-

tated the relief of the 35th, 37th, and 79th Divisions by the divisions commanded by Generals Summerall (1st), Haan (32nd), and Buck (3rd), respectively. This change was completed by the morning of October 1st. The 91st Division was withdrawn to corps reserve, and the 92nd Division was placed at the disposal of the XXXVIII French Corps. The 1st Division was moved from its reserve position in the rear of the center and right corps, to a first-line position on the right of the left corps. This operation involved a complicated road movement, but the situation on the right of the I Corps and the desire to assure the dislodgment of the enemy from his position east of Fleville, prompted the employment of this experienced and tried division on this portion of the field.

The relief indicated above, involving the movement of approximately 150,000 men in and out of the battle line during the period when the communications across no-man's-land were in process of being restored and already severely taxed by heavy movements of artillery and supplies to the front and the evacuation of wounded to the rear, constituted an achievement creditable to all concerned.

31. Between September 26th and 30th, the German order of battle west to east was as follows:

IN LINE	IN RESERVE
<i>Between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse River.</i>	<i>Not appearing in line within this period.</i>
9th Landwehr Division	53d Reserve Division
76th Reserve Division	228th Division
2d Landwehr Division	44th Reserve Division
45th Reserve Division (Elements)	17th Reserve Division (?)
52d Division	1st Austrian Division (?)
53d Division (In close support)	<i>In Woevre (Exhausted).</i>
5th Guard Division	192d Division
1st Guard Division	10th Division
117th Division	77th Reserve Division
37th Division	
115th Division	
5th Bavarian Reserve Division	<i>In Metz Area.</i>
7th Reserve Division	25th Division
Total 11 Divisions plus one in close support and also elements of another.	204th Division
	37th Austro-Hungarian Division (?)
	38th Austro-Hungarian Division (?)

Between the Meuse and Moselle Rivers.

1st Austro-Hungarian Division
 15th Division
 33d Division
 32d Division
 28th Reserve Division
 8th Landwehr Division
 13th Landwehr Division
 107th Division
 35th Austro-Hungarian Division
 195th Division
 5th Landwehr Division
 88th Division
 31st Division
 123d Division
 255th Division

Total 15 Divisions.

Grand Total 26 Divisions, plus one in close support and elements of the 45th Reserve Division.

In Lorraine.

41st Division
 31st Reserve Division
 1st Landwehr Division
 Total 15 Divisions

32. A study of the situation existing on October 1st, revealed the importance of three hostile points, intimately connected with the problem of a further advance:

(1) Cunel Heights, supported on the east by the hostile artillery across the Meuse River and on the west by the fire from the heights of the Bois de Romagne.

(2) The heights of the Bois de Romagne, supported by fire from Cunel Heights, and on the west by fire from the heights of the Argonne Forest.

(3) The eastern edge of the Argonne Forest, especially in the vicinity of Chatel Chehery and Cornay.

In addition to these strong points, a secondary position extended from the heights of the Bois de Romagne to Fleville, which prevented infiltration between the above heights and the Aire River, and any extensive flank attack against Cornay and Chatel Chehery.

33. Based upon the foregoing situation, a general attack was ordered with the following objects in view:

(a) By concerted effort General Bullard's (III) and Cameron's (V) Army Corps were to carry the heights of Cunel and of Romagne. The main effort was to be directed against the western flank of Cunel Heights, in order to avoid enemy fire from the east bank of the Meuse River, and against the eastern flank of Romagne Heights. Heavy

counter battery fire with high explosives and gas was to be maintained throughout the attack, and the observation stations east of the Meuse River were to be blinded by a similar fire.

(b) General Liggett's (I) Corps was given the two-fold mission of neutralizing the flanking fire delivered by the enemy from the eastern edge of the Argonne Forest and of assisting the left of General Cameron's (V) Corps by capturing the western portion of the heights of the Bois de Romagne. This last mission also included the expulsion of the enemy from his position east of Fleville, in order to gain elbow room for launching an attack northwest through Cornay and Chatel Chehery to outflank the Argonne Forest.

34. A renewed general attack was launched at 5:30 on the morning of October 4th. Our order of battle was as follows:

ARGONNE FOREST TO MEUSE RIVER

	<i>I Corps</i>	<i>V Corps</i>	<i>III Corps</i>
Line -----	77-28-1	32-3	80-4-33
Corps Res. -----	82-5 [†] Cav	42-91	
Army Res. -----	92-35	29	

MEUSE RIVER TO MOSELLE RIVER

	<i>XVII French Corps</i>	<i>II French Colonial Corps</i>	<i>IV U.S. Corps</i>
Line -----	18 [†] -10 [†] -15 [†]	26-2 [†] -39 [†]	89-78-90-69 [†]
Corps Res. -----	26 [†]	79	5-7-37

To correct tactical defects disclosed by our initial advance of September 26th, special instructions were given prior to the attack of October 4th regarding flanking maneuvers, mixing of units, and close cooperation between commanders.

The enemy resistance to our advance launched on the 4th of October was desperate in the extreme, and while all objectives were not gained, important progress was made in clearing the way for an attack against the flank of the Argonne Forest.

General Bullard's (III) Corps penetrated the Bois de Cunel, Bois des Ogons and Bois de Fays, but was unable to make any further advance. General Cameron's (V) Corps advanced its line through Gesnes to the foot of the southern

[†] French divisions.

slopes of the heights of Romagne. The right of General Liggett's (I) Corps (1st Division) reoccupied Montrebeau Woods and Exermont, and captured the ridge east of Fleville. The center of this corps extended along the Aire River in liaison with the 1st Division, but little progress was made within the Argonne Forest.

By October 6th the attack had reached the line: Bois de la Cote Lemont— $\frac{1}{2}$ Bois de Fays—north of Gesnes—Cote 240—Fleville (exclusive)—Chehery—Le Chene Tondu—south of Etang de Poligny. (See Plate X.)

35. Throughout this period the fighting was severe, with many instances of hand-to-hand combats between the opposing infantry. The enemy was rapidly pouring his best troops into the battle and they were defending their positions with resolute determination. The effect of our continuous blows was especially reflected in German retirements on other fronts, since to yield on this front would imperil the enemy's whole army. Our previous conclusion that we must maintain the battle until the enemy was worn out was now fully confirmed, and arrangements looking far ahead as to our own resources were pushed accordingly.

The Fourth French Army was not able to drive the enemy from his strong position about St. Etienne, and Marshal Foch asked that two American divisions be sent to assist. Though much needed to replace exhausted troops in the Meuse-Argonne, General Lejeune's (2d) and General W. R. Smith's (36th) Divisions were designated for this purpose and succeeded in brilliant fashion, the 2d carrying the key-point in the German line October 3d and 4th, which made possible the further advance of the Fourth French Army, and the 36th relieving the 2d on October 10th and advancing 26 kilometers to the Aisne River by October 12th.

36. Between October 1st and 6th the German order of battle on our front, west to east, was:

IN LINE	IN RESERVE
9th Landwehr Division	<i>Not appearing in line within this period.</i>
76th Reserve Division	17th Reserve Division
2d Landwehr Division	228th Division
52d Division	15th Austro-Hungarian Division
45th Reserve Division (1 Regiment)	106th Austro-Hungarian Division
1st Guard Division	108th Division (?)
5th Guard Division	195th Division
115th Division	<i>In Woevre (Exhausted).</i>
53d Reserve Division	192d Division
37th Division	10th Division
236th Division	77th Reserve Division
28th Division	<i>In Metz Area.</i>
5th Bavarian Reserve Division	25th Division
1st Austro-Hungarian Division	204th Division
15th Division	37th Austro-Hungarian Division (?)
33d Division	38th Austro-Hungarian Division (?)
32d Division	<i>In Lorraine.</i>
28th Reserve Division	41st Division
8th Landwehr Division	1st Landwehr Division
13th Landwehr Division	<i>Divisions Withdrawn.</i>
107th Division	7th Reserve Division
35th Austro-Hungarian Division	117th Division
5th Landwehr Division	Total 17 divisions.
88th Division	
31st Division	
123d Division	
255th Division	
1 Division (about) composed of unidentified Austrian units	
Total 27 divisions plus one regiment of the 45th Reserve Division.	

37. While the enemy continued to hold the greater portion of the heights of Cunel and of Romagne on October 6th, sufficient space had been gained along the valley of the Aire River to permit a flank attack to the northwest, against the rear of the Argonne Forest, making it possible to complete the "pinching out" of that obstacle.

Another important consideration prompted the decision to seize this opportunity to force a rapid withdrawal of the enemy from the Argonne Forest. The liaison detachment under the XXXVIII French Corps, Fourth French Army, had failed to advance, exposing our left. On October 2d a mixed battalion of General Alexander's (77th) Division (on our extreme left) pushed forward to a position in the forest about two kilometers northeast of Binarville, while the units on the flanks were unable to make similar headway. This resulted in the isolation of this small force

which was completely surrounded by the enemy. For four days every effort of the division to break through and relieve the beleaguered force was unsuccessful, and it was apparent that its food and ammunition would soon be exhausted. As a matter of fact, the men soon consumed all their rations, and little ammunition remained. Only by a remarkable exhibition of fortitude and heroism was the command enabled to survive the fierce onslaughts of the enemy. Disdaining any thought of surrender, the unequal fight was maintained day and night.

In this extremity, an attack by General Muir's (23th) and General Duncan's (82) Divisions was launched against the left flank and rear of the enemy's position in the Argonne, on the early morning of the 7th, in the region of Chatel Chehery and Cornay. At the same time General Alexander's (77th) Division pressed its advance towards the surrounded force. The success of the former attack was immediate, though attended by particularly vicious fighting, including the celebrated incident for which Sergeant Alvin C. York, of the 82d Division, received the Congressional Medal of Honor. Threatened in rear, the enemy commenced his withdrawal from the Argonne by noon of the 7th, which resulted in the rapid advance of units of General Alexander's (77th) Division to the relief of the so-called "Lost Battalion" that night. After October 5th, the liaison detachment of the XXXVIII French Corps having been withdrawn, connection with the Fourth Army was maintained by a flank detachment furnished by our left division.

In a letter dated September 30th, Marshal Foch discussed the question of extending the First American Army attack to the east bank of the Meuse, which we had already planned to initiate as soon as available divisions for the purpose could be withdrawn from the St. Mihiel front. In the same letter, he suggested limiting the operation of the First American Army to both banks of the Meuse River, and creating a new force, part French and part American, under French command, to operate on both flanks of the Argonne Forest. The main objectives of these operations would remain the same.

In reply to his suggestions it was pointed out that the proposal did not appear advisable, because so long as the objectives of the operation remained Sedan and Mezieres, the problems of the Meuse Valley and the Argonne Forest were inseparable. Aside from the tactical aspects, a glance at the supply situation clearly demonstrated the inadvisability of such changes. The discussion terminated with the approval of the proposed attack by the First Army to the east of the Meuse River.

38. Four specific attacks were planned and executed in the third phase:

(1) *October 7th.*—The I Corps, employing the 82d Division between the 1st and 28th Divisions, attacked the eastern edge of the Argonne Forest.

(2) *October 8th.*—The XVII French Corps, reinforced by the 33d and 29th U.S. Divisions, attacked on the front Beaumont—Brabant-sur-Meuse, with the object of seizing the heights east of the Meuse River.

(3) *October 9th.*—The V Corps, reinforced by including the 1st Division within its front, and by one brigade from the 91st Division, attacked the heights of the Bois de Romagne.

(4) *October 10th-11th.*—The results achieved by the I and V Corps called for a general attack on the entire front from Beaumont to the Aisne River.

39. These attacks were very successful, especially those of General Liggett's (I) American and the XVII French Corps. The former, by hard fighting on October 7th, 8th, and 9th, succeeded in driving the enemy from the eastern edge of the Argonne Forest; and then cleared the forest by a rapid advance northwest into the open ground, forcing the enemy's retirement from the front of the right of the Fourth French Army.

The attack by the XVII French Corps, with two French and two American divisions, making this corps two-thirds American, advanced our lines to the commanding ground marked by Sivry-sur-Meuse—Bois de la Gde Montagne—Bois d'Haumont—LaWavrille, and further resulted in the capture of over 3,000 prisoners, a number of whom were Austrians. This advance secured for us and deprived the

enemy of several important observation points. Its main purpose, however, was to increase the fighting front of the army and thus absorb and consume the maximum possible number of German divisions. In this latter respect, the attack was particularly successful, aimed as it was directly at the vital pivot of the German line on the western front, and, until the Armistice, this threat forced the enemy to maintain in this region a large number of divisions.

The narrowness of the ridge east of and parallel to the Meuse River limited the number of troops that could be employed there by the First Army. This restriction, coupled with the heavy hostile artillery fire directed from the vicinity of Romagne-sous-les-Cotes and from north of Damvillers, prevented a deeper advance, or the clearing of the heights of the Cotes de Meuse until we were able to launch our attack from south of Dun-sur-Meuse as originally planned.

40. To reap the advantage of these blows, General Cameron's (V) Corps attacked in force on October 9th, and cleared the southern slopes of the Bois de Gesnes and of Le Petit Bois. On the 10th it advanced its line to Sommerance—northwestern edge of the Bois de Romagne—Romagne-sous-Montfaucon (exclusive). In the meantime General Bullard's (III) Corps had advanced through the Bois de Fays and secured a solid footing in the Bois de Foret.

The attacks of General Bullard's (III) and Cameron's (V) Corps had driven the enemy from his positions in front of the Kriemhilde-Stellung, and in the vicinity of Romagne-sous-Montfaucon had captured elements of this defensive system. The fighting continued to be stubborn and frequently hand-to-hand; the enemy's resistance increased, and every foot of ground gained by our troops was bitterly contested. This period will be recorded as covering some of the hardest infantry fighting on the western front.

By the evening of October 11th, our line stood from east to west: La Wavrille—western half of Bois d'Ormont—Molleville Farm—Bois de Chaume—Bois de la Cote Lemont—Bois de Brieulles—part of Bois de Foret—south of Cunel—south of Romagne-sous-Montfaucon—south of Cote Dame Marie—Sommerance—Aire River to Grandpre, exclusive. (See Plate XI.)

41. At this time the German order of battle from west to east was as follows:

IN LINE	IN RESERVE
9th Landwehr Division	<i>Not appearing in line within this period.</i>
76th Reserve Division	27th Division
53d Reserve Division (Elements)	15th Austro-Hungarian Division
5th Guard Division	17th Reserve Division
2d Landwehr Division	37th Honved Division (Hungarian Landwehr)
45th Reserve Division	
37th Division	
41st Division	
52d Division	<i>In Woevre</i>
115th Division	10th Division
123d Division	77th Reserve Division
228th Division	
236th Division	<i>In Metz Area</i>
5th Bavarian Reserve Division	37th Austro-Hungarian Division
28th Division	38th Austro-Hungarian Division
7th Reserve Division	
15th Division	<i>In Lorraine</i>
106th Austro-Hungarian Division	<i>Withdrawn</i>
1st Austro-Hungarian Division	117th Division
32d Division	Total 9 divisions.
33d Division	
192d Division	
28th Reserve Division	
8th Landwehr Division	
13th Landwehr Division	
107th Division	
35th Austro-Hungarian Division	
5th Landwehr Division	
88th Division	
31st Division	
123d Division	
255th Division	
Total 31 divisions; also elements of 53d Reserve Division.	

42. The First Army order of battle, by days, during this period was as follows:

Oct. 7—MEUSE-ARGONNE FRONT

	<i>I Corps</i>	<i>V Corps</i>	<i>III Corps</i>
Line -----	77-28-82	1-32-3	80-4
Corps Res. ----	5 Fr. Cav.	42	5
Army Res. ----	78-35	91	

MEUSE-MOSELLE FRONT

	<i>XVII French Corps</i>	<i>XXXIII French Corps</i>	<i>II French Colonial Corps</i>	<i>IV U.S. Corps</i>
Line -----	33-18 ^f -26 ^f	10 ^f 15 ^f	26-2 ^f -39 ^f	37-90-69 ^f
Corps. Res. ---	29		79	7-92
Army Res. --				89

Oct. 8—MEUSE-ARGONNE FRONT

	<i>I Corps</i>	<i>V Corps</i>	<i>III Corps</i>
Line -----	77-28-82	1 - 1 Brig of 91-32-3	80-4
Corps Res. ----	5 Fr. Cav.	42	5
Army Res. ----	78-35	91 (Less 1 Brig)	89

MEUSE-MOSELLE FRONT

	<i>XVII French Corps</i>	<i>XXXIII French Corps</i>	<i>II French Colonial Corps</i>	<i>IV U.S. Corps</i>
Line -----	33-29-18 ^f -26 ^f	10 ^f -15 ^f	26-2 ^f -39 ^f	37-90-69 ^f
Corps Res. ---			79	7-92
Army Res. --				

Oct. 9—MEUSE-ARGONNE FRONT

	<i>I Corps</i>	<i>V Corps</i>	<i>III Corps</i>
Line -----	77-82	1 - 1 Brig of 91-32-3	80-4
Corps Res. ----	28-5 ^f Cav.	42	5
Army Res. ----	78-35	91 (less 1 Brig)	89

MEUSE-MOSELLE FRONT

	<i>XVII French Corps</i>	<i>XXXIII French Corps</i>	<i>II French Colonial Corps</i>	<i>IV U.S. Corps</i>
Line -----	33-29-18 ^f -26 ^f	10 ^f -15 ^f	79-2 ^f -39 ^f	37-90-92
Corps Res. ---				7
Army Res. --	26			

43. To coordinate the operations of the Fourth French Army and the First American Army, French General Headquarters, on October 10th, fixed the boundary between them as far north as Boult-aux-Bois, while on the 12th the direction of the First Army's advance was designated Buzancy—Mezieres, and the Fourth French Army, having reached the west bank of the Aisne River from Vouziers to

^f French divisions.

west of Grandpre, was to cooperate on the east bank of that river with the left of the First American Army.

44. The attacks during the preceding phase, although reaching the third position of the Hindenburg Line, and even capturing a portion of this position near Romagne and Cunel, left in the enemy's hands the strong defensive organizations in the Bois de Romagne and in the Bois de Bantheville, commanding and flanking terrain to the east and west. These woods had to be reduced before a further considerable advance could be made. Cunel Heights was disputed territory and its occupation by troops of General Bulard's (III) Corps was fiercely contested by the enemy.

To the west of Romagne Heights, our line faced the strongly fortified position of Cote de Chatillon—Landres-et-St. Georges — St. Georges — St. Juvin — Champigneulle—Bois des Loges—Grandpre—and the fortified line joining these points, with the Aire River as an obstacle.

Hard fighting continued east of the Meuse River, where lack of space and the exceptionally rugged terrain prohibited the employment of large forces and limited us to a series of local operations.

As has been seen, the Fourth French Army had now come up on our left and held the southern bank of the Aire River and the west bank of the Aisne River to include Vouziers.

45. The situation confronting us was in many respects similar to that encountered in the initial attack. It was again practically a problem of forcing our way through a defile. The defenses of the Bois de Romagne and of the Bois de Bantheville may be compared to those of the Bois de Montfaucon, Bois de Cheppy, and Montfaucon; the defenses of Cunel Heights to those of the Bois de Forges; and those of Champigneulle, Bois des Loges and Bois de Bourgogne to the Argonne Forest. The enemy's positions were ideal for defense. Wood fighting had already delayed us considerably because the full value of our powerful artillery could not be utilized in attacks against such natural positions as the Bois de Romagne and the Bois de Bantheville. The decision was therefore made to attack in the same manner as in the initial advance of September 26th.

Plans for a general attack were prepared, based on the following:

(a) The XVII French Corps was to continue its offensive east of the Meuse River.

(b) The III and V Corps, with fresh divisions (Generals McMahon's [5th] and Menoher's [42d]), were to drive salients through the hostile third positions on both flanks of the Bois de Romagne and of the Bois de Bantheville, utilizing their other divisions to clear the woods and connect up these salients. The two attacks were to join on a line Les Grands Carres—La Bergerie Ferme and then to advance northwards.

(c) The I Corps was to hold the enemy on its left flank while advancing its right in conjunction with the left of the V Corps.

(d) The Fourth French Army was ordered by General Petain to attack on the same day, so as to outflank the enemy opposing our left.

46. In order to complete the relief of the 1st and 80th Divisions by the 42d and 5th, and to arrange other details, our attack was planned for October 15th, but as the Fourth French Army was to attack on the 14th, our arrangements were changed as far as possible to conform.

The plan of the V Corps provided for an initial attack by its center brigade, in advance of the main attack, to clear the Cote Dame Marie. Arrangements for barrages and distribution of troops had progressed so far that this attack, which was originally designed as a holding attack, could not be changed, and necessitated the designation of 8:30 A.M. as the hour for the main attack, and 5:30 A.M. as the hour for the preliminary attack mentioned above.

47. The enemy opposed a violent resistance to our advance on the morning of the 14th, and only small gains were realized on this day, the most important being the Cote Dame Marie west of Romagne and south of Landres-et-St. Georges.

The attack was continued on the 15th and 16th, and as a result our front was advanced to the line (east to west) La Waville—western half of Bois d'Ormont—south of the Bois de la Grande Montagne—Bois de Chaume—Bois de la

Cote Lemont—Bois de Brioules—southern portion of Bois de Foret—part of Bois de la Pultiere—Cunel—Romagnesous-Montfaucon—north of Cote Dame Marie—northern edge of Bois de Romagne—Cote de Chatillon—south of Landres-et-St. Georges—south of St. Georges—St. Juvin—Aire River. The principal advance was made in the center over the Cote Dame Marie and through the Bois de Romagne. (See Plate XI.)

The success of the attack of General Hines' (III) Corps was limited by the heavy hostile machine gun and artillery fire from the direction of the Bois de Bantheville, the Bois des Rappes, and the Bois de la Pultiere, which held up the advance, in spite of provisions which had been made in the corps plans to neutralize these localities. The attack was deprived of the means of maintaining a continuous pressure by the premature employment of the infantry supports and reserves of one division.

The attack of General Summerall's (V) Corps was held up on the left by heavy resistance encountered along the Kriemhilde—Stellung; and for the same reason the right of General Liggett's (I) Corps failed to make much headway. However, the attack in the center of the army on the right of General Summerall's (V) Corps gained material advantages, as the hostile third position was passed at a vital point and, as will be indicated later, an opening for further advances was gained. In other words, what was intended to be a holding and mopping up attack actually made the most important progress, partially as a result of the heavy pressure being exerted along adjacent portions of the front.

48. The order of battle of the First Army for this attack was:

ARGONNE FOREST TO MEUSE RIVER

	<i>I Corps</i>	<i>V Corps</i>	<i>III Corps</i>
Line -----	77-82	42-32	5-3-4
Corps Res. -----	78-5 Fr. Cav.	89	
Army Res. -----	1-91		80-90

MEUSE RIVER TO FRESNES-EN-WOEVRE

	XVII French Corps	XXXIII French Corps
Line -----	33-29-18 ^t -26 ^t -10 ^t	15 ^t
Corps Res -----	26	35
Army Res -----	-	-

NOTE.—Front from Fresnes-en-Woevre to Moselle River turned over to Second Army, A.E.F. on Oct. 12th.

49. During this same period, the order of battle of the enemy, west to east, was:

IN LINE

195th Division
 76th Reserve Division
 2d Landwehr Division
 45th Reserve Division
 37th Division (Elements)
 15th Bavarian Division
 13th Division
 41st Division
 52d Division
 115th Division
 236th Division
 3d Guard Division
 123d Division
 199th Division
 28th Division
 107th Division
 5th Bavarian Reserve Division
 (Elements)
 106th Austro-Hungarian
 Division
 228th Division
 32d Division
 15th Division
 33d Division
 27th Division
 1st Austro-Hungarian Division
 192d Division
 28th Reserve Division
 13th Landwehr Division
 2 Unidentified Divisions
 35th Austro-Hungarian Division
 5th Landwehr Division
 88th Division
 31st Division
 255th Division
 7th Reserve Division
 (Elements)
 Total 32 divisions plus elements of
 37th Division, 5th Bavarian
 Reserve Division and 7th Reserve
 Division. Estimated total
 strength in line 33½ divisions.

IN RESERVE

Not appearing in line within this period.

37th Honved Division (Hungarian Landwehr)
 15th Austro-Hungarian Division

In Woevre.

10th Division
 77th Reserve Division

Withdrawn (Exhausted).

117th Division
 1st Guard Division
 5th Guard Division
 9th Landwehr Division
 Total 8 divisions.

^t French divisions.

50. On October 15th request was made by the Allied Commander-in-Chief for two American divisions of the First Army to be dispatched to Belgium to assist the Sixth French Army near Ypres. Generals Johnston's (91st) and Farnsworth's (37th) Divisions were selected for this purpose and entrained on the 17th.

51. The Fourth French Army continued its attacks, in liaison with our left, and succeeded in reaching the Grandpre—Olizy Road on October 13th, only to be driven back to Termes—Brecy on the 14th. The remainder of the front made little progress, except east of Vrizy, where a crossing of the river was effected.

52. On October 12th, orders were issued by the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, for the Second American Army to take over that portion of the First American Army front extending from Fresnes-en-Woevre to Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle River, and at the same time Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett (I Corps) was assigned to the command of the First Army, taking actual command on October 16th.

At this time the American front extended from the western edge of the Argonne Forest one hundred and thirty-three kilometers to Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle River. The western portion (78 kilometers) now formed the First Army front, under Lieutenant General Liggett, with the XVII French Corps, III, V, and I American Corps in the order named from right to left. Lieutenant General R. L. Bullard (III Corps) was designated to command the newly created Second Army, holding the right of our line (55 kilometers), with the VI and IV American Corps and II French Colonial Corps. At the same time, General Joseph T. Dickman was transferred from the IV Corps to command of the more actively engaged I Corps, and Major Generals Charles P. Summerall (1st Division) and John L. Hines (4th Division) were promoted to command the V and III Corps, respectively.

53. In concluding this record of the First Army to October 16th, it is desired to comment on several matters deemed worthy of special mention.

The first half of the Meuse-Argonne battle presented difficulties, numerous and seemingly unsurmountable, which makes the success gained stand as a splendid achievement in the history of American armies. Suddenly conceived and more hurried in plan and preparation; complicated by close association with a preceding major operation and directed against the vital point of the western front; attended by cold and inclement weather and fought largely by partially trained troops: the battle was prosecuted with an aggressive and heroic spirit of courage and fortitude which demanded eventual success despite all obstacles. The morale of the American soldier during this most trying period was superb. Physically strong and virile, naturally courageous and aggressive, inspired by unselfish and idealistic motives, he guaranteed the victory and drove a veteran enemy from his last ditch. Too much credit cannot be given him; his patriotism, courage, and fortitude were beyond praise.

Upon the young commanders of platoons, companies, and battalions fell the heaviest burden. They not only suffered all the dangers and rigors of the fight but carried the responsibility of caring for and directing their men, often newly arrived and not fully trained. Where these leaders lacked practical knowledge of battle tactics they supplied the deficiency by courageous onslaughts against the enemy's line. Yet quick to learn, they soon developed on the field into skilled leaders and inspired their men with increased confidence.

To the higher commanders and their staffs great credit is due for the successful performance of an exceptionally complicated and arduous task. The problems born of inexperience multiply with each increase of strength, and the division, corps, and particularly the army headquarters were confronted by problems of superlative difficulty. Their work is seldom appreciated and its importance rarely realized. The army staff at one time was involved in serving a front of 93 miles and a force of approximately one million men. With typical American directness of action and intensity of purpose, each successfully carried out his duties despite all complications and every untoward event. To Brigadier General Hugh A. Drum, my chief of staff for the

First Army, especial credit is due for the discharge of his vast responsibilities with high efficiency.

Deeds of valor were too numerous to mention here. Outstanding was the heroism of Lieutenant Samuel Woodfill, 5th Division, in attacking single-handed a series of German machine gun nests near Cunel and killing the crews of each in turn until reduced to the necessity of assaulting the last detachment with a pick, dispatching them all; and of Sergeant Alvin C. York of the 82d Division, in standing off and capturing 132 Germans after his patrol was literally surrounded and outnumbered ten to one; and of Major Charles S. Whittlesey and his men of the 77th Division, when their battalion was cut off in the Argonne, in refusing to surrender and holding out until finally relieved. Doubtless many died in performing deeds of unknown heroism, and no survivor remained to testify.

In these difficult operations, the personality and leadership of Generals Hunter Liggett, Robert L. Bullard, Joseph T. Dickman, Charles P. Summerall and John L. Hines stand out conspicuously. Displaying exceptional efficiency in battle, these officers were promoted to command Armies and Army Corps, the numerical strength of which was larger than any similar American units heretofore engaged in battle. Their names will always be associated with the following operations.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HUNTER LIGGETT:

I Corps in crossing the Ourcq in the Aisne-Marne offensive, in the St. Mihiel offensive, and in reducing the Argonne Forest; First Army's general advance and pursuit November 1 to 11, 1918.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT L. BULLARD:

1st Division at Cantigny; III Corps in the Marne-Aisne offensive and in the initial attacks in the Meuse-Argonne; Second Army, October 12 to November 11, 1918.

MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH T. DICKMAN:

3d Division in the Aisne-Marne defensive and offensive; IV Corps in the St. Mihiel offensive; I Corps in the Meuse-Argonne operations, and in the general advance and pursuit November 1 to 7, 1918; Third Army's march to the Rhine.

MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES P. SUMMERALL:

1st Brigade F. A. 1st Division at Cantigny; 1st Division at Soissons, in the St. Mihiel offensive and in breaking the German defenses between Bois de Romagne and Fleville, October 4 to 9, 1918; V Corps in the Meuse-Argonne operations, and in the general advance and pursuit November 1 to 7, 1918.

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN L. HINES:

1st Brigade, 1st Division at Soissons; 4th Division in the initial attacks in the Meuse-Argonne, capturing the Bois de Foret; III Corps in the Meuse-Argonne operations, and in the general advance and pursuit, and the crossing of the Meuse, November 1 to 11, 1918.

Associated with the commanders mentioned above were many sterling and steadfast leaders. The following were promoted to Army Corps commands for marked efficiency in battle:

MAJOR GENERAL C. H. MUIR:

Commanded the 28th Division in the Aisne-Marne offensive and in the difficult attacks along the eastern flank of the Argonne; later commanded the IV Corps.

MAJOR GENERAL W. M. WRIGHT:

Commanded the 89th Division in the St. Mihiel offensive and in the general advance and pursuit in the Meuse-Argonne November 1 to 11, 1918; later commanded the I Corps.

MAJOR GENERAL ADELBERT CRONKHITE:

Commanded the 80th Division in the initial attacks of the Meuse-Argonne and in the general advance and pursuit November 1 to 5, 1918; later commanded the IV Corps.

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM G. HAAN:

Commanded the 32d Division in the Aisne-Marne offensive, and in the severe fighting about Bois de Romagne in the Meuse-Argonne offensive; later commanded the VII Corps.

MAJOR GENERAL HENRY T. ALLEN:

Commanded the 90th Division in the St. Mihiel offensive and in the general advance and pursuit in the Meuse-Argonne November 1 to 11, 1918; later commanded the VIII Corps.

MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES T. MENOHER:

Commanded the 42d Division in the Aisne-Marne defensive and offensive, in the St. Mihiel offensive, and in the severe fighting about Bois de Romagne in the Meuse-Argonne and in the general advance and pursuit November 1 to 7, 1918; later commanded the VI Corps.

There were many commanders of divisions and of brigades and others in important staff positions who served with efficiency deserving of special mention. Complete analysis of achievements of units and of staff sections and departments would be necessary in order to allot full credit to all, a task impossible in a report of such limited scope.

54. The following pages of this report cover the operations of the First Army to the conclusion of hostilities, during which period it was commanded with conspicuous suc-

cess by Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett, whose splendid leadership of the I Army Corps, previously cited, had so fully demonstrated his fitness for this high command.

JOHN J. PERSHING,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding First Army,
A. E. F.

* * * * *

Second Section

REPORT OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL HUNTER LIGGETT
U. S. ARMY

OPERATIONS

October 16, 1918, to April 20, 1919

PART IV (b)

Meuse-Argonne Offensive

October 16, 1918, to the Armistice .

55. Instructions were received on October 16th from the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, reiterating in principle the existing missions. However, the details of the First Army's mission were somewhat changed. In these new instructions the enemy was to be driven to the east and across the Meuse River. A further advance was to be made as soon as possible in conjunction with the Fourth French Army. The first mission was to clear the woods east of the Aisne and north of the Aire and thus flank that part of the hostile line on the Aisne.

56. The fifth phase included three important undertakings: (a) preparation for a powerful general attack, (b) local operations to secure a suitable line of departure for the general attack, and (c) the operations against the Bois des Loges and Bois de Bourgogne, in compliance with the instructions mentioned in paragraph 55 above.

57. While the hard and bitter fighting from September 26th had accomplished excellent results both in actual gains and in consumption of hostile divisions, such a long period of continuous fighting had been very trying on our troops. There was a serious need for rest and reorganization. The series of successive attacks, one after the other, covering a period of three weeks, had resulted in a certain loss of cohesion and in a tendency to uncoordinated action. It was essential to gather the army as a team in order that its full weight might be employed in a powerful and concerted blow.

The 28th of October was tentatively designated for the next general attack and all efforts directed to that end. In preparation for this attack, arrangements were made for a reorganization of the front line and the utilization of fresh divisions. Every effort was made to profit by past

experience and to encourage the fighting spirit of the command. This latter effort was stimulated by the Army Commander and staff making frequent visits to subordinate commands and issuing pertinent instructions, to which there was an immediate and effective response as evidenced by later results.

58. A series of local operations were executed to facilitate the initial advance in the approaching operation. While we had pierced the hostile third position on the Cunel and Romagne heights, advances were necessary in these localities to secure a suitable line of departure. It was desirable to drive the enemy from the Bois des Rappes, Clairs Chenes and the high ground east thereof and to secure the northern edge of the Bois de Bantheville. These operations were successfully carried out by Hines' (III) and Summerall's (V) Corps during this period. Some very hard local fights took place in which our troops always succeeded in gaining the advantage. By the 20th of October, the line of Hines' (III) and Summerall's (V) Corps ran north of the Bois de Foret, Clairs Chenes, Bois des Rappes, and along the northern and western flanks of the Bois de Bantheville and Cote de Chatillon, and then south of Landres-et-St. Georges and St. Georges. The situation was excellent as will be indicated later. To the east of the Meuse by local attacks we continued to advance our line, forcing the enemy to employ fresh troops in that vicinity.

59. In accordance with the instructions from G.H.Q., A.E.F., General Dickman's (I) Corps, in conjunction with the Fourth French Army, conducted operations to clear the Bois des Loges and southern part of the Bois de Bourgogne. An examination of the situation on General Dickman's (I) Corps front at this time will indicate both the desirability and the probability of success of such an operation. An advance in this vicinity would flank the Germans on the Aisne, and also flank their defenses to the east of the Bois des Loges. A study of the characteristics of the terrain, including the Aire River, and of the wooded abrupt bluffs and mutually supporting spurs, shows the difficulties of the task. In addition, the enemy, realizing the importance of this flank, employed his best troops to defend it.

The fighting on General McRae's (78th) Division front, for a period of ten days, was very severe, especially near the Bois des Loges, Grandpre, and Talma Ferme. Frequent counter attacks coupled with flanking machine gun and artillery fire forced our troops back in several instances. However, on the 26th, General Dickman's (I) Corps succeeded in gaining a footing on the high ground and in the woods east of Talma Ferme, and, by the 27th, had driven the enemy from Grandpre. The Bois des Loges still remained in the enemy's hands. The above maneuver carried the right of the Fourth French Army forward, and a line was thus secured especially advantageous for a general attack. This fighting had a material effect on the final attack, as it drew the enemy's strength to the I Corps front and away from the center, where our main attack was to be made.

60. During the remaining days of this period, local fighting continued, especially in General Hines' (III) Corps which captured Aincreville on the 31st.

61. The army's order of battle changed considerably during this period, principally in preparation for the general attack.

On October 24th the order of battle was as follows:

ARGONNE TO MEUSE			
	<i>I Corps</i>	<i>V Corps</i>	<i>III Corps</i>
Line -----	78-82	42-89	90-3
Corps Res. ----	77-80	32-1-2	5
Army Res. ----			
MEUSE TO FRESNES-EN-WOEVRE			
	<i>XVII French Corps</i>		<i>XXXIII French Corps</i>
Line -----	15 ^f -29-26-26 ^f 10 ^f		35

By October 31st the order of battle was:

ARGONNE TO MEUSE			
	<i>I Corps</i>	<i>V Corps</i>	<i>III Corps</i>
Line -----	78-77-80	42-89	90-5
Corps Res. ----	82	2-1	3-32
Army Res. ----	6	29	
MEUSE TO FRESNES-EN-WOEVRE			
	<i>XVII French Corps</i>		<i>XXXIII French Corps</i>
Line -----	15 ^f -79-26-26 ^f -10 ^f		35

NOTE.—During this phase the 77th and 5th Divisions were withdrawn for short rests and to reorganize.

^f French divisions.

62. At this time, the enemy's order of battle, west to east, was:

IN LINE

195th Division
 76th Reserve Division
 103d Division
 2d Landwehr Division
 240th Division
 45th Reserve Division
 15th Bavarian Division
 41st Division
 13th Division
 115th Division
 3d Guard Division
 28th Division
 123d Division
 107th Division
 88th Division
 5th Bavarian Reserve Division
 (Elements)
 One Division (Unidentified)
 7th Reserve Division (Elements)
 1st Austro-Hungarian Division
 228th Division
 32d Division
 192d Division
 1st Landwehr Division
 15th Division
 33d Division
 27th Division
 106th Austro-Hungarian Division
 28th Reserve Division
 3d Bavarian Division
 13th Landwehr Division
 Total 28 Divisions. Also elements
 of the 5th Bavarian Reserve Di-
 vision and 7th Reserve Division
 in line.

IN RESERVE

Not appearing in line at this time.

37th Honved Division
 20th Division
 15th Austro-Hungarian Divi-
 sion (?)
 5th Guard Division
 52d Division
 241st Division

Withdrawn (Exhausted)

117th Division
 236th Division
 37th Division
 9th Landwehr Division
 Total 10 Divisions.

63. During this phase, changes in corps boundaries and reliefs of divisions became necessary. The reasons for these changes are apparent. However, the difficulties, both to the troops and to the staffs, to be overcome in these moves should be appreciated. Aside from the tactical requirements of the actual fighting and the losses incident thereto, three other considerations were involved:

(a) The attacking front of the army (Argonne to Meuse and Meuse to Beaumont) limited the number of troops that could be profitably employed. Between the Argonne and the Meuse this limit was nine divisions plus

army and corps troops. Between the Meuse and Beaumont, the number varied from three to five divisions.

(b) The roads available and their condition limited the amount of supplies that could be handled. The road capacity was carefully calculated and was found sufficient for the needs of the number of divisions stated in (a), plus a small margin for the increase required during reliefs.

(c) Except for the German dugouts in the Argonne, accommodations for rest and shelter did not exist north of the Clermont—Verdun road, and the weather was usually inclement. Divisions, therefore, had to be moved from and to distant rear areas. This was especially disadvantageous in view of the narrowness of the army rear zone.

64. During the first operation, the following number of divisions were employed on the army's attacking front:

West of Meuse -----	17	
East of Meuse -----	6	(4 French)
	<hr/>	
	23	(4 French)

The Germans employed during this period the following divisions:

West of Meuse -----	25	
East of Meuse -----	13	
	<hr/>	
	38	(4 Divs employed twice)

65. The attacks east of the Meuse had accomplished the primary mission, i.e., extension of the front of attack to force the enemy to engage more divisions. The second mission, i.e., to clear the heights east of Dun-sur-Meuse, could not be accomplished during this period due to lack of space for deployment of more troops and of divisions for this purpose.

The original plans (see Par. 14, Part IV) contemplated a preliminary attack from the south with a subsequent attack to the east from near Dun-sur-Meuse. The latter phase of this plan could not be accomplished with certainty of success until Cunel heights had been captured.

The attacks east of the Meuse deceived the enemy as to future developments. A deep penetration was made on the 8th, 9th and 10th of October which coincided with

the clearing of the Argonne. Bois de la Grande Montagne was taken on the 15th and 16th of October, being closely associated with the general attack west of the Meuse, October 14th. Bois d'Etrayes and Bois Belleau were captured on October 23d, while preparations were under way for the general attack west of the Meuse.

66. During this period the following divisions were employed on the front east of the Meuse:

American -----	4	(counting the 79th Div., which entered front Oct. 29th)
French -----	4	(counting the 10th Div., which did not attack)
German -----	13	(one Div. employed twice)

THE SECOND OPERATION, NOVEMBER 1st-11th

67. The terrain and tactical situation were favorable to the enemy on November 1st. His front had been greatly shortened and the configuration of the line between the Fourth French Army and the First Army permitted him to transfer several divisions from the Fourth French Army front to that of the First Army. On October 31st the enemy's order of battle was that given in par. 62.

68. During the period from October 18th to October 31st, our commanders, staffs, and troops, though closely engaged with the enemy, had a partial opportunity to reorganize and complete arrangements for a powerful blow. Every effort was made to place the army in shape for this attack. The weather took a favorable turn, with a consequent improvement in morale. The front line was reorganized so that the attacking front (between the Meuse and the Aisne) on November 1st was as follows:

	<i>I Corps</i>	<i>V Corps</i>	<i>III Corps</i>
Line -----	78-77-80	2-89	90-5
Corps Res. -----	6-82	42-1	32

Ammunition, supplies, and equipment were at hand in large quantities, and all hospitals had been evacuated.

69. Our front line had been advanced to a more advantageous position from which to launch a general attack. From east of Landres-et-St. Georges to the Meuse we were

beyond the Hindenburg Line and at the Cote de Chatillon we flanked the defenses of Landres-et-St. Georges. By gaining the northern edge of the Bois de Bantheville we were fairly close to the Barricourt ridge.

70. The Fourth French Army had, in the meantime, secured a bridgehead over the Aisne north of Vouziers, and was ready on November 1st, to participate in a combined attack by the two armies to "pinch out" the salient at the junction of the Aire and the Aisne Rivers.

71. The terrain presented a configuration somewhat similar to that encountered in our initial attack, i.e., a broad defile, though the eastern flank of the defile (Barricourt ridge) could be attacked by a direct drive.

On the east, breaking away from the Meuse River at Dun-sur-Meuse, is a main ridge (designated as the Barricourt ridge) which runs northwest via Buzancy to Stonne. On the west is the high wooded country of Bois des Loges and Bois de Bourgogne. Between these two commanding ridges is the lower rolling country forming the center of the defile.

The enemy was known to have strong positions at Bois des Loges, Champigneulle, St. Georges, Landres-et-St. Georges, and Bois des Hazois. Captured documents indicated his intention of organizing a position (Freya Stellung) along the west slopes of the Barricourt ridge. The eastern heights of the Barricourt ridge commanded all the crossings of the Meuse and formed a connecting link with the high ground east of the Meuse, about Cote Saint Germain.

72. Prior to the attack of November 1st, the following instructions were received from G.H.Q., A.E.F.:

(a) A general directive from Marshal Foch, dated October 21st, confirming the agreement reached at a preliminary conference, regarding the combined mission of the Fourth French Army and of the First Army, A.E.F.

(b) Instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, ordering a general attack by the First Army on October 28th, with the object of securing control of Buzancy and of the heights immediately east thereof, after which steps were to be taken to free the Bois de Bourgogne and gain the heights surrounding Briquenay.

On October 27th, the date for the attack was postponed to November 1st or 2nd, as the Fourth French Army could not complete its preparations earlier. The attack was launched on November 1st.

73. Prior to the receipt of the above instructions, plans for a general attack had been prepared by the First Army, copies submitted to G.H.Q., A.E.F., and orders distributed to the troops on October 22nd. These plans contemplated the weight of the attack on the front Aincreville-St. Georges, with the object of capturing *first* the Barricourt ridge and then effecting a junction with the Fourth French Army near Boulton-aux-Bois.

74. The plans in Marshal Foch's directive contemplated the junction of the Fourth French Army and the First Army, A.E.F., in the vicinity of Boulton-aux-Bois, with the weight of the American attack against the front Grandpre—Landres-et-St. Georges. The Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, approved the plan submitted by the First Army as it offered an opportunity to capture the Barricourt ridge, an excellent flank position, which would compel the enemy to withdraw to the east of the Meuse River.

75. The plan adopted is set forth in detail in F.O. No. 88, First Army. Succinctly, the main provisions were (See Plate XII) :

(a) The objectives assigned were: first, the heights of Barricourt, and, second, a subsequent development to Boulton-aux-Bois, by means of which junction would be made with the Fourth French Army and the Bois de Bourgogne and the woods to the north thereof would be reduced.

(b) General Summerall's (V) Corps was to make a deep drive to the north carrying the ridge west of Barricourt, the Bois de Barricourt, and Fosse.

(c) General Hines' (III) Corps was to support the right of the V Corps, turning the east flank of the Bois de Barricourt and carrying that ridge at Villers-devant-Dun.

(d) General Dickman's (I) Corps was to protect the left of the V Corps and eventually make a direct drive to Boulton-aux-Bois.

(e) Exploitation was planned as indicated on the map.

(f) An attack by General Hines' (III) Corps to the east across the Meuse, south of Dun-sur-Meuse, was prepared as a preliminary to our new line of advance to the east.

(g) Special arrangements were made to employ persistent gas on the eastern flank of the Bois de Bourgogne and on other strong points.

(h) An innovation in the employment of the heavy artillery was introduced:

Prior to the commencement of the attack, all sensitive points, known batteries, dumps, crossroads, etc., were systematically bombarded as usual. However, as the attack started, the mass of the army and corps artillery was employed in successive concentration fires which preceded the barrage fire of the divisions of the V and III Corps. The combination of these fires resulted in a danger zone on the front of these corps of 1000 meters in depth. This fire was intense and extremely effective.

(i) Plans for the attack along the front of the III and V Corps provided that specially strong hostile positions were to be attacked by specified units, while the major portion of the divisions pushed rapidly on between these strong points. This scheme worked admirably.

(j) The determination to drive the attack beyond Baricourt ridge prompted the placing of General Parker's (1st) and Menoher's (42d) Divisions in close reserve in rear of the V Corps. If necessary, these divisions were to be passed through General Lejeune's (2d) and Cronkhite's (80th) Divisions to contribute a fresh impulse.

(k) The operation as planned, coupled with the attack of the Fourth French Army, was expected to produce results similar to those secured in the St. Mihiel attack, i.e., the salient between the Fourth French Army and the First Army would be "pinched out." The hard and expensive fighting which would have been necessary in a heavy attack on the I Corps front was avoided.

(l) The army air service (bombing squadrons) was employed in closer liaison with the infantry. Heretofore the main bombing efforts had been directed against the enemy's communications, dumps, concentrations, etc. In

the attack of November 1st, the bombing squadrons attacked the hostile infantry and artillery in close cooperation with our advancing infantry. This resulted in direct material and moral assistance to the infantry during the critical stages of the attack.

76. The advance included three phases, as follows:

(a) The general assault on November 1st.

(b) The pursuit.

(c) The crossing of the Meuse.

77. In the advance of November 1st, Generals Hines' (III) and Summerall's (V) Corps carried their attacks with great dash and spirit to Barricourt ridge, reaching the general line Aincreville—west of Cote 243—northern edge of Bois de Barricourt and center of Bois de la Folie before dark, having broken through the German defensive system and artillery lines. The right of General Dickman's (I) Corps advanced in close liaison with the left of General Summerall's (V) Corps, but the remainder of the I Corps was unable to make much headway during the day. (See Plate XIII.)

78. It was recognized that the strong defenses of the Bois des Loges and of Champigneulle would be difficult and a deep penetration was not expected on this part of the front.

The Fourth French Army on November 1st advanced to the following general line: Primat—east of Falaise—Chestres—Vandy—Terron-sous-Aisne.

79. The situation on the evening of November 1st forced the enemy to resort to one of two modes of action, i.e., to deliver a strong counter attack or to withdraw from all territory south of Buzancy—Boult-aux-Bois.

The blow struck by Generals Hines' (III) and Summerall's (V) Corps was so heavy that the enemy's consequent demoralization would not permit of any return offensive action. In fact, although a serious resistance was offered, he was shortly forced to cross the Meuse near Dun-sur-Meuse and Stenay. The retreat on this part of the field demanded a general withdrawal along the whole front if large captures were to be avoided and unity of command preserved.

80. The attack continued with great force on the 2d and 3d. The III and V Corps hurled the enemy across the Meuse, while the I Corps, preceding the Fourth French Army to Boulton-aux-Bois, drove the hostile rear guards north along the east bank of the Bar River.

81. Plate XIII shows the daily lines for the subsequent days.

82. By November 4th, the enemy was in full retreat on the entire front of the First Army and was much disorganized, especially between the Meuse and the Bar Rivers. Rear guard fights were frequent, the enemy generally employing machine guns distributed in depth. However, our troops, frequently attacking at night, gave him no respite until he crossed the Meuse from Wadelincourt (suburb of Sedan) to the south of Dun-sur-Meuse. During the night of November 6th-7th our troops reached the heights overlooking Sedan.

83. Between November 1st and 7th, the western boundary of the army changed several times, and the notification in several instances reached army headquarters too late to be transmitted to the troops in time to become effective as ordered. The last change, received on the 7th of November, limited the left of the army to Mouzon, the original objective having been Sedan. However, this change was not actually effected until after the Armistice, as the Fourth French Army was not earlier prepared to take over the sector between Mouzon and Sedan. These changes shortened our front on the north, while at the same time, the army was swinging to the east.

The change of direction executed by the First Army (from facing north to facing east) necessitated strong protection on the exposed flank, i.e., to the north, and as the Fourth French Army did not keep abreast of the left of the First Army, the I Corps was maintained on the flank of the V Corps. This resulted in our driving the enemy through Sedan, some of our troops passing through the zone so recently transferred to the Fourth French Army.

84. In effecting the final change of boundary indicated in par. 83, the I Corps was gradually withdrawn to the south for eventual employment in the attack eastward from the vicinity of Dun-sur-Meuse.

85. The crossing of the Meuse River began on November 4th. Between the Meuse and Chiers Rivers, north and northeast of Stenay, there was a very strong position which commanded the crossings of the Meuse in that vicinity. It was apparent that the enemy would make a serious fight in this position in order to cover the withdrawal of his forces retreating on Sedan and Mezieres. Once the Meuse River was crossed south of Stenay, an advance in the direction of Montmedy would turn the position mentioned above. Such a maneuver would also offer excellent opportunities for the capture of the large masses of German troops driven back on the line Sedan—Montmedy. Furthermore, this maneuver would take in reverse the hostile fortifications (Hindenburg Line) about Haraumont, thereby clearing the Cotes de Meuse.

The foregoing considerations accorded with our original plan for the second phase of the attack east of the Meuse (see Part IV (a), par. 14), but as the maneuver required artillery fire from the heights near Villers-devant-Dun to cover the crossing of the Meuse about Dun-sur-Meuse, it was not initiated until these heights had been secured.

86. With the foregoing as a basis, plans to carry the attack in force east of the Meuse were promulgated in First Army's F.O.s Nos. 99 (refers to F.O. No. 87), 101, 102, dated November 3d, 4th, 5th.

On November 4th, General Ely's (5th) Division of General Hines' (III) Corps, crossed the Meuse and established bridgeheads south of Dun-sur-Meuse.

The hostile resistance in front of General Summerall's (V) Corps increased materially, preventing an immediate crossing on its front. However, this corps made all arrangements for and eventually crossed south of Mouzon.

87. The Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, issued instructions on November 5th covering the future operations for both the First and Second Armies, A.E.F. These operations were directed on the general localities of Briey—Longwy, but made no material change in the existing First Army's plans.

88. From November 4th to November 11th, the attack east of the Meuse continued. The Cotes de Meuse were

gradually cleared by the III Corps and 2d C.A.C. French, the XVII French Corps having been relieved by the 2d C.A.C. The attack gradually extended to the south as the enemy was forced to the east. The general line Baalon—Louppy-sur-Loison—Damvillers—Cote de Romagne was carried, and by November 10th an excellent line of departure had been secured for a general attack towards Montmedy.

89. During the period November 6th to 10th, little was to be gained by forcing the Meuse on the front of the V Corps in the face of the physical difficulties and serious resistance to be expected. The I Corps was withdrawing and its divisions were marching to points on the Meuse between Dun-sur-Meuse and Verdun, preparatory to a general attack which would have turned the enemy's strong position in front of the V Corps.

90. Late on November 9th, instructions from the Allied Commander-in-Chief were transmitted by G.H.Q., A.E. F., directing a general attack, which was executed by the First Army on November 10th-11th. Crossings of the Meuse were secured by General Summerall's (V) Corps during the night of November 10th-11th and the remainder of the army advanced on the whole front.

91. At 6:25 A.M., November 11th, word was received that the Armistice had been signed and would take effect at 11:00 o'clock A.M., the same day. Orders were immediately communicated to the troops, enforcing the conditions imposed by the terms of the armistice.

92. The line of the First Army on November 11th at 11:00 o'clock A.M., was: Fresnes-en-Woevre—Grimaucourt—Abaucourt—Ville-devant-Chaumont—Chaumont-devant-Damvillers—Peuvillers—Jametz—Remoiville—Baalon—Stenay—The Meuse—Moulins—The Meuse—Pont Maugis. (See Plate XIII.)

93. The German order of battle was approximately, west to east:

IN LINE

42d Division
 14th Reserve Division
 240th Division*
 202d Division
 195th Division
 45th Reserve Division
 (Elements)
 10th Division*
 76th Reserve Division
 236th Division*
 31st Division*
 7th Reserve Division
 (Elements)
 203d Division
 52d Division*
 115th Division
 103d Division
 15th Bavarian Division
 41st Division
 18th Division
 88th Division
 27th Division
 28th Division
 13th Division
 107th Division
 20th Division*
 117th Division*
 5th Bavarian Reserve
 Division*
 241st Division
 123d Division
 Wurtemberg Mountain Regi-
 ment
 75th Reserve Division
 228th Division
 192d Division
 1st Landwehr Division
 15th Division
 33d Division
 106th Austro-Hungarian
 Division
 32d Division
 37th Division
 5th Guard Division
 3d Bavarian Division
 13th Landwehr Division
 1st Austro-Hungarian Division

Total 39 Divisions: Also elements
 of the Wurtemberg Mountain
 Regiment—7th Reserve Division
 and 45th Reserve Division, total-
 ling approximately 40 Divisions.

IN RESERVE

*Not appearing in line during this
 period.*

15th Austro-Hungarian Divi-
 sion (?)

Withdrawn (Exhausted).

2d Landwehr Division

Total 2 Divisions.

*NOTE.—During this period the
 following divisions changed posi-
 tion:

240th Division
 31st Division
 52d Division
 10th Division
 236th Division
 20th Division
 117th Division
 5th Bavarian Reserve Division

94. The details of the supply, hospitalization, and engi-
 neer undertakings are discussed in the reports of the Assis-
 tant Chief of Staff, G-4. It is sufficient to invite attention to
 the following interesting items:

Supplies and ammunition were provided without shortage for the army, which reached the following strength:

Americans -----	896,000 men
French -----	135,000 men
Total -----	1,031,000 men

The following were the artillery ammunition expenditures from September 26th to November 11th:

75-mm. -----	2,974,953
75-mm., Gas -----	131,791
95-mm. H.E. -----	1,939
105-mm. -----	148,661
120-mm. -----	14,453
145-mm. -----	10,331
155-mm., L-77 -----	41,782
155-mm., L-14 -----	404
155-mm., L-17 -----	80,068
G.P.F. -----	268,712
155-mm., CS-12 -----	1,986
155-mm., CS-17 -----	498,092
155-mm., St. Chamond -----	26,941
220-mm. -----	1,012
220 T.R. -----	3,191
280 -----	2,102
8" -----	9,455
9.2" -----	702

The standard gauge railroads through St. Mihiel to Verdun and through Varennes were reconstructed, in addition to road repair and the construction of many bridges. On the Meuse-Argonne battlefield our engineers constructed 31 kilometers of standard gauge railroad and reconstructed 75 kilometers. They also constructed or rebuilt approximately 250 kilometers of narrow gauge or 60 centimeter railroad. Five hundred and fourteen kilometers of roads were repaired and maintained.

The transportation and supply of divisions to and from the Meuse-Argonne front was an immense task. There were 26 American and 7 French divisions, aside from hundreds of thousands of corps and army troops, moved in and out of the army's zone.

One hundred and seventy-three thousand men were evacuated to the rear and over 100,000 replacements were received during this period.

95. The results achieved by the First Army in the Meuse-Argonne operation are evident. Plate XIV illus-

trates the strategical and tactical importance of the army's advance. A consideration of the situation along the entire western front on October 31st, of the successive changes corresponding with the rapid advance of the First Army from November 1st to November 6th, and of the position of the Army on November 11th, demonstrates the vital character of the blow struck at the enemy's communications south-east of Sedan. He had opposed a desperate resistance in the Meuse-Argonne region throughout the month of October, employing the best of his divisions. On November 1st, the climax of 36 days of constant fighting, his lines gave way and he retreated to the Meuse River completely defeated and was denied the means of supplying his armies to the east of Picardy.

96. During the battle the enemy engaged on the First Army front 43 divisions, having an estimated fighting strength of 470,000 men. These were opposed by 22 American and 6 French divisions, having an approximate strength of 500,000.

97. The enemy's losses during this operation were:

Prisoners captured by the First Army, approximately 26,000.

Estimated German casualties 100,000. (Based on information captured from German sources.)

Eight hundred and seventy-four German cannon and over 3,000 machine guns were captured.

98. The First Army's battle casualties during the Meuse-Argonne were about 117,000, all ranks. (For details see appendix E.)

The First Army's losses are therefore estimated to have been approximately 9,000 less than those of the enemy. This result is remarkable in view of the difficulties of the terrain, constant attacks, and in some instances the employment of partially trained troops.

99. Starting from the east and west line, La Harazee—Bois de Forges, on September 26th, the major portion of the army ended the war on the general north and south line following the Meuse River. Such a change of direction (90°) presented problems of supply as well as maneuver which were only overcome by especially efficient staff work.

PART V

Events Following the Armistice

1. The army carried out the following important functions shortly after the Armistice, in addition to many minor routine duties:

(a) The III Corps Headquarters and 1st, 2d, 3d, 32d, and 42d Divisions, and a number of corps and army troops were transferred to the Third Army as a part of the Army of Occupation. This corps and these divisions were completely outfitted for the march to the Rhine.

(b) The First Army maintained the supply and communication for its units transferred to the Third Army until November 20th. This work included the reconstruction of roads, railroads, and telephone lines into German territory.

(c) Provisions were made for the reception of thousands of destitute persons, including French, Russian and Italian released prisoners.

(d) The entire army battle area was policed during October and November, and the property salvaged was valued at \$20,000,000. The preliminary burial and registration of the dead was completed.

(e) The First Army was gradually withdrawn from its battle area to rest and training areas south of Bar-sur-Aube. These movements were completed by January 1, 1919. The organization of the First Army following its movement to the training area was:

I Corps. Commander, Major General William M. Wright, U.S. Army. Headquarters, Tonnerre, Department of Yonne.

Training areas under jurisdiction of I Corps: 15th, 16th, 19th, and 21st.

Divisions: 36th (16th Area), 78th (21st Area), and 80th (15th Area).

Corps Troops: (19th Area).

V Corps. Commander, Major General Charles P. Summerall, U.S. Army. Headquarters, Nogent-en-Basigny, Department of Haute-Marne.

Training areas under jurisdiction of V Corps: 7th, 8th, 10th, 11th, and 17th.

Divisions: 26th (8th Area), 29th (11th Area), and 82d (10th Area).

Corps Troops: (7th and 17th) Areas.

VIII Corps. Commander, Major General Henry T. Allen, U.S. Army. Headquarters, Montigny-sur-Aube, Department of Cote-d'Or.

Training areas under jurisdiction of VIII Corps: 9th, 12th, 13th, and 14th.

Divisions: 6th (14th Area), 77th (9th Area), and 81st (12th Area).

Corps Troops: (13th Area.)

Army Artillery: Commander, Major General William S. McNair, U.S. Army.

Training area under jurisdiction of Army Artillery: 18th.

PART VI

Special Considerations and Recommendations

1. The Allied Commander-in-Chief directed a large combined offensive on the front of the First Army, A.E.F., Second Army, A.E.F., and the Tenth French Army (between Nancy and Baccarat), to take place on November 14th. This offensive was to be directed against the north and south flanks of Metz, i.e., via Briey and Chateau Salins. The First Army's part of the plan required it to secure, by preliminary operations, a suitable line of departure east of the Meuse. The army, being divided by the Meuse River, would not be favorably disposed for a coordinated effort until it had obtained possession of the high ground between the Chiers and Meuse Rivers. The foregoing, coupled with orders from higher authority already referred to, prompted the attacks of November 10th and 11th. In addition, the disorganization and demoralization of the enemy at this time was such that we could not afford to give him any respite during which to get his forces in hand.

2. The First Army's advance to the neighborhood of Sedan has already been discussed in par. 83, Part IV (b). In accordance with instructions from higher authority, the I and V Corps were, on November 6th, directed to bend their efforts to secure the early fall of Sedan. These instructions gave considerable latitude to these corps in accomplishing this special mission, limiting, however, the operations of the V Corps by the expression "the troops of the I Corps *assisted on their right* by the V Corps."

Some units of the V Corps, in an endeavor to reach Sedan by its west flank, marched directly west through the area of the I Corps and on into that of the Fourth French Army. This resulted in some confusion due to crossings of columns and interference with the supply system of the I Corps. However, immediate and effective steps were

taken, as soon as this situation became known, to have these troops withdrawn to their proper zone of action.

3. The strength of the First Army varied from 600,000 (including French troops) to over 1,000,000 about October 10, 1918, when the maximum was reached. (See Appendix C.)

4. During the middle of October the inevitable straggling, incident to bitterly contested battles of long duration, became evident. Stringent regulations were immediately enforced to suppress this evil. Stragglers' posts and patrols were established and the direct responsibility of noncommissioned officers was emphasized. However, the principal deterrent was the splendid spirit of the personnel of the Army which strongly condemned this practice.

Much of the straggling was unintentional. Soldiers would lose their way due to frequent moves of their organizations, or would satisfy their curiosity by exploring the areas of nearby units. Inexperienced company officers, confident of the courage and integrity of their men, failed to take prompt corrective measures to stop this promiscuous visiting. Our experience in this matter indicated the following as important preventatives of straggling:

Noncommissioned officers must be directly charged with the responsibility for the presence of all the men in their subordinate units, and with the development of squad and section pride.

Divisional, corps or army insignia should be worn by every man.

An especially trained military police force must be available and territorial organization prescribed for its employment.

5. Our peacetime establishment should be based on an army organization which includes not only corps and combat divisions, but also the various army troops. Our peacetime departmental organization should be replaced by an army organization. With the adoption of the above change the following advantages will be secured:

Transition to a war footing will be facilitated.

Knowledge in civil as well as in military circles of the composition and functions of an army will be secured in

peace times instead of waiting for war. Few of our officers before we entered this war had any conception of the composition and functions of the mass of men required as army troops.

A large proportion of the army troops includes the skilled mechanics used in commercial industries. An army organization in peace would provide for the proper and efficient classification of these men for military purposes. They are essential in any army in time of war.

6. The First Army began its first attack about 1½ years after the United States entered the war. It is interesting to note that during the entire operations, with exception of the 14-inch Naval guns, the First Army did not fire an American cannon or shell. We were fortunate in having Allies who could supply these articles and many others.

7. Appendix C gives the strength of the air forces (planes and balloons) employed by the First Army during its operations.

The pursuit and combat work of the air forces of the First Army is illustrated by the following figures:

(a) Number of enemy planes destroyed, confirmed -----	417
(b) Number of enemy balloons destroyed, confirmed -----	53
(c) Number of our planes lost in action-----	199
(d) Number of our balloons destroyed -----	22

After the St. Mihiel operation the French air division, while assisting the First Army, operated directly under French command.

8. In the way of commendations the undersigned heartily adopts General Pershing's commendations as set forth in this report. Individual commendations have been submitted to higher authority in a large number of cases. I can only add an expression of sincere personal appreciation for the gallantry, loyalty and sterling support given me by all ranks of the army.

HUNTER LIGGETT,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Commanding,
First Army, A.E.F.

Appendix A

COMMANDERS AND PRINCIPAL STAFF OFFICERS, FIRST ARMY

The commanders and principal staff officers of the army are given below; the other army staff officers are shown in appendix B.

Commanders

General John J. Pershing from Aug. 10 to Oct. 15, 1918.

Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett from Oct. 16, 1918, to April 20, 1919.

Chief of Staff

Brigadier General Hugh A. Drum, G.S., from Aug. 10, 1918, April 20, 1919.

Deputy Chiefs of Staff

Colonel Monroe C. Kerth, G.S., from Sept. 2 to Sept. 19, 1918.

Colonel Walter S. Grant, G.S., from Sept. 19 to Nov. 11, 1918.

Lieutenant Colonel Van L. Wills, G.S., from Nov. 11, 1918, to April 20, 1919.

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1

Colonel Alvin B. Barber, G.S., from Aug. 10 to Oct. 14, 1918.

Colonel Leon B. Kromer, G.S., from Oct. 14, 1918, to April 20, 1919.

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2

Colonel Willey Howell, G.S., from Aug. 10, 1918, to March 6, 1919.

Colonel George M. Russell, G.S., from March 6, 1919, to April 20, 1919.

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-3

Colonel Robert McCleave, G.S., from Aug. 10 to Oct. 17, 1918.

Colonel George C. Marshall, Jr., G.S., from Oct. 17 to Nov. 19, 1918.

Colonel Laurence Halstead, G.S., from Nov. 19, 1918, to April 20, 1919.

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-4

Colonel John L. DeWitt, G.S., from Aug. 10, 1918, to Jan. 31, 1919.

Lieutenant Colonel Troup Miller, G.S., from Jan. 31, 1919, to April 20, 1919.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Colonel Lewis H. Watkins, G.S., from Aug. 10, 1918, to April 20, 1919.

Chiefs of Artillery

Major General Edward F. McGlachlin, Jr., from Aug. 10 to Nov. 20, 1918.

Major General William S. McNair, from Nov. 20, 1918 to April 20, 1919.

Chiefs of Air Service

Brigadier General William Mitchell, from Aug. 10 to Oct. 14, 1918.

Colonel Thomas DeW. Milling, from Oct. 14, 1918, to Jan. 16, 1919.

Lieutenant Colonel Shepler W. Fitzgerald, from Jan. 16 to April 20, 1919.

Chief Engineers

Brigadier General Jay J. Morrow, from Aug. 10, 1918 to Oct. 23, 1918.

Colonel George R. Spalding, from Oct. 23, 1918, to Nov. 24, 1918.

Colonel Ernest D. Peek, from Nov. 24, 1918, to Jan. 4, 1919.

Colonel George M. Hoffman, from Jan. 7, 1919, to April 20, 1919.

Chief Signal Officer

Colonel Parker Hitt, from Aug. 10, 1918, to April 20, 1919.

Chief Surgeons

Colonel Alexander N. Stark, from Aug. 10 to Dec. 3, 1918.

Colonel Thomas L. Rhoads, from Dec. 3, 1918, to April 20, 1919.

Chief of Tank Corps

Brigadier General Samuel D. Rockenbach, from Aug. 21 to Oct. 25, 1918.

Chief of Chemical Warfare Service

Colonel John W. N. Schulz, from Sept. 1, 1918, to April 20, 1919.

Appendix B

APPENDIX B ROSTER OF FIRST ARMY STAFF

*Roster of Officers, Headquarters First Army, From Date of
its Organization up to and Including Signing of the
Armistice, November 11, 1918*

ARMY COMMANDER

Pershing, John J.....	General
Liggett, Hunter.....	Lt. Gen.

AIDES

Ord, James G.....	Lt. Col.
Stackpole, Pierpont L.....	Lt. Col.

CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION

Drum, Hugh A.....	Brig. Gen.
	Chief of Staff
Grant, Walter S.....	Col. G. S.—
	Deputy Chief of Staff
Wills, V. L.....	Lt. Col. G.S.
McGuire, Edward C.....	Major Cav.
Terrey, C. M.....	1st Lt. F.A.
Hill, N. P.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Alexander, James L. Jr.....	2d Lt. F.A.

G1 SECTION

Kromer, L. B.....	Col. G.S. Asst.
	Chief of Staff
*Barber, A. B.....	Col. G.S.
Thayer, A.....	Col. Cav.
*Bugge, Jens.....	Col. G.S.
Bonnaffon, S.....	Lt. Col. Inf.
Moore, Charles B.....	Lt. Col. Inf.
Peek, W. H.....	Lt. Col. F.A.
Gasser, L. D.....	Lt. Col. Inf.
Turner, F. H.....	Lt. Col. Inf.
Case, H. D.....	Major Inf.
Davis, George G.....	Major Inf.
Glore, C. F.....	Major Inf.
Straight, Willard D.....	Major Inf.
Aleshire, J. P.....	Major Inf.
Sherman, T. M.....	Major Inf.
Burr, Eugene F.....	Capt. Inf.
Davis, Paul B.....	Capt. Engrs.
Dobbins, Robert A.....	Capt. Inf.
Marks, Julian I.....	Capt. QMC
West, Duvall, Jr.....	Capt. F.A.

*Served as chief of section or service prior to November 11

Bowman, Charles A.	1st Lt. Inf.
Carey, Kenneth A.	1st Lt. Inf.
Hayes, Stanton A.	1st Lt. Inf.
Hughes, Clyde D.	1st Lt. Inf.
Lufkin, Benjamin	1st Lt. Cav.
Parker, Louis F.	1st Lt. Inf.
Rosenfield, Charles	1st Lt. Inf.
Seiberling, John F.	1st Lt. F.A.
Trumball, George M.	1st Lt. Engrs.
Beal, Raymond H.	2d Lt. Inf.
Griffiths, W.A. Jr.	2d Lt. F.A.
Hoss, Joseph R.	2d Lt. F.A.
Hock, Paul M.	2d Lt. Inf.
Hutcheson, Sam	2d Lt. F.A.
Lawson, Harry O.	2d Lt. A.S.
Newman, Charles H.	2d Lt. F.A.
Voorhees, Claude H.	2d Lt. Inf.
Wishard, Frederick B.	2d Lt. Inf.

G2 SECTION

Howell, Willey	Col. G.S.—Asst. Chief of Staff
Catron, Thom	Major G.S.
Thompson, C. F.	Major G.S.
Conner, B. H.	Capt. Inf.
Deardon, William H.	Capt. Inf.
Dodd, Haywood S.	Capt. Cav.
Fowler, Alvah T.	Capt. Engrs.
Griffith, Sanford	Capt. C.I.
Matz, Charles H.	Capt. Inf.
Neidert, Otto W.	Capt. Inf.
Russell, Nelson B.	Capt. Inf.
Beseler, William F.	1st Lt. Inf.
Bradley, Francis W.	1st Lt. A.G.D.
Bradley, Robert F., Jr.	1st Lt. Inf.
Conner, L. G.	1st Lt. Inf.
Griswold, Harry	1st Lt. C.A.C.
Hartman, Rudolph H.	1st Lt. Inf.
Leroy, Hayden	1st Lt. A.S.
Lottig, Oscar	1st Lt. Inf.
McGibeny, Donald H.	1st Lt. Inf.
McWilliams, Donald S.	1st Lt. Inf.
Parish, John C.	1st Lt. Inf.
Peirce, Hayford	1st Lt. C.I.
Pomeroy, Eugene C.	1st Lt. Inf.
Rice, Grantland	1st Lt. F.A.
Fernbach, Oscar	1st Lt. Inf.
Peirce, Walter	1st Lt. Inf.
Adams, Franklin A.	2d Lt. Inf.
Amacker, David	2d Lt. Inf.
Cram, Paul P.	2d Lt. Inf.
Cutting, Charles S.	2d Lt. Inf.
Echternach, Albert B.	2d Lt. F.A.
Graham, John	2d Lt. Inf.
Grunor, Emmett	2d Lt. Inf.
Hedlund, Mauritz	2d Lt. A.G.D.
Holteen, Willard F.	2d Lt. Inf.
Hotten, Harold J.	2d Lt. F.A.
Levengood, Sidney L.	2d Lt. C.I.
Lovering, L.A.	2d Lt. Inf.
Stonestreet, Albert H.	2d Lt. C.I.

Farnham, William H.....	2d Lt. Inf.
Gilmore, Robert W.....	2d Lt. Inf.
Seymour, L. D.....	2d Lt. ASSC
Tiedeman, John E.....	2d Lt. Inf.
Atkins, Herbert.....	2d Lt. F.A.

G2-C SECTION

Hall, C. L.....	Col. G.S.
Lyman, Theodore.....	Capt. Engrs.
Tufts, William O.....	Capt. Engrs.
Baldwin, Asa C.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
White, H. M.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Wilson, Henry I., Jr.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Bandli, Edward M.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Clark, Howard.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Dent, F. J.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Gehres, W. S.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Holmes, Charles B.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Kavanagh, Andrew J.....	2d Lt. Engrs.

G3 SECTION

Marshall, George C., Jr.....	Col. G.S.—Asst. Chief of Staff
*McCleave, Robert.....	Col. G.S.
Ward, Ralph T.....	Col. Engrs.
Fuqua, Stephen O.....	Col. Inf.
Lahm, Frank P.....	Col. ASSC
Lister, Ralph.....	Col. Inf.
Dawley, D. J.....	Lt. Col. F.A.
Anderson, James A.....	Major QMC
Caffey, B. F.....	Major Inf.
Covell, William E. R.....	Major Engrs.
Freeman, Edward D.....	Major Inf.
Beckert, Carl R.....	Capt. Inf.
Bonkard, J. Philip.....	Capt. ASSC
Burleson, Richard A.....	Capt. Inf.
Calrow, C. J.....	Capt. Engrs.
Green, Joseph C.....	Capt. Inf.
Hull, Robert A.....	Capt. Inf.
Perry, Francis W.....	Capt. Engrs.
Williamson, Royden.....	Capt. Inf.
Drake, Charles A.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Jacobs, Michael.....	1st Lt. C.A.C.
Lecour, Joseph H.....	1st Lt. F.A.
Quick, R. T.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Regnier, R. A.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Stanton, James R.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Warnecke, Lloyd H.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Bandini, Elliott.....	2d Lt. Inf.
Eldridge, James S.....	2d Lt. Inf.
Parsons, G. F., Jr.....	2d Lt. Inf.
Topka, Gilbert S.....	2d Lt. F.A.

G4 SECTION

DeWitt, John L.....	Col. G.S.—Asst. Chief of Staff
McCleave, E. G.....	Lt. Col. G.S.
Tyner, George P.....	Lt. Col. G.S.
Lang, C. D.....	Major F.A.

*Served as chief of section or service prior to November 11

McCullagh, Samuel.....	Major M.C.
Mather, Victor.....	Major QMC
Meyer, Vincent.....	Major F.A.
Rafferty, William A.....	Major Inf.
Clark, M. W.....	Capt. Inf.
Hayes, D. E.....	Capt. Engrs.
Lockwood, R. J.....	Capt. R.T.C.
McMahon, William C.....	Capt. Inf.
Mills, M. D.....	Capt. Engrs.
Shepard, Perry M.....	Capt. QMC
Smith, R. Penn, Jr.....	Capt. QMC
Symington, Donald.....	Capt. Ord.
Woodruff, E. D.....	Capt. Engrs.
Taylor, E. J.....	Capt. Inf.
Bond, O. J.....	Capt. F.A.
Sutherland, D. L.....	Capt. Inf.
Bass, J. Leland.....	Capt. F.A.
Boone, Daniel H.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Burge, Joseph D.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Freeman, Clarke.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Kearney, John.....	1st Lt. Cav.
Sparks, H.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Wing, Bryce.....	1st Lt. QMC
Bullitt, O. H.....	2d Lt. Ord.
Butler, M. D.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Cass, Lee G.....	2d Lt. QMC

G5 SECTION

†Watkins, Lewis H.....	Col. G.S.—Asst. Chief of Staff
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ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

Loughry, Howard K.....	Lt. Col. F.A.— Adjutant General
*Barnes, Joseph F.....	Col. F.A.
Walker, James F.....	Lt. Col. C.A.C.
Byrne, Michael J.....	Major A.G.D.
Pearson, Madison.....	Major Inf.
Clark, Roland E.....	Capt. Inf.
Van Sickle, Kenneth L.....	1st Lt. A.G.D.

STATISTICAL SECTION, A.G.O.

Shor, George G.....	Major A.G.D. —Army Personnel Adj.
Cohen, Rodney S.....	Capt. Inf.
Turner, Henry C.....	Capt. Inf.
Williams, Patrick.....	Capt. Inf.
Fontana, Jules.....	1st Lt. A.G.D.
Jackson, Royal W.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Wilson, Paul N.....	1st Lt. A.G.D.
Elliott, Wellington M.....	2d Lt. A.G.D.
Smith, Potter L.....	2d Lt. A.G.D.

POSTAL OFFICER

Gennaria, A. H.....	1st Lt. Inf.
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C. R. A.

Stelle, M. B.....	Maj. Amb. Ser.
Deckum, W. G.....	Capt. C.A.C.
Dunlap, R. W.....	Capt. M.T.C.
Lawson, M. C.....	Capt. QMC

*Served as chief of section or service prior to November 11.

†Served in G-3 section during active operations.

Green, Thomas M.....	Capt. Cav.
Ross, B. C.....	Capt. Inf.
Clowe, Richard D.....	Capt. Engrs.
Joyce, Walter L.....	Capt. M.T.C.
Cross, George I.....	Capt. Engrs.
Dickinson, Herbert.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Marcus, Marvin M., Jr.	1st Lt. F.A.
Bodman, Herbert L.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Bonaventure, George A.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Daly, F. A.....	1st Lt. M.T.C.
Wiggins, J. G.....	1st Lt. M.T.C.
Farley, C. J.....	1st Lt. M.T.C.
Porter, Robert E.....	1st Lt. M.T.C.
Smith, H. Cavalier Jr.....	1st Lt. M.T.C.
Moans, T.....	2d Lt. M.T.C.
Ralston, A. S.....	2d Lt. M.T.C.
Craig, J. W.....	2d Lt. M.T.C.
Doyle, F. A.....	2d Lt. Inf.

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SECTION

Johnson, Jacob C.....	Col. I.G.D.— Inspector General
Bradford, James H.....	Col. I.G.D.
McMaster, George M.....	Col. Inf.
Strayer, Thorne.....	Lt. Col. I.G.D.
Rich, Albert T.....	Major I.G.D.

JUDGE ADVOCATE'S SECTION

Brown, Arthur W.....	Lt. Col.— Judge Advocate
*Winship, Blanton.....	Col. J.A.
Phillips, J. Van Ness.....	Major A.G. D.
Webb, V.....	Capt. J.A.
McNevin, Alfred C. B.....	1st Lt. Inf.

CHIEF QUARTERMASTER'S SECTION

Luberoff, George.....	Lt. Col. QMC— Chief Quartermaster
McKeany, Joseph D.....	Lt. Col. QMC
Beezley, Orva E.....	Major QMC
Porter, John A.....	Major QMC
Stevenson, Reginald C.....	Major QMC
Ryus, Herman D.....	Major QMC
Wilson, Edwin G.....	Capt. QMC
Hampton, R. M.....	1st Lt. V.C.
Gilmore, Lyle H.....	1st Lt. QMC

ATTACHED CHIEF QUARTERMASTER'S SECTION

Baker, Frayne.....	Major QMC
Cook, George C.....	Major QMC
Brune, Clarence M.....	Capt. QMC
Clarke, John M.....	Capt. QMC
Dovine, A. G.....	Capt. QMC
Goble, Francis M.....	Capt. QMC
LeFew, William V.....	Capt. QMC
Manes, W. M.....	Capt. QMC
Muckleston, Stanley M.....	Capt. U.S.M.C.
Poole, Walter B.....	Capt. QMC

*Served as chief of section or service prior to November 11

Thrasher, Charles O.....	Capt. QMC
Carpenter, Fred B.....	1st Lt. QMC
Cavitt, Norman.....	1st Lt. QMC
Dix, Olwyn T.....	1st Lt. QMC
Henderson, John D.....	1st Lt. QMC
Jensen, Oscar T.....	1st Lt. QMC
Miller, Joseph A.....	1st Lt. QMC
Powell, William M.....	1st Lt. QMC
Robertson, James E.....	1st Lt. QMC
Sanford, Henry B.....	1st Lt. QMC
Bradley, J. H.....	2d Lt. QMC
Davis, Edward J.....	2d Lt. QMC
Dessau, Frank R.....	2d Lt. QMC
Gibson, R. T.....	2d Lt. QMC
Heinz, Andrew O.....	2d Lt. QMC
Hilgard, Julius E.....	2d Lt. QMC
Jameson, Claude A.....	2d Lt. QMC
Little, Henry.....	2d Lt. QMC
McCormick, H. B.....	2d Lt. QMC
Renner, Enos H. Jr.....	2d Lt. QMC
Ryan, Christopher T.....	2d Lt. QMC
Smith, George W.....	2d Lt. QMC
Whaley, George C.....	2d Lt. QMC
Withers, Archibald M.....	2d Lt. QMC

CHIEF SALVAGE OFFICER'S SECTION

Beall, Jeremiah.....	Lt. Col. Ord.— Chief Salvage Officer
Phillips, Paul M.....	Capt. QMC
McLeod, Norman.....	Capt. QMC
Deutschman, A. L.....	1st Lt. QMC
Sterner, E. D.....	1st Lt. QMC
Terrill, V. R.....	1st Lt. QMC
Weller, Arvid B.....	1st Lt. QMC
Hogan, Emmett N.....	2d Lt. QMC
Hudspeth, Cooper.....	2d Lt. QMC
Singles, Perry T.....	2d Lt. QMC

CHIEF VETERINARIAN'S SECTION

Merrillat, Louis A.....	Major V.C.— Chief Veterinarian
Jensen, Walter B.....	1st Lt. V.C.
Brown, Vernie H.....	2d Lt. QMC
Clark, George W.....	2d Lt. V.C.
Cornell, William A.....	2d Lt. V. C.

CHIEF SURGEON'S SECTION

Stark, A. N.....	Col.. M.C.—Chief Surgeon
Murphy, Fred T.....	Lt. Col. M.C.
Rhoades, Rex H.....	Lt. Col. D.C.
Hutton, Paul C.....	Col. M.C.
Edwards, George M.....	Lt. Col. M.C.
Magee, James C.....	Lt. Col. M.C.
Riley, Charles W.....	Major M.C.
Draper, George.....	Major M.C.
Harwood, T. E., Jr.....	Major M.C.
Blumenthal, Robert W.....	Capt. M.C.
Long, C. B.....	1st Lt. San. Corps

ATTACHED CHIEF SURGEON'S SECTION

Darrach, William.....	Lt. Col. MC
Phalen, James M.....	Lt. Col. M.C.
Lyle, H. H. M.....	Lt. Col. M.C.
Lehr, Louis C.....	Major M.C.
Merritt, Edwin A.....	Major M.C.
Zabriskio, E. A.....	Major M.C.
Webster, Charles E. G.....	Major M.C.
Vaughan, John M.....	Major M.C.
Peterson, George.....	1st Lt. M.C.
Riley, Bernard L.....	1st Lt. D.C.
Cole, Charles J.....	1st Lt. D.C.

SEARCHLIGHT OFFICER

Tompkins, William T.....	Major Engrs.
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CHIEF ENGINEER'S SECTION

Spalding, G. R.....	Col. Engrs.— Chief Engineer
*Morrow, Jay J.	Brig. Gen. Engrs.
Bain, Jarvis J.....	Col. Engrs.
Goethals, George R.....	Col. Engrs.
McIndoo, J. F.....	Col. Engrs.
Sage, W. H., Jr.	Col. Engrs.
Olson, Dewitt P.....	Lt. Col. Engrs.
Randall, G. B.....	Lt. Col. Engrs.
Scheidenhelm, F. A.....	Lt. Col. Engrs.
Bragdon, J. S.....	Major Engrs.
Coe, E. K.....	Major Engrs.
Hutchings, H.....	Major Engrs.
Keenan, John T.....	Major Engrs.
LaCroix, M. F.....	Major Engrs.
MacGlasham, Alexander.....	Major Engrs.
Morris, Victor.....	Major Engrs.
Post, W. S.....	Major Engrs.
Simpson, W. J. P.....	Major Engrs.
Chapman, C. S.....	Major Engrs.
Brigham, D. S.....	Major Engrs.
Behrman, A. S.....	Capt. San. Corps
Berry, E. S.....	Capt. Engrs.
Carley, E. K.....	Capt. Engrs.
Chambers, H. E.....	Capt. Engrs.
Childs, Harold P.....	Capt. Engrs.
Cunningham, James A.....	Capt. Engrs.
Davy, J. J.....	Capt. Engrs.
Dudley, H. C.....	Capt. Engrs.
Fitzgerald, Leonard.....	Capt. Engrs.
Geiger, Arthur W.....	Capt. Engrs.
Groves, J. D.....	Capt. Engrs.
Hanson, P. O.....	Capt. Engrs.
Johnson, Hollister.....	Capt. Engrs.
Lee, C. H.....	Capt. Engrs.
Letton, H. P.....	Capt. Engrs.
McLane, G. L.....	Capt. Engrs.
Mohler, B. M.....	Capt. Engrs.
Morgan, John T.....	Capt. Engrs.
Olds, Norman E.....	Capt. Engrs.
Peaslee, N. H.....	Capt. Engrs.

*Served as chief of section or service prior to November 11

Scott, Stanley L.....	Capt. Engrs.
Veale, John H.....	Capt. Engrs.
Wheeler, A. W.....	Capt. Engrs.
Wieland, A. E.....	Capt. Engrs.
Wirsching, C. B.....	Capt. Engrs.
Blake, E. T.....	Capt. Engrs.
St. Gaudens, Homer.....	Capt. Engrs.
Bookout, Charles T.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Daniell, Smith O.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Garnock, A. R.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Hulme, Norman.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Burr, Charles N.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Schroeder, A. X.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Smith, George K.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Townsend, C. P.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Villavaso, J. F.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Campbell, T. F.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
O'Meara, R. J.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Borden, T. P.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Brady, T. S.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Eckert, Alfred.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Black, Claude R.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Fletcher, A. A.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Friday, W. W.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Gemeny, Albin L.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Hales, Barksdale.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Lobenstein, Julian.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Murphy, Harley O.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Murray, Joseph I.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Rovenstein, E. A.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Sherer, Walter N.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Smith, C. O.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Sussman, Adolph.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Winsor, Q. J.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Wyatt, R. M.....	2d Lt. Engrs.

ATTACHED CHIEF ENGINEER'S SECTION

Dillon, T. H.....	Col. Engrs.
Peek, E. D.....	Col. Engrs.
Payne, E. V. R.....	Lt. Col. Engrs.
Perry, Oscar B.....	Lt. Col. Engrs.
Beverly, E. P.....	Major Engrs.
Chentworth, C. J.....	Major Engrs.
Williams, Lindsey.....	Major M.C.
Baker, Shirley.....	Capt. Engrs.
Beeman, T. R.....	Capt. Engrs.
Brown, R. V.....	Capt. Engrs.
Burnham, W. A.....	Capt. Engrs.
Burrowes, H. G.....	Capt. Engrs.
Dean, Bertram D.....	Capt. Engrs.
Rill, J. J.....	Capt. Engrs.
Van Loben Sels, E. D.....	Capt. Engrs.
Woodhull, L. R.....	Capt. Engrs.
Tallant, John D.....	Capt. Engrs.
Hartigan, T. J.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Judson, S. A.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Snyder, Carl M.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Soest, Hugo C.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Tilden, R. S.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Price, Robert E.....	2d Lt. Engrs.
Sherrerd, George, Jr.	2d Lt. Engrs.

CHIEF ORDNANCE OFFICER'S SECTION

Fuller, Lawson M.....	Col. Ord.—Chief Ordnance Officer
O'Hern, Edward P.....	Col. Ord.
Coles, Thomas L.....	Lt. Col. Ord.
Stout, H. H.....	Lt. Col. Ord.
Topham, Joseph L., Jr.....	Lt. Col. Inf.
Booth, Lucien D.....	Major F.A.
Goss, George A.....	Capt. Ord.
Harkins, Earl.....	Capt. Ord.
Johnson, Harry E.....	Capt. Ord.
Kennedy, R. R.....	Capt. Ord.
Powers, Walter.....	Capt. Ord.
Priddy, Vern.....	Capt. Ord.
Root, R. K.....	Capt. Ord.
Smith, Froman.....	Capt. Ord.
Tift, Lewis S.....	Capt. Ord.
Varnum, Guy R.....	Capt. Ord.
Anderson, Oscar S.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Baer, J. W.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Curtis, Monroe.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Joachim, William F.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Jordan, Clarence L.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Palmer, Charles H.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Reed, E. V.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Wheless, Eakin L.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Worthington, Thomas.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Boal, William S.....	2d Lt. Ord.
Briggs, Ainslee G.....	2d Lt. Ord.
McOsker, Fergus J.....	2d Lt. Ord.
Murphy, Martin I.....	2d Lt. Ord.

ATTACHED CHIEF ORDNANCE OFFICER'S SECTION

Sabin, W. A.....	Major Ord.
Snyder, Oliver F.....	Major Ord.
Lemon, George F.....	Major Ord.
Armstrong, Charles F.....	Major Ord.
Adamson, Keith F.....	Capt. Ord.
Cook, Ralph W.....	Capt. Ord.
Cooper, Marcus F.....	Capt. Ord.
Cox, Abraham B.....	Capt. Ord.
Fasick, H. R.....	Capt. Ord.
Galloway, Wilson.....	Capt. Ord.
Gillam, William S.....	Capt. Ord.
King, E. P.....	Capt. Ord.
Lansing, Charles.....	Capt. Ord.
Lawrence, George H.....	Capt. Ord.
Leech, Wilbur V.....	Capt. Ord.
Lewis, Philemon S.....	Capt. Ord.
McAllister, J. C.....	Capt. Ord.
McPhail, Theodore.....	Capt. Ord.
Sullivan, Eugene J.....	Capt. Ord.
Teetor, Daniel G.....	Capt. Ord.
Varley, William.....	Capt. Ord.
Wadsworth, Philip.....	Capt. Ord.
Aldridge, Charles W.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Ballenberg, A. E.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Blodgett, George R.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Brockhage, John W.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Brown, Kenneth J.....	1st Lt. Ord.
Corley, J. S.....	1st Lt. Ord.

Dean, F. F.	1st Lt. Ord.
Doud, C. E.	1st Lt. Ord.
Gaillard, Samuel G.	1st Lt. Ord.
Heweston, Joseph	1st Lt. Ord.
Holmgran, F. C.	1st Lt. Ord.
Holt, J. C.	1st Lt. Ord.
Hoynes, John F.	1st Lt. Ord.
Ireland, Sharpe	1st Lt. Ord.
Kearney, John	1st Lt. Ord.
Lawson, W. S.	1st Lt. Ord.
Long, Russell W.	1st Lt. Ord.
Lynch, W. C.	1st Lt. Ord.
McClure, Clarence	1st Lt. Ord.
McNamee, Joseph	1st Lt. Ord.
Mali, J. T. J.	1st Lt. Ord.
Mandler, Fred	1st Lt. Ord.
Manley, Harry E.	1st Lt. Ord.
Maverick, George H.	1st Lt. Ord.
May, Gerald B. de C.	1st Lt. Ord.
Morrison, E. S.	1st Lt. Ord.
Oldfield, William A.	1st Lt. Ord.
Palmer, Charles H.	1st Lt. Ord.
Payne, H. H.	1st Lt. Ord.
Peairs, John W.	1st Lt. Ord.
Pearson, N. H.	1st Lt. Ord.
Picksley, Will W.	1st Lt. Ord.
Ralston, C. H.	1st Lt. Ord.
Rehm, Alvin C.	1st Lt. Ord.
Rogers, Osee L.	1st Lt. Ord.
Seaman, Howard B.	1st Lt. Ord.
Sellers, H. B.	1st Lt. Ord.
Slingluff, Montgomery J.	1st Lt. Ord.
Strauss, M. F.	1st Lt. Ord.
Taylor, Zera G.	1st Lt. Ord.
Thalhimer, Morton G.	1st Lt. Ord.
Tilton, C. E.	1st Lt. Ord.
Walters, Jack E.	1st Lt. Ord.
Wandall, Carleton	1st Lt. Ord.
Westlake, E. L.	1st Lt. Ord.
White, Richard A.	1st Lt. Ord.
Baity, Harman C.	2d Lt. Ord.
Christnacht, G. W.	2d Lt. Ord.
Clarke, George E.	2d Lt. Ord.
Davis, J. A.	2d Lt. Ord.
Dykes, Leonard R.	2d Lt. Ord.
Edmiston, W. H.	2d Lt. Ord.
Gage, L. B.	2d Lt. Ord.
Garrison, W. L.	2d Lt. Ord.
Guenther, Lester C.	2d Lt. Ord.
Hogen, O. E.	2d Lt. Ord.
Hall, R. J.	2d Lt. Ord.
Harbord, Rex	2d Lt. Ord.
Harris, C. F.	2d Lt. Ord.
Hoy, Harry R.	2d Lt. Ord.
Jarvis, Marshall	2d Lt. Ord.
Johnston, J. B.	2d Lt. Ord.
Knowles, E. D.	2d Lt. Ord.
Latham, G. C.	2d Lt. Ord.
Leonard, Bryam	2d Lt. Ord.
McCaffrey, J. B.	2d Lt. Ord.
Manger, William R.	2d Lt. Ord.
Pershing, Frank E.	2d Lt. Ord.

Rhea, J. B.	2d Lt. Ord.
Scheib, D. D.	2d Lt. Ord.
Stevens, A. J.	2d Lt. Ord.
Trenkman, E. D.	2d Lt. Ord.
Tulbert, Walter L.	2d Lt. Ord.
Worth, W. A.	2d Lt. Ord.

OFFICE CHIEF OF AIR SERVICE

Milling, T. DeW.	Col.—Chief of Air Service
*Mitchell, William	Brig. Gen. ASSC
Dodd, T. F.	Col. A.S.
Chapman, C. G.	Lt. Col. ASSC
Morrow, J. C.	Lt Col. ASSC
Paegelow, J. A.	Lt. Col. ASSC
Sherman, W. C.	Lt. Col. A.S.
Bowen, Thomas S.	Major ASSC
Kelleher, William P.	Major ASSC
McNarney, Joseph T.	Major ASSC
Walsh, R. L.	Major A.S.
Cardwell, O. B.	Capt. A.S.
Joralemon, Ira B.	Capt. ASSC
Kincaid, R. G.	Capt. A.S.
Lagen, Marc A.	Capt. A.S.
Perry, W. G.	Capt. A.S.
Roosevelt, Philip J.	Capt. ASSC
Ruston, W. V. C.	Capt. Inf.
Sloan, John	Capt. S. C.
Baird, Henry D.	1st Lt. A.S.
Flint, R.	1st Lt. A.S.
Goldsborough, W. G.	1st Lt. A.S.
Hartigan, J. D.	1st Lt. A.S.
Harwood, B. P.	1st Lt. F.A.
Leech, M. W.	1st Lt. ASSC
McBrayne, W. C.	1st Lt. A.S.
Miller, Lawrence	1st Lt. ASSC
Reis, Alvin C.	1st Lt. A.S.
Shawhan, Romer	1st Lt. A.S.
Smith, H. W.	1st Lt. A.S.
Sparks, W. S.	1st Lt. A.S.
Sturgis, Henry S.	1st Lt. A.S.
Vasconcelles, J. C.	1st Lt. A.S.
Williams, R. H.	1st Lt. A.S.
Smith, Richard	1st Lt. A.S.
Dozier, E. Y.	2d Lt. S.C.
Goodell, William, 3d	2d Lt. A.S.
Gramlich, Alvis T.	2d Lt. A.S.
Henderson, J. D.	2d Lt. A.S.
Nolan, E. F.	2d Lt. A.S.
Phelps, R.	2d Lt. A.S.
Welsh, H. S.	2d Lt. ASSC

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER'S SECTION

Hitt, Parker	Col. S.C.—Chief Signal Officer
Behn, Sosthenes	Lt. Col. S.C.
Bickelhaupt, C. O.	Major S.C.
Wedgwood, Bruce	Major S.C.
Zerbee, L. F. J.	Major ASSC

*Served as chief of section or service prior to November 11

Hart, Harry W.....	Capt. S.C.
Loghry, Robert.....	Capt. ASSC
Marvel, Oren E.....	Capt. S.C.
Miller, Paul D.....	Capt. S.C.
Pratt, George C.....	Capt. S.C.
Burgess, Ralph E.....	1st Lt. S.C.
Miller, T. L.....	1st Lt. S.C.
French, E. F.....	2d Lt. S.C.

CHIEF MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICE

Herringshaw, W. F.....	Col. Cav.—Chief Motor Transport Officer
Burt, F. T.....	Lt. Col. QMC
Winters, W. H.....	Lt. Col. QMC
Strelinger, G. P.....	Major QMC
Wetherill, S. P., Jr.	Major QMC
Clarke, J. S.....	Capt. QMC
Cock, E.....	Capt. QMC
Harran, A. J.....	Capt. QMC
Hexter, Percy K.....	Capt. M.T.C.
Hoyme, Robert.....	Cap. Ord.
Gage, J. N.....	Capt. QMC
Enos, Ralph V.....	1st Lt. QMC
Peniwell, Roy H.....	1st Lt. QMC
Whitman, R. W.....	1st Lt. QMC
Bangs, Edward G.....	2d Lt. QMC
Coleman, James B.....	2d Lt. M. T.C.
Little, C. E.....	2d Lt. M.T.C.
Merriman, William H.....	2d Lt. QMC
Stern, Edwin W.....	2d Lt. QMC
Rhoades, M. C.....	2d Lt. QMC
Hiller, J. A.....	2d Lt. QMC

CHEMICAL WARFARE SECTION

Schulz, John W. N.....	Col. Engrs.— Chief Gas Officer
Ardery, E. D.....	Col. Engrs.
Walton, James H.....	Major Engrs.
Rhode, L. M.....	Capt. C. W.S.
Taylor, Louis J.....	Capt. C.W.S.
Bailey, Richard O.....	Capt. C.W.S.
Balfe, T. W.....	Capt. C.W.S.
Clancy, Richard W.....	Capt. C.W.S.
Davis, Louis S.....	Capt. C.W.S.
Noyes, C. R.....	1st Lt. C.W.S.
Rixey, Eppa.....	1st Lt. C.W.S.
Meserve, Philip W.....	1st Lt. C.W.S.
French, Dudley.....	1st Lt. C.W.S.
Woods, Frank.....	2d Lt. C.W.S.
Wetherill, P. E.....	2d Lt. C.W.S.

TANK CORPS SECTION

Rockenbach, Samuel D.....	Brig. Gen. N. A.
Pullen, Daniel D.....	Lt. Col. Engrs.
Miller, William.....	1st Lt. Engrs.
Bond, Frederick.....	2d Lt. Engrs.

PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL'S SECTION

McDonnell, John G.....	Major Cav.— Provost Marshal
Smallwood, Charles S.....	Major Inf.

Pinkerton, Allen.....	Major Inf.
Whitener, W. C.....	Major Inf.
Eller, Louis H.....	Major F.A.
McFadden, J. Franklin.....	Major ASSC
Davidson, F. M.....	Capt. F.A.
Clarke, George S.....	Capt. Inf.
Davidson, F. McKenzie.....	Capt. F.A.
Logan, Fred McI.....	Capt. Inf.
Rolfe, R. C.....	1st Lt. ASSC
Parker, Felix.....	1st Lt. C.A.C.
Healey, James.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Beale, Roy I.....	2d Lt. Inf.
Bishop, James F.....	2d Lt. F.A.
Monohan, Roy P.....	2d Lt. ASSC

PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL'S SECTION

—P. W. E.—

Robertson, William R.....	Major Inf —C.O., P.W.E.
Holmes, James P.....	Capt. Inf.
Hunt, James W.....	Capt. Inf.
Stockder, Hans J.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Dolan, William H.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Blair, Glen F.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Overstreet, Harold A.....	2d Lt. Cav.
Seibles, H. T.....	2d Lt. A.G.D.
Flothow, Paul G.....	2d Lt. Inf.
Friskie, Charles J.....	2d Lt. A.G.D.

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

Potts, Allen.....	Major Inf.— Headquarters Commandant
Clarke, Don E.....	Capt. QMC
Cox, Walton H.....	Capt. Cav.
Morrow, William I.....	Capt. Cav.
Parker, J. W.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Parrish, Clifford C.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Pratt, William H.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Stewart, Melville.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Bennett, John D.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Bitzer, Paul.....	1st Lt. QMC
Bowles, Aubrey E., Jr.....	1st Lt. Cav.
Brosch, Frank J.....	1st Lt. C.A.C.
Crump, William M.....	1st Lt. F.A.
Harrison, J. Letcher.....	1st Lt. F.A.
Livingston, R. D.....	1st Lt. Cav.
McCullough, William H.....	1st Lt. Cav.
Hanson, Emil.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Reynolds, E. C.....	1st Lt. M.C.
Alexander, John J.....	2d Lt. Inf.
Askew, Laurin B.....	2d Lt. Cav.
Fowlkes, Richard V.....	2d Lt. A.G.D.
Havice, Joy F.....	2d Lt. F.A.
Meyer, Herbert L.....	2d Lt. Inf.

MESSAGE CENTER

Auchincloss, C. Russell.....	Capt. Inf.
Sailer, Vance L.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Allen, S. H.....	1st Lt. Inf.
Bisbee, Frank D.....	1st Lt. Inf.

Collins, Henry J. A.....1st Lt F.A.
Bryan, W.S.....2d Lt. Inf.

MESSAGE CENTER—ATTACHED

Ransom, J. R. T.....Capt. Inf.
Halloran, Ed. R.....1st Lt. S.C.
McKay, W. R.....1st Lt. Inf.
Elish, K. M.....2d Lt. Inf.

Appendix C

TABLE OF FIRST ARMY STRENGTH

The data given herein has been secured from three sources, i.e., (a) records of the Adjutant General, strength charts, (b) records of supply branch, G-4, First Army, and (c) letter from the French Mission.

The first two reports do not agree. It is difficult to reconcile the difference as the records of strength other than for combat units were not kept at First Army Headquarters. The figures given by G-4 are more reliable. The G-4 figures and those of the French Mission place the maximum strength of the army as follows:

Americans.....	896,000	Oct. 6
French.....	135,000	Oct. 10
<hr/>		
Total.....	1,031,000	

In addition to the tables mentioned above there is also attached herewith a table giving the strength in airplanes of the Air Service forces of the First Army.

Extract from report of Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, First Army, showing strength of First Army on various dates.

DAILY AUTOMATIC SUPPLIES ORDERED BY G-4 FOR THE TROOPS OF THE FIRST ARMY

<i>September</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Animals</i>	<i>Gasoline</i>
23d	791,719	122,590	151,720
24th	790,000	123,000	152,000
25th	775,000	127,000	157,000
26th	777,800	129,900	159,300
27th	807,971	128,044	159,440
28th	835,026	129,571	158,835
29th	851,306	132,146	167,617
30th	864,000	134,000	170,300
<i>October</i>			
1st	878,694	135,803	170,420
2d	852,400	128,300	169,400
3d	842,800	121,800	167,700
4th	855,000	131,900	169,800
5th	872,800	135,400	171,200

6th	896,000	143,500	178,800
7th	870,600	132,300	176,400
8th	890,100	133,100	166,100
9th	617,700	109,200	123,400
10th	623,100	108,000	132,900
11th	609,100	105,100	126,200
12th	597,900	96,700	132,300
13th	596,800	97,400	133,300
14th	633,400	99,000	136,600
15th	605,700	94,000	120,600
16th	646,600	103,700	126,100
17th	618,800	113,300	124,600
18th	593,700	102,200	122,200
19th	592,800	102,100	122,300
20th	594,800	101,300	123,700
21st	592,600	102,100	123,600
22d	593,500	102,200	123,500
23d	592,300	98,000	121,900
24th	589,400	98,200	124,100
25th	552,500	91,400	117,300
26th	612,900	101,800	122,700
27th	641,500	103,000	136,700
28th	634,600	97,000	132,700
29th	651,300	103,300	133,900
30th	651,000	99,100	138,600
31st	599,900	86,300	128,400
<i>November</i>			
1st	645,900	102,100	135,200
2d	681,400	103,600	143,500
3d	679,200	102,500	144,100
4th	678,400	100,200	143,900
5th	688,800	100,200	196,100
6th	668,200	97,700	144,300
7th	683,700	102,200	147,200
8th	707,600	103,600	148,700
9th	712,200	100,400	147,100
10th	683,200	97,000	147,100
11th	694,100	99,100	140,900

The exact figures showing number of men and animals supplied prior to September 23d are not available. Supplies for approximately 750,000 men, 100,000 animals, and 150,000 gallons of gasoline were ordered forwarded each day from August 10th to September 23d. Exact figures from September 23d until completion of the Meuse-Argonne operation are given above. It will be noted that there was a decided decrease in the supplies ordered forward on October 8th. This was due to the anticipated formation of the Second Army.

To the foregoing should be added the strength of the French units with the First Army. This strength varied from time to time and on October 10 reached a maximum of a little over 135,000 officers and soldiers.

AIRPLANES—FIRST ARMY AIR SERVICE

ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE:

	<i>Bombardment</i>		<i>Pursuit</i>		<i>Observation</i>	
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Available</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Available</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Available</i>
1918						
Sept. 12th	88	65	372	297	338	245
13th	85	47	372	230	324	245
14th	85	62	363	200	343	257
15th	88	53	372	221	336	264
Average	86	57	370	237	335	252

FRENCH AERIAL DIVISION

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Available</i>
Sept. 12th, 1918	513	336
13th	595	426
14th	678	440
15th	623	400
Average	602	400

MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE

	<i>Pursuit</i>		<i>Bombardment</i>		<i>Observation</i>	
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Available</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Available</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Available</i>
1918						
Sept. 26th	312	193	86	58	423	333
27th	322	207	83	60	434	344
28th	325	185	68	48	407	322
29th	333	200	70	51	419	362
30th	339	228	71	52	419	361
Oct. 1st	334	223	79	51	421	356
2d	331	198	81	59	423	343
3d	331	198	81	59	423	343
4th	297	185	79	55	419	342
5th	296	202	78	55	400	330
6th	301	191	82	56	417	324
7th	279	198	82	56	393	320
8th	276	198	85	63	423	332
9th	282	193	93	71	438	342
10th	310	154	93	67	436	320
11th	282	181	97	71	443	330
12th	274	192	101	78	426	329
13th	287	222	100	80	435	352
14th	296	217	97	82	431	356
15th	293	204	99	84	434	355
16th	280	213	98	83	423	354
17th	282	197	107	98	332	275
18th	278	169	116	91	324	259
19th	281	170	103	82	350	263
20th	282	188	108	91	352	274
21st	283	174	103	93	354	280
22d	277	132	95	81	346	275
23d	278	139	98	73	341	275
24th	276	172	104	72	337	270
25th	274	178	100	76	328	271
26th	274	176	101	80	340	287
27th	280	166	101	75	343	282
28th	280	154	99	76	342	274
29th	276	139	103	73	337	263
30th	282	141	107	66	331	254
31st	284	145	93	61	331	260

Nov.	1st	284	173	92	73	317	244
	2d	289	174	93	79	338	262
	3d	288	161	95	71	328	247
	4th	288	163	94	69	320	240
	5th	295	168	94	64	318	220
	6th	290	153	93	66	302	221
	7th	285	171	93	73	326	251
	8th	287	150	95	81	332	253
	9th	283	181	95	85	311	246
	10th	284	164	95	81	307	246
	11th	283	188	94	80	305	242

Number of enemy planes destroyed and confirmed—417.

Number of enemy balloons destroyed and confirmed—53.

Number of our planes lost in action—199.

Number of our balloons destroyed—22.

Balloons in St. Mihiel Offensive—16 (1 for each company on the front).

Balloons in Meuse-Argonne Offensive—22.

AMERICAN SQUADRONS IN FIRST ARMY OFFENSIVE

ST. MIHIEL:

12 Monoplane Pursuit Squadrons.

9 Corps Observation Squadrons.

2 Army Observation Squadrons.

1 Bombardment Squadron.

1 Night Reconnaissance Squadron.

25 Total.

MEUSE-ARGONNE:

13 Monoplane Pursuit Squadrons (1 night).

7 Corps Observation Squadrons.

3 Army Observation Squadrons (1 night).

4 Bombardment Squadrons.

1 Army Artillery Observation Squadron.

28 Total.

Appendix D

ROSTER OF FIRST ARMY UNITS

A ROSTER OF UNITS THAT HAVE AT ONE TIME BEEN A PART
OF THE FIRST ARMY, A. E. F., WITH DATES OF
JOINING AND RELIEF

Compiled by STATISTICAL SECTION, A.G.O., FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.

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<i>Unit</i>	<i>Joined</i>	<i>Left</i>
ARTILLERY:		
31st Artillery Brig. (CAC) Hqs.	Before 8/27/18	Still in 1st Army
55th Artillery CAC	Before 8/27/18	12/12/18
56th Artillery CAC	Before 8/27/18	12/12/18
57th Artillery CAC	Before 8/27/18	12/17/18
32d Artillery Brig. (CAC) Hqs.	Before 8/27/18	11/21/18
58th Artillery CAC	Before 8/27/18	Still in 1st Army

59th Artillery CAC	Before	8/27/18	12/12/18
65th Artillery CAC	Before	8/27/18	12/27/18
39th Artillery Brig. (CAC) Hqs.	Before	8/27/18	12/19/18
44th Artillery CAC	Before	8/27/18	12/27/18
51st Artillery CAC	Before	8/27/18	12/24/18
42d Artillery CAC	Before	8/27/18	9/11/18
53d Artillery CAC	?		11/8/18
60th Artillery CAC		9/1/18	12/27/18
1st Army Prov. Park (52d Arty CAC)	?		?
Army Artillery Park		10/7/18	Still in 1st Army
Tractor Arty. Replac. Bn.		10/15/18	12/1/18
Second Section Range Finders		11/1/18	11/27/18
52d Ammunition Train (CAC)		10/12/18	12/27/18
53d Ammunition Train (CAC)		10/12/18	12/27/18

RAILWAY ARTILLERY:

30th Artillery Brig. (CAC) Hqs.	10/12/18	11/22/18
42d Artillery CAC	10/12/18	11/22/18
53d Artillery CAC	10/12/18	11/8/18
Naval Batteries 1, 2, 3, 4, 5th Btrys	10/14/18	11/29/18
43d Artillery CAC	10/20/18	11/18/18
70th Artillery (French) 2, 19 & 31st Btrys	10/6/18	10/20/18
71st Artillery (French) 3, 6, 7th Btrys	9/4/18	10/12/18
74th Artillery (French)—2d Bn.	10/20/18	11/15/18
75th Artillery (French)—19th Btry.	10/6/18	11/15/18
76th Artillery (French)—20th Btry.	9/11/18	10/6/18
77th Artillery (French)—23d Btry.	9/4/18	10/20/18
78th Artillery (French) 4th & 26th Btrys.	10/6/18	11/15/18
1st Prov. High Burst Ranging Section	11/1/18	11/18/18
Det. Railway Artillery M.T.S.	11/1/18	11/20/18
Railways Operation Btry.—(French)		
70th Regt.—20th Battery	11/1/18	11/20/18
Special Meteorological Section	11/1/18	11/15/18

FRENCH ARTILLERY:

28th Trench Mortar Btry.	9/6/18	10/6/18
73d Artillery Regiment 1, 3, 7, 8, 11th Battalions	9/4/18	10/6/18
81st Artillery, A, B and 1st Battalions	?	?
86th Artillery, A, B, C and 3d Battalions	9/4/18	11/15/18
87th Artillery, A, B, C, 4, 5, 6th Bns.	10/12/18	11/7/18
151st Artillery R.A.P.	10/22/18	11/1/18
155th Artillery, 2, 3, 4, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 23 Btrys.	10/4/18	10/10/18
176th Artillery, 1, 23, 4, 10th Battalions		
23, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40th Btrys.	9/4/18	11/18/18
203d Artillery—3d Battalion	10/12/18	11/10/18
211th Artillery—2d Battalion	9/4/18	11/18/18
247th Artillery, 1st and 2d Bns.	10/20/18	11/7/18
282d Artillery, 1, 2, 3, 5 and 13th Bns.	9/3/18	9/29/18
317th Artillery, 2d and 3d Battalions	9/15/18	11/15/18
420th Artillery—2d Battalion	10/21/18	11/7/18
Naval Batteries, 6, 10, 12, 17, 18 Btrys.	9/18/18	11/7/18
1st Caterpillar Company—1st Section	10/7/18	11/10/18

TANK CORPS UNITS:

1st Brigade Tank Corps (U.S.)		
326, 327, 344, 345th Battalions		
316, 321, R & S Companies		
Det. 9th Co. 2d Motor Mech. Regt.	9/25/18	10/30/18
3d Brigade Tank Corps (U.S.)	9/14/18	10/24/18

APPENDIX D

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504th Regt. Tanks (French)	9 / 18 / 18	10 / 23 / 18
505th Regt. Tanks (French)	9 / 7 / 18	10 / 23 / 18
11th Groupment Tanks (French)	9 / 7 / 18	9 / 26 / 18
Two Groups Tanks (French) St. Chaumont	9 / 7 / 18	11 / 21 / 18
1st Group Schneider Tanks (French)		
14th and 17th Companies	9 / 26 / 18	10 / 20 / 18
4th Groupment Tanks (French)	?	?

ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS:

1st A.A. Bn.—Btrys. A,B,C,D, & H. & S.		
Before	8 / 27 / 18	Still in Army
2d A.A. Bn.—Btrys. A,B,C,D	?	11 / 20 / 18
5th A.A. Btry.	10 / 6 / 18	11 / 9 / 18
7th A.A. Btry.	9 / 24 / 18	10 / 26 / 18
1st A.A.M.G. Bn.	10 / 6 / 18	11 / 23 / 18
2d A.A.M.G. Bn.	10 / 1 / 18	Still in Army
44th M.G. Co. (French) 4 Sections	?	?
129th M.G. Co. (French) 4 Sections	?	?
143d M.G. Co. (French)	?	?
147th M.G. Co. (French) 3 Sections	?	?
467th M.G. Co. (French) 2 Sections	10 / 26 / 18	12 / 11 / 18
Post Semi Fixed Artillery (French)		
12, 54, 53, 55, 56, 121, 123, 125, 162d Sec.	10 / 7 / 18	12 / 11 / 18
Sections Semi Fixed Artillery (French)		
12, 27, 46, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57,		
58, 59, 70, 119, 121, 123, 127, 131, 155,		
162, 163, 164, 168, 179, 195, 207, 208,		
213, 314, 315, 319, 300 and 13, 14, 19th		
Batteries	10 / 6 / 18	12 / 11 / 18
Sections Auto Cannon Artillery (French)		
2, 3, 8, 17, 9, 19, 23, 32, 38, 55, 56, 57,		
60, 67, 68, 69, 72, 74, 80	10 / 16 / 18	12 / 11 / 18
Sections Trailer Mounts Artillery (French)		
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9	11 / 8 / 18	12 / 11 / 18
Groupment Trailer Mounts Artillery (French)		
101, 102, 103d	11 / 8 / 18	12 / 11 / 18

SEARCHLIGHTS:

56th Engineers—Cos. A,B,C	10 / 26 / 18	12 / 1 / 18
3d Section Searchlights (French)	9 / 24 / 18	11 / 2 / 18
34th Projectors (French)	11 / 2 / 18	12 / 11 / 18

ENGINEERS:

11th Engrs. Rgt. Hqs. 1st Bn. Hqs. 2d Bn.		
Hqs., Cos. A,B,C,D,E,F	9 / 4 / 18	12 / 5 / 18
12th Engrs. Rgt. Hqs., 1st Bn. Hqs., 2d Bn.		
Hqs., Cos. A,B,C,D,E,F	Before 8 / 27 / 18	10 / 13 / 18
14th Engrs. Rgt. Hqs., 2d Bn. Hqs. & Cos. D,		
E, F	10 / 7 / 18	11 / 29 / 18
15th Engrs. 1st Bn. Hqs. and Cos. B, F	10 / 12 / 18	12 / 5 / 18
16th Engrs. Rgt. Hqs., 1st Bn. Hqs., 2d Bn.		
Hqs., Cos. A,B,C,D,E,F	10 / 24 / 18	12 / 5 / 18
21st Engrs. Rgt. Hqs., 1st Bn. Hqs. 2d Bn.		
Hqs. and Cos. A,B,C,D,E,F	10 / 17 / 18	12 / 5 / 18
22d Engrs. 2d Bn. Hqs., 4th Bn. Hqs. and		
Cos. D,E,F,K,L,M	9 / 23 / 18	11 / 29 / 18
23d Engrs. 1st Bn. Hqs. 3d Bn. Hqs., Entire		
Regt., Truck Cos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,		
10, and Wagon Cos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5	10 / 5 / 18	12 / 11 / 18
24th Engrs. Rgt. Hqs. 1st Bn. Hqs., 2d Bn.		
Hqs. and Cos. A,B,C,D,E,F	10 / 8 / 18	10 / 13 / 18

25th Engrs. Rgt. Hqs. and Cos. A,B,C,D,E,F	9/10/18	12/13/18
26th Engrs. Rgt. Hqs. and Cos. A,B,C,D,E,F		
Before	8/27/18	12/14/18
27th Engrs. Rgt. Hqs. and Cos. A,B,C,D,E,F	9/20/18	12/18/18
28th Engrs. 1st Bn. Hqs., 2d Bn. Hqs., Cos. A,B,C,E,F	10/13/18	12/ 5/18
29th Engrs. Det. Co. "I"	Before 8/27/18	Still in Army
Co. "I" less Det.	do	do
35th Engrs. Det. att. Co. L, 23d Engrs.	do	?
37th Engrs. Rgt. Hqs. 1st Bn. Hqs. 2d Bn. Hqs. and Cos. A,B,C,D,E,F	Before 8/27/18	12/14/18
40th Engrs.	do	11/24/18
3d Pioneer Infantry	9/17/18	12/ 9/18
54th Pioneer Infantry	10/ 6/18	11/21/18
56th Pioneer Infantry	10/ 6/18	11/15/18
59th Pioneer Infantry	9/11/18	10/13/18
802d Pioneer Infantry	9/24/18	12/11/18
805th Pioneer Infantry	9/29/18	12/11/18
806th Pioneer Infantry	10/ 3/18	10/13/18
807th Pioneer Infantry less Band, Band Still with 1st Army	9/29/18	12/11/18
808th Pioneer Infantry	9/ 8/18	1/ 6/19
815th Pioneer Infantry	11/ 9/18	12/ 5/18
816th Pioneer Infantry	11/ 9/18	12/ 5/18
114th Engineers	?	?
301st Water Tank Train	10/25/18	1/ 1/19
1st Prov. Water Train (311th Co.—103d Motor Sup. Train)	9/26/18	12/ 3/18
2d Prov. Water Train (Truck Co. No. 3—23d Engrs.)	11/ 5/18	11/29/18
3d Prov. Water Train (466th M.T. Co.—417th M.S.T.)	10/15/18	12/ 5/18
465th Pontoon Train	11/ 6/18	11/12/18

LABOR BATTALIONS:

313th Labor Bn.	10/21/18	12/14/18
330th Labor Bn.	11/ 6/18	12/ 5/18
339th Labor Bn.	10/ 6/18	12/14/18
344th Labor Bn.	10/30/18	12/ 5/18

SERVICE BATTALIONS:

505th Service Bn.	Before 8/27/18	10/13/18
508th Service Bn.	do	do
522d Service Bn.	9/26/18	10/26/18
524th Service Bn.	Before 8/27/18	10/26/18
527th Service Bn.	10/13/18	12/10/18
528th Service Bn.	Before 8/27/18	10/13/18
530th Service Bn.	do	11/30/18
535th Service Bn.	10/ 1/18	11/ 2/18
537th Service Bn.	10/ 6/18	12/ 5/18
542d Service Bn. (Co. A)	?	?
544th Service Bn.	10/ 1/18	12/10/18
545th Service Bn.	10/ 1/18	12/ 5/18
546th Service Bn.	10/29/18	1/ 7/19
603d Engineers (One Bn.)	10/29/18	Serving with V Corps.
604th Engineers (One Bn.)	do	

FRENCH ENGINEER UNITS:

9/18 Roads Service	Before	11/13/18	12/10/18
D/27 Base Company		do	do
M/3T Fortress Works		do	do
6/1T Fortress Works		do	do
13/2T Fortress Works		do	do
14/3T Bridges and Buildings		do	do
20/5T Bridges and Buildings		do	do
24/1 Supervision of Bridges		do	do
25/2 Fortress Works		do	do
MD/22 Shelter Works		do	do
MD/23 Shelter Works		do	do

CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE:

1st Gas Rgt. (Formerly 30th Engrs.)	11/12/18	11/23/18
Army Gas Depot "A"	11/5/18	12/8/18
Army Gas Depot "C"	do	do
Army Gas Depot "D"	do	do
Army Gas Depot "E"	do	do
British Units serving with the 1st Gas Regiment—Special Cos. Royal Engineers, D,E,P,R,Z,J	11/12/18	11/17/18

SOUND AND FLASH RANGING SECTIONS:

Flash Ranging Section 1	Before	8/27/18	11/16/18
Flash Ranging Section 2		do	do
Sound Ranging Section 1		do	do
Sound Ranging Section 2		do	do
Sound Ranging Section 3		do	do

AIR SERVICE:

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ARMY OBSERVATION GROUP:

9th Aero Squadron.	9/20/18	11/17/18
24th Aero Squadron.	9/21/18	Still in 1st Army
91st Aero Squadron.	9/21/18	11/17/18
3d Air Park-Flight B, formerly 255th Aero Squadron.	9/14/18	Still in 1st Army
Photo Section No. 2 (Formerly 101st Photo Section)	9/21/18	11/17/18
Photo Section No. 10	9/28/18	11/17/18

FIRST PURSUIT GROUP:

27th Aero Squadron.	10/19/18	12/6/18
94th Aero Squadron.	10/19/18	11/17/18
95th Aero Squadron.	10/19/18	12/6/18
147th Aero Squadron.	10/19/18	12/6/18
648th Aero Squadron Flight "C"	10/19/18	12/18/18
4th Air Park (Formerly 218th Squadron)	10/3/18	11/17/18
185th Aero Squadron.	10/6/18	Still in Army

SECOND PURSUIT GROUP:

13th Aero Squadron.	9/16/18	12/6/18
22d Aero Squadron.	do	Still in 1st Army
49th Aero Squadron.	do	12/6/18
139th Aero Squadron.	do	12/12/18
3d Air Park (Formerly 255th Squadron)	do	Still in 1st Army
5th Air Park (Formerly 279th Squadron)	11/2/18	12/29/18

THIRD PURSUIT GROUP:

28th Aero Squadron.	9/20/18	Still in 1st Army
93d Aero Squadron.	do	12/12/18
103d Aero Squadron.	do	do
213th Aero Squadron.	do	Still in 1st Army
2d Air Park (Formerly 260th Squadron)	do	12/18/18

NIGHT BOMBARDMENT GROUP (FRENCH)

115th Caproni Squadron. (French)	9/ 9/18	11/11/18
130th Caproni Squadron. (French)	do	do
3d Caproni Squadron. (Italian)	do	do
14th Caproni Squadron. (Italian)	do	do
15th Caproni Squadron. (Italian)	do	do

ARMY ARTILLERY OBSERVATION GROUP

228th Escadrille (French)	9/24/18	11/ 9/18
229th Escadrille (French)	do	11/18/18
219th A.L.G.P. Squadron (French)	9/ 9/18	11/18/18
186th Aero Squadron	10/20/18	Still in 1st Army
234th Escadrille (French)	9/24/18	10/12/18
225th Escadrille (French)	9/ 8/18	do
206th Escadrille (French)	9/ 8/18	10/ 5/18
43d Balloon Co.	9/21/18	12/12/18
39th Balloon Co. (French)	9/21/18	11/12/18
93d Balloon Co. (French)	9/ 5/18	11/12/18
11th Balloon Co.	9/21/18	12/12/18

FIRST DAY BOMBARDMENT GROUP:

11th Aero Squadron.	9/ 8/18	12/12/18
20th Aero Squadron.	do	do
96th Aero Squadron.	9/22/18	do
166th Aero Squadron.	9/21/18	11/17/18
648th Aero Squadron (Flight "A")	9/22/18	12/18/18
Photo Section No. 12	9/28/18	12/18/18

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ARMY AIR SERVICE TROOPS:

462d Aero Construction Squadron	9/17/18	11/17/18
463d Aero Construction Squadron	do	do
474th Aero Construction Squadron	10/19/18	11/20/18
477th Aero Construction Squadron	10/10/18	11/20/18
495th Aero Construction Squadron	9/ 9/18	11/20/18
484th Aero Construction Squadron	9/15/18	11/ 1/18
496th Aero Construction Squadron	?	?

MISCELLANEOUS UNITS:

155th Aero Squadron	11/14/18	12/ 6/18
Photo Section No. 14	11/ 7/18	12/23/18
23d Escadrille (French)	9/24/18	11/18/18
243d Escadrille (French)	9/24/18	11/18/18

MISCELLANEOUS FRENCH ESCADRILLES:

2d Bombing Escadre	?	?
2d Combat Escadre	?	?
4th Escadrille	?	?
5th Escadrille	?	?
6th Escadrille	?	?
9th Escadrille	?	?
13th Escadrille	?	?
14th Escadrille	?	?
15th Escadrille	?	?
16th Escadrille	?	?
18th Escadrille	?	?
19th Escadrille	?	?
20th Escadrille	?	?
42d Escadrille	?	?

FRENCH DIVISION AERIENNE:

Combat Escadre No. 1, P.C.	9/ 9/18	?
Bombardment Escadre No. 12, P.C.	do	?
2d Brigade P.C.	do	?
Bombardment Escadre No. 13, P.C.	do	?

BALLOON COMPANIES (FRENCH)

27th Balloon Company	?	?
41st Balloon Company	9/ 5/18	?
53d Balloon Company	9/ 7/18	?

EVACUATION HOSPITALS:

Evac. Hosp. No. 1	Before	8/27/18	10/ 9/18
2		do	do
3		9/18/18	12/ 2/18
4		9/10/18	12/ 1/18
5		9/10/18	9/29/18
6	Before	8/27/18	12/18/18
7		do	12/ 1/18
8		do	12/16/18
9		do	12/14/18
10		9/20/18	12/18/18
11		9/10/18	1/ 4/18
12	Before	8/27/18	10/ 9/18
13		do	10/ 9/18
14		9/18/18	12/11/18
15		9/21/18	12/19/18
16		10/ 9/18	12/19/18
20		10/ 8/18	11/29/18
21		10/ 9/18	12/19/18
22		10/ 8/18	11/28/18
23		11/ 3/18	11/28/18

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MOBILE HOSPITALS:

Mobile Hosp. No. 1		9/ 5/18	12/18/18
2		9/24/18	12/11/18
3	Before	8/27/18	10/ 9/18
4		9/ 4/18	12/18/18
5		9/21/18	12/18/18
6		9/29/18	12/18/18
8		10/ 9/18	12/18/18
39	Before	8/27/18	10/ 9/18

AMERICAN RED CROSS HOSPITALS:

American Red Cross Hosp. No. 107	?	?
110	9/24/18	12/10/18
111	?	?
114	9/18/18	12/18/18

FIELD HOSPITALS:

Field Hosp. No. 41	Before	8/27/18	12/20/18
42		do	12/4/18
116		do	10/15/18
117		do	do
162		9/15/18	11/16/18
163		do	do

GAS HOSPITALS:

Detachment of Evac. Hosp. No. 8	11/4/18	11/29/18
10	do	11/19/18
10	do	11/29/18

CONTAGIOUS HOSPITALS:

Detachment of Evac. Hosp. No. 6	9/27/18	12/10/18
Detachment of Evac. Hosp. No. 10	10/2/18	12/17/18
Detachment of A.R.C. Hosp. No. 110	11/7/18	11/29/18

NEUROLOGICAL HOSPITALS:

Neurological Hosp. No. 1	10/10/18	11/7/18
2	do	10/18/18
3	10/12/18	11/7/18

EVACUATION AMBULANCE COMPANIES:

Evacuation Amb. Co. No. 1	9/29/18	12/19/18
2	do	12/19/18
3	Before	8/27/18
4	do	10/16/18
5	10/14/18	11/20/18
6	10/13/18	do
7	8/31/18	12/21/18
8	9/29/18	11/20/18
9	9/10/18	?
10	9/29/18	12/19/18
11	do	12/20/18
12	do	12/19/18
14	?	?
Evac. Amb. Prov. Co. No. 1	8/31/18	10/16/18

BASE HOSPITALS:

Base Hosp. No. 45	?	?
51	?	?
83	?	?

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ARMY AMBULANCE SECTIONS:

Ambulance Section No. 514	9/18/18	10/13/18
520	9/5/18	12/19/18
521	9/1/18	12/28/18
530	9/10/18	12/28/18
570	9/26/18	11/2/18
599	9/24/18	12/19/18
601	9/1/18	11/20/18
602	9/1/18	12/19/18

AMBULANCE COMPANIES:

Ambulance Company No. 41	9/18/18	11/11/18
42	10/3/18	12/22/18
108	?	?
120	10/30/18	11/26/18
132	?	?
310	Before 8/27/18	10/13/18
318	?	?

PRISONER OF WAR COMPANIES:

Army Prisoner of War Enclosure No. 1	11/7/18	12/9/18
Auxiliary Cage	11/7/18	11/21/18
Prisoner of War Escort Co. No. 23	do	12/5/18
25	do	do
30	do	do
31	do	do
54	do	do
55	do	do
56	do	do
57	10/24/18	11/19/18
58	do	12/10/18
59	do	12/5/18
60	do	do
61	do	11/19/18
62	do	12/5/18
63	11/7/18	12/10/18
64	do	11/19/18
65	do	11/19/18
66	do	do
67	do	do
68	do	do
79	do	12/5/18
82	11/17/18	11/29/18
84	do	12/5/18
87	11/7/18	do
88	do	12/10/18
89	10/24/18	12/5/18
90	do	11/19/18
91	do	12/11/18
94	11/7/18	12/10/18
95	do	do
96	do	do
Prisoner of War Labor Co. No. 23	11/5/18	12/5/18
25	do	do
30	do	do
31	do	do
54	do	11/19/18
55	do	12/5/18
56	do	do
57	do	11/19/18
60	do	12/5/18
61	do	11/19/18
62	do	12/5/18
64	do	11/19/18
65	do	do
66	do	do
67	do	do
68	do	12/5/18
90	do	do

GRAVES REGISTRATION UNITS:

Unit "A" Graves Registration Service	9 / 5/18	12 / 8/18
Unit "B" Graves Registration Service	10/15/18	12 / 8/18
Graves Reg. Unit No. 301	do	do
302	do	do
305	do	do
306	do	do
310	do	do
311	do	do
308	do	10/22/18

MILITARY POLICE UNITS UNDER C. R. A.

2d Military Police Co. B.	10/19/18	11/21/18
3d Military Police Co. B.	10/31/18	11/16/18
103d Military Police Co. B.	10/19/18	11/21/18
306th Military Police Co. (One Co.)	10/19/18	12 / 4/18
307th Military Police Co. A.	10 / 8/18	11/21/18
316th Military Police Co. A.	10/18/18	11/21/18

MILITARY POLICE UNITS UNDER PROVOST MARSHAL:

1st Army Military Police Bn.	11 / 4/18	Still in 1st Army
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SALVAGE SQUADS:

6th Salvage Squad	11 / 7/18	12/18/18
305th Salvage Squad	10/20/18	do
309th Salvage Squad	11 / 6/18	do
313th Salvage Squad	10/20/18	do
314th Salvage Squad	do	do
317th Salvage Squad	11 / 6/18	do
318th Salvage Squad	10/20/18	do

SIGNAL CORPS UNITS:

319th Field Signal Bn. Cos. A, B, C	10/25/18	Still in 1st Army
401st Teleg. Bn.	9/22/18	do
411th Teleg. Bn.	10/11/18	do
Army Radio Sect. (GHQ Unit)	?	?
Photo Section	Before 8/27/18	Still in 1st Army
Meteorological Section	9 / 9/18	11 / 4/18
Portions of Pigeon Co. No. 1 (GHQ Unit)	Before 8/27/18	11/11/18

MISCELLANEOUS UNITS:

1st Army Advance Replac. Depot	10/28/18	11/25/18
1st Army Regl. Replac. Depot	11 / 2/18	1 / 6/19
2d Cavalry—Troop C (Hqs. Guard)	10/22/18	11/18/18
1st Army Punishment Bn.	10/15/18	12/10/18
Quartermaster Corps Detachment	11 / 1/18	12/10/18
1 Dump 3 Refilling Points		
Supply Co. 335th Q. M. Park "A"		
Army Motor Transport Park	9/10/18	11 / 9/18
Sales Commissary Unit No. 20	9 / 7/18	Still in 1st Army
417th Motor Supply Train	9/18/18	Still in 1st Army
378th Service Park Unit	11/29/18	12/23/18
404th Service Park Unit	do	do
410th Service Park Unit	?	Still in 1st Army
412th Service Park Unit	11/29/18	12/23/18

APPENDIX D

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FIRST CORPS	Before	8/27/18	Still in 1st Army
ARTILLERY:			
1st Corps Prov. Arty. Park		9/3/18	11/20/18
3d Corps Arty. Park		10/17/18	12/8/18
1st Bn. Trench Artillery		9/16/18	11/22/18
5th R. A. P. (French) Arty.		9/11/18	11/1/18
6th R. A. P. Arty. (French)		do	10/6/18
8th R. A. P. Arty. (French)		9/26/18	10/20/18
49th Artillery (French)		?	?
182d Artillery (French)		9/3/18	10/13/18
183d Artillery (French)	Before	8/27/18	10/16/18
219th Artillery (French)		9/26/18	11/18/18
238th Artillery (French)		do	11/7/18
247th Artillery (French)		10/20/18	do
282d Artillery (French)		9/3/18	10/6/18
4th Bn. and 25th and 26th Btrys.			
289th Artillery (French)		9/25/18	11/18/18
5th Bn. and 2 Btrys.			
342d Artillery (French)		9/4/18	9/18/18
2d Bn.			
416th Artillery (French)		9/26/18	11/7/18
451st Artillery (French)		8/21/18	11/9/18
Flash Ranging Section No. 14		11/5/18	11/10/18
Sound Ranging Section No. 35		9/28/18	11/23/18
Sound Ranging Section No. 74		10/6/18	11/23/18
CAVALRY:			
2d Cavalry—Hqs. 1st Sqdrn. Hqs. and Troops A,B,H		10/22/18	11/18/18
SIGNAL:			
322d Field Signal Bn.		9/20/18	11/16/18
406th Teleg. Bn.		9/26/18	Still in 1st Army
ENGINEERS:			
111th Engineers and Train		9/15/18	11/15/18
53d Pioneer Infantry		10/22/18	Still in 1st Army
AIR SERVICE:			
1st Corps Observation Group		9/21/18	12/10/18
1st Aero Sqdn.		?	?
12th Aero Sqdn.		9/19/18	11/18/18
50th Aero Sqdn.		9/6/18	11/29/18
Photo Section No. 1		9/24/18	Still in 1st Army
648th Aero Sqdn.—Flight B		9/22/18	12/18/18
211th Escadrille (French)		10/28/18	11/18/18
Balloon Wing Co. "A"		9/21/18	12/2/18
Balloon Co. No. 1		8/21/18	11/17/18
Balloon Co. No. 2		8/29/18	11/16/18
Balloon Co. No. 5		9/3/18	12/12/18
SANITARY:			
1st Corps Rest Camp and Relay Station		10/11/18	11/22/18
Ambulance Co. No. 163		9/3/18	11/16/18
Ambulance Section No. 506		11/3/18	12/21/18
Ambulance Section No. 520		9/5/18	12/19/18
Ambulance Section No. 569		10/28/18	11/23/18
161st Field Hospital		?	?
Sanitary Section No. 131 (French)		11/8/18	11/15/18

VETERINARY:

117th Mobile Veterinary Section	10 / 6 /18	12 / 1 /18
303d Remount Sqdrn.	9 /30 /18	12 / 1 /18

MISCELLANEOUS:

1st Corps Replac. Bn. (Absorbed by 1st Army Adv. Repl. Bn.)	Before 8 /27 /18	11 /13 /18
414th Motor Supply Train	9 /15 /18	Still in 1st Army Corps
368th Service Park Unit	9 /16 /18	do
1 Corps Sales Commissary Unit	?	do
Salvage Squad No. 1	10 /16 /18	do
1st Corps Military Police Co.	10 /31 /18	do

THIRD CORPS	Before 8 /27 /18	11 /17 /18
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ARTILLERY:

1st Corps Artillery Park	10 /15 /18	11 /20 /18
66th Field Artillery Brig.	9 /16 /18	11 /16 /18
146th and 148th Artys.		
81st Arty. (French—1 Bn.)	?	?
212th Artillery (French)	9 / 4 /18	9 /30 /18
228th Artillery (French)	9 / 4 /18	10 /10 /18
250th Artillery (French)	9 / 7 /18	11 / 6 /18
289th Artillery (French)	9 /25 /18	11 /18 /18
308th Artillery (French)	10 / 5 /18	10 /19 /18
407th Artillery (French)	10 /20 /18	11 /12 /18
413th Artillery (French) 1st and 3d Bns.	9 /11 /18	11 /14 /18
456th Artillery (French)	9 / 4 /18	11 / 6 /18
Sound Ranging Section No. 27 (French)	10 / 6 /18	11 /23 /18
Sound Ranging Section No. 56 (French)	do	do

CAVALRY:

2d Cavalry Det —Troops I and K	9 /21 /18	11 /16 /18
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SIGNAL:

52d Teleg. Bn.	9 /21 /18	11 /16 /18
308th Field Signal Bn.	do	do

ENGINEERS:

308th Engineers and Train	9 /21 /18	11 /16 /18
315th Engineers—2d Bn.	10 /25 /18	11 /19 /18
464th Pontoon Train	9 / 2 /18	11 /16 /18
Equipage de Pont 15/18 Co. (French)	10 / 5 /18	11 /21 /18
1st Pioneer Infantry	9 /23 /18	11 /16 /18

AIR SERVICE:

3d Corps Observation Group	9 /24 /18	11 /16 /18
88th Aero Sqdn.	9 /17 /18	do
90th Aero Sqdn	9 /21 /18	12 /20 /18
Photo Section No. 6	Before 8 /27 /18	11 /16 /18
199th Aero Sqdn.	9 / 8 /18	12 /18 /18
205th Escadrille (French)	9 /24 /18	11 /18 /18
204th Escadrille (French)	do	do
Balloon Wing Co. D	9 /24 /18	12 / 2 /18
3d Balloon Co.	9 / 4 /18	12 / 4 /18
9th Balloon Co.	Before 8 /27 /18	12 /12 /18
42d Balloon Co.	9 /21 /18	12 /12 /18

SANITARY:

Amb. Co. No. 332	9/21/18	11/19/18
Amb. Section 560	9/14/18	11/29/18
Amb. Section 571	9/14/18	11/29/18
Field Hospital No. 332	9/23/18	11/16/18

VETERINARY:

Mobile Veterinary Hosp. No. 1	10/10/18	11/16/18
302d Field Remount Sqdn.	?	?

MISCELLANEOUS:

Prov. Replac. Bn.	9/21/18	11/ 9/18
3d Corps Military Police Co.	10/31/18	11/16/18
415th Motor Supply Train	9/ 7/18	11/16/18
405th Service Park Unit	?	11/16/18
Sales Commissary Unit No. 33	9/21/18	11/16/18
Mobile Laundry Unit No. 301	do	11/21/18
501st Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop	9/23/18	11/16/18

FOURTH CORPS:

ARTILLERY:

155th R. A. P. Arty. (French)	10/ 4/18	10/10/18
132d Arty. (French)—7th Bn.	?	?
160th Arty. (French) Before	8/27/18	10/10/18
182d Arty. (French)	9/ 3/18	10/10/18
212th Arty. (French)	9/ 4/18	9/30/18
250th Arty. (French)—4th, 14th, 15th Btrys.	9/ 7/18	11/ 6/18
268th Arty. (French)	?	?
308th Arty. (French)	10/ 5/18	10/19/18
342d Arty. (French)—1st and 2d Bns.	9/ 4/18	9/18/18
456th Arty. (French)	do	11/ 6/18

AIR SERVICE:

4th Corps Observation Wing	9/24/18	10/10/18
4th Corps Observation Group	9/ 7/18	10/10/18
8th Aero Sqdn. Before	8/27/18	do
135th Aero Sqdn.	do	do
3d Air Park (Formerly 255th Aero Sqdn. Flight "C")	9/14/18	12/ 2/18
Photo Det. No. 4 (Formerly 106th Photo Section) Before	8/27/18	10/10/18
168th Aero Sqdn.	10/ 2/18	10/10/18
	12/ 5/18	Still in 1st Army
Balloon Wing Company "C"	9/ 9/18	10/10/18
10th Balloon Co.	8/31/18	12/23/18
15th Balloon Co.	9/27/18	10/10/18
16th Balloon Co.	9/ 1/18	10/10/18
69th Balloon Co. Before	8/27/18	12/23/18

MISCELLANEOUS:

4th Corps Replac. Bn.	Before	8/27/18	10/10/18
413th Motor Supply Train		9/ 7/18	do
Service Park Unit No. 369		?	10/10/18
Sales Commissary Unit No. 31		9/14/18	10/10/18
1st Military Police Co. B		9/24/18	10/18/18
7th Military Police Co. B		10/ 5/18	10/10/18
103d Military Police Co. A		?	11/21/18
315th Military Police Co. A		10/ 5/18	10/18/18

ENGINEERS:

301st Engineers and Train	Before	8/27/18	10/10/18
51st Pioneer Infantry		do	do

CAVALRY:

2d Cavalry—Troop M	Before	8/27/18	10/10/18
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SIGNAL:

405th Teleg. Bn.	Before	8/27/18	10/10/18
310th Field Signal Bn.		9/4/18	10/10/18

VETERINARY:

Mobile Veterinary Hosp. No. 5		9/21/18	12/18/18
306th Remount Sqdn.		9/30/18	10/10/18

FIFTH CORPS:	Before	8/27/18	Still in 1st Army
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ARTILLERY:

2d Corps Artillery Park	Before	8/27/18	12/8/18
Naval Batteries (French) 11th and 16th		9/10/18	11/7/18
5th R. A. P. Arty. (French)		9/11/18	11/1/18
2d, 6th, 22d Btrys.			
8th R. A. P. Arty. (French)		9/26/18	10/20/18
34th, 35th, 36th Btrys.			
73d Arty. (French) 4th Bn.		9/4/18	10/6/18
176th Arty. (French) 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 17th,			
18th, 19th, 20th, 24th, 28th, 32d Btrys.	do		11/18/18
211th Arty. (French)		10/25/18	11/5/18
246th Arty. (French)		9/6/18	10/6/18
330th Arty. (French)		10/21/18	11/7/18
402th Arty. (French)	do		do
203d Arty. (French)		10/12/18	11/10/18
289th Arty. (French) 1st, 22d, 3d, 4th,			
5th, 29th, Btrys. 6th Bn.		9/25/18	11/18/18
219th Arty. (French)		9/26/18	11/7/18
301st Arty. (French)		10/21/18	do
342d Arty. (French)		9/4/18	10/4/18
454th Arty. (French)		10/21/18	11/6/18
Sound Ranging Section No. 17 (French)		9/28/18	11/23/18
Sound Ranging Section No. 57 (French)		10/6/18	11/23/18

CAVALRY:

2d Cavalry Det.—Troops D and F.		10/6/18	11/18/18
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SIGNAL:

55th Teleg. Bn.		8/28/18	11/20/18
317th Field Signal Bn.		9/20/18	11/24/18

ENGINEERS:

310th Engineers—Hqs. and 2d Bn.		9/15/18	11/22/18
602d Engineers—Hqs. and one Sapper Bn.		10/11/18	do
52d Pioneer Inf.		10/26/18	Still in V Corps

AIR SERVICE:

5th Corps Observation Group		9/24/18	12/10/18
99th Aero Sqdn.	Before	8/27/18	Still in 1st Army
Photo Section No. 5		do	do
104th Aero Sqdn.	Before	8/27/18	12/20/18
1st Air Park		10/31/18	Still in 1st Army

APPENDIX D

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214th Aero Sqdn.		9/25/18	11/18/18
215th Aero Sqdn.		do	do
Balloon Wing Co. "B"	Before	8/27/18	11/17/18
6th Balloon Co.		9/3/18	12/12/18
7th Balloon Co.		9/4/18	do
8th Balloon Co.		9/15/18	do
12th Balloon Co.		9/1/18	do
SANITARY:			
Ambulance Section No. 590		10/21/18	11/20/18
Ambulance Section No. 603		9/8/18	do
Ambulance Section No. 604		9/15/18	12/19/18
Field Hosp. No. 338		11/4/18	Still in V Corps
Field Hosp. No. 339		do	do
VETERINARY:			
5th Corps Mobile Veterinary Hosp.		10/2/18	12/2/18
312th Remount Sqdn.		10/10/18	11/22/18
MISCELLANEOUS:			
8th Corps Replac. Bn.		?	?
418th Motor Supply Train		10/25/18	Still in V Corps
Convoys Administratif Sup. Train (Fr.)		10/6/18	11/26/18
Service Park Unit No. 308		10/25/18	Still in V Corps
Sales Commissary Unit No. 317		9/25/18	do
Laundry Co. No. 303		10/6/18	10/11/18
304		do	do
310		do	11/27/18
5th Corps Military Police Co.		11/2/18	Still in V Corps
SIXTH CORPS	Before	8/27/18	10/10/18
ENGINEERS:			
115th Engineers		10/5/18	10/10/18
301st Engineers—2d Bn.	Before	8/27/18	do
51st Pioneer Inf.—2d Bn.		do	do
SIGNAL:			
301st Field Signal Bn.		9/26/18	10/10/18
417th Teleg Bn		do	do
VETERINARY:			
6th Corps Mobile Veterinary Unit		?	?
MISCELLANEOUS:			
6th Corps Replacement Bn		9/20/18	10/10/18
6th Corps Munitions Detachment		9/28/18	do
Sales Commissary Unit		?	do
399th Machine Shop Truck Unit (Ser Pk)		9/21/18	do
6th Corps Military Police Co		9/28/18	do
SEVENTH CORPS		11/7/18	11/20/18
CAVALRY:			
2d Cavalry Det—Troop G.		11/2/18	11/11/18
SIGNAL:			
51st Teleg. Bn.		11/9/18	11/16/18
326th Field Signal Bn		do	11/20/18

VETERINARY

308th Mobile Veterinary Unit	11/ 9/18	11/20/18
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MISCELLANEOUS:

7th Corps Military Police Co.	11/ 9/18	11/20/18
7th Corps Prov. Motor Supply Co.	do	do
396th Service Park Unit	do	do

SECOND COLONIAL CORPS (FRENCH)	?	10/10/18
	11/ 7/18	11/20/18

ARTILLERY:

1st R. A. P. Arty. (French)	10/20/18	11/19/18
1st, 4th, 5th, 15th, 16th Btrys.		
5th R. A. P. Arty. (French)	9/11/18	11/ 1/18
1st, 4th, 9th, 24th, 29th, 30th, 38th Btrys.		
117th Arty. (French)—1st and 3d Bns.	10/12/18	11/18/18
133d Arty. (French)—1st and 3d Bns.	10/16/18	11/ 7/18
142d Arty. (French)—1st, 3d, 5th, 6th, Bns.	9/11/18	11/19/18
211th Arty. (French)	10/25/18	11/ 5/18
289th Arty. (French)—A, B, 1st & 6th Bns.	9/25/18	11/10/18
413th Arty. (French) less 2d Bn.	9/11/18	11/14/18
16th Arty. (French)	do	10/ 6/18
23d Arty. (French)	do	do
39th Arty. (French)	do	10/10/18
71st Arty. (French)—5th Bn.	9/ 4/18	10/12/18
103d Arty. (French)—8th Bn.	9/11/18	10/10/18
113th Arty. (French)—8th Bn.	do	11/ 7/18
120th Arty. (French)—6th Bn.	do	10/10/18
176th Arty. (French)—2d & 5th Bns. 24th Btry.	9/ 4/18	11/18/18
109th Arty. (French)—1st & 5th Bns.	10/12/18	10/20/18
151st R.A.P. Arty. (French)—14th & 16th Btrys.	10/22/18	11/ 1/18
182d R.A.P. Arty. (French) 1st, 2d, 3d Bns.	9/ 3/18	11/13/18
273d Arty. (French)	9/11/18	10/10/18
6th R.A.P. Arty. (French)—7th, 16th, 24th 25th, 26th, 56th Btrys.	9/11/18	10/ 6/18
10th R.A.P. Arty. (French)—17th, 18th Btrys.	9/11/18	10/ 6/18
22d Arty. (French)	9/10/18	do
41st Arty. (French)	11/10/18	11/12/18
246th Arty. (French)	9/ 6/18	10/ 6/18
32d Arty. (French)	?	?
33d Arty. (French)	?	?
51st Arty. (French)	?	?
308th Arty. (French)	10/ 5/18	10/19/18
Sound Ranging Section No. 30 (French)	10/20/18	11/19/18
Sound Ranging Section No. 31 (French)	do	do
Sound Ranging Section No. 59 (French)	10/12/18	11/19/18
Sound Ranging Section No. 72 (French)	do	do
Sound Ranging Section No. 73 (French)	10/ 6/18	do
Sound Ranging Section No. 16 (French)	?	?
Flash Ranging Section No. 67 (French)	10/ 6/18	11/23/18

ENGINEERS:

Equipage de Pont 9/19 Co. (French)	9/25/18	11/20/18
Equipage de Pont 16/18 Co. (French)	10/ 4/18	11/19/18
Equipage de Pont 17/16 Co. (French)	9/25/18	11/19/18

SANITARY:

Ambulance Section No. 514	9/ 8/18	10/13/18
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AIR SERVICE:

28th Escadrille (French)	9 / 9 /18	10 /10 /18
47th Escadrille (French)	do	do
	11 /15 /18	11 /19 /18
277th Escadrille (French)	9 / 9 /18	10 /10 /18
	11 /15 /18	11 /19 /18
20th Balloon Co. (French)	9 / 7 /18	10 /10 /18
61st Balloon Co. (French)	9 /24 /18	11 /29 /18
52d Balloon Co. (French)	9 / 7 /18	10 /10 /18
25th Balloon Co. (French)	9 /24 /18	11 /19 /18
1st Escadrille (French)	10 /19 /18	11 /12 /18
56th Escadrille (French)	9 /24 /18	11 /15 /18
208th Escadrille (French)	10 / 4 /18	11 /19 /18
218th Escadrille (French)	9 / 7 /18	11 /12 /18
236th Escadrille (French)	9 /24 /18	11 /19 /18
272d Escadrille (French)	10 / 5 /18	11 /12 /18
281st Escadrille (French)	9 /24 /18	11 /15 /18
French Auto Repair Unit No. 282	9 /10 /18	10 / 6 /18

DIVISIONS—AMERICAN

1	26	37	81
2	28	40 (Replacement)	82
3	29	42	89
4	32	77	90
5	33	78	91
6	35	79	92
7	36	80	

DIVISIONS—FRENCH

2d D.C.P.
 10th D.I.C.
 15th D.I.
 18th D.I.
 26th D.I.
 39th D.I.
 69th D.I.
 5th Cav.

Appendix E

TABLE OF LOSSES, FIRST ARMY
CASUALTIES REPORTED BY DIVISIONS OF FIRST ARMY
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE
26th Sept.-11th Nov., 1918

Divisions	Killed		Known Prisoners		Missing		Wounded		Gassed		Total		Grand Total
	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	
1st	23	1221	4	3	1329	84	4909	17	1596	127	9059	9186
2d	11	392	15	1	435	82	2290	3	85	97	3217	3314
3d	51	1218	1	66	4	456	211	5130	55	1182	322	8052	8374
4th	29	591	3	370	192	3683	24	548	248	5192	5440
5th	45	881	33	220	196	4181	11	251	252	5566	5818
6th	1	6	2	4	36	1	2	6	46	52
7th	2	9	3	3	28	3	85	8	125	133
Sub-Total	162	4318	1	118	11	2815	772	20257	114	3749	1060	31257	32317
26th	21	504	1	257	99	1542	1648	121	3951	4072
28th	21	482	1	403	104	2888	126	3773	3899
29th	29	447	2	32	2	136	92	2383	26	1616	151	4614	4765
32d	30	650	62	11	797	115	4084	17	578	173	6171	6344
33d	14	355	71	1	57	61	1596	40	2158	116	4237	4353
35th	27	555	4	64	2	446	207	5727	6	376	246	7168	7414
36th
37th	18	417	5	148	84	2420	26	375	128	3365	3493
42d	13	398	10	55	54	2413	27	703	94	3579	3673
Sub-Total	173	3808	7	501	17	2042	816	23053	142	7454	1155	36858	38013
77th	44	973	5	230	119	3629	17	544	185	5376	5561
78th	21	765	1	11	2	198	104	3138	54	1695	182	5805	5987
79th	35	666	43	2	1417	131	3982	22	466	190	6574	6764
80th	39	773	85	1	137	118	3072	50	1334	208	5401	5609
81st	11	167	1	56	6	28	592	6	165	46	986	1032
82d	34	741	7	178	9	385	116	3511	33	1260	199	6075	6274
89th	41	874	12	1	201	112	3249	39	1296	193	5632	5825
90th	19	609	18	6	267	68	2864	19	707	112	4465	4577
91st	36	850	10	1	100	132	3296	26	350	195	4606	4801
92d	2	36	7	3	181	5	45	10	269	279
Sub-Total	282	6454	9	413	27	2948	931	27514	271	7860	1520	45189	46709
Additional Totals	Field 147th Regt, 4	Artillery 29	Regts (66th Brig)	Regts serving with divisions.,	119th-120th-121st	Regts., (57th FA Brig)							
	4	1	12	207	3	18	19	255	274
TOTAL	621	14609	17	1032	55	7806	2531	71031	530	19081	3754	113559	117313

Compiled by Statistical Section AGO First Army.

CASUALTIES REPORTED BY DIVISIONS OF FIRST ARMY

ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE
September 11th-16th, 1918

Divisions	Killed		Known Prisoners		Missing		Wounded		Gassed		Total		Grand Total
	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	
1st	2	76	----	----	----	60	3	377	----	9	5	522	527
2d	9	186	----	12	----	292	34	1007	----	23	43	1520	1563
3d	----	2	----	----	----	----	----	9	----	----	----	11	11
4th	3	15	----	----	----	6	3	45	----	14	6	80	86
5th	11	274	----	2	1	72	36	1198	2	18	50	1564	1614
6th	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
7th	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Sub-Total	25	553	----	14	1	430	76	2636	2	64	104	3697	3801
26th	15	182	1	11	----	24	50	999	----	510	66	1726	1792
28th	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
29th	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
32d	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
33d	----	3	----	----	----	----	----	2	----	----	----	5	5
35th	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
36th	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
37th	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
42d	11	151	----	----	1	43	16	626	1	27	29	847	876
Sub-Total	26	336	1	11	1	67	66	1627	1	537	95	2578	2673
77th	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
78th	1	4	----	----	----	----	----	34	----	1	1	39	40
79th	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
80th	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
81st	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
82d	3	58	----	6	1	49	19	510	13	339	36	962	998
89th	14	135	----	----	----	4	31	682	6	205	51	1026	1077
90th	11	241	----	----	----	41	63	1599	14	442	88	2323	2411
91st	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
92d	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Sub-Total	29	438	----	6	1	94	113	2825	33	987	176	4350	4526
TOTALS	80	1327	1	31	3	591	255	7088	36	1588	375	10625	11000

